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ommander thought him guilty of proposing a great military blunder. On the 6th of January, McClellan wrote to Buell: Halleck, from his own accounts, will not soon be in condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland; and again on the 13th: Halleck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need, when you undertake the movement on Bowling Green. January 6th, McClellan wrote to Buell: My own general plans for the prosecution of the war, make the speedy occupation of eas, notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, made no effort to molest Grant, allowing him to continue the investment at his leisure, a blunder almost equal to that of opposing no obstacle to the march from Fort Henry. By the night of the 13th, Grant was established on a line of heights, in general parallel with the enemy's outworks, and extending for a distance of over three miles. Various spaces and elevations afforded positions for artillery, and from these he annoyed the enemy, but
in answer to which he said: I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding, as the only reply necessary. He had arrested officers for violation of these orders, and sent them to St. Louis to report to Halleck, more than a week previous. On the 13th, Halleck replied: You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington ask, is that you enforce discipline, and punish the disorderly. . . . . Instead of relieving you, nor one more gallant, despite his age. But Smith was sixty years old, and the exposure he underwent at Fort Donelson produced an illness, which proved fatal before the next summer. Halleck, meanwhile, continued his cautions to Grant. On the 13th, he telegraphed: Don't bring on any general engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear in force, our troops must fall back. And on the 16th: As the enemy is evidently in strong force, my instructions not to advance, so as to bring on a general eng
ntion to prevent it, and was immediately warned by his chief to leave nothing undone to avert the catastrophe. Grant's dispatches at this time bear witness to the constant anxiety the rebels occasioned him, and to the necessity for a sleepless and stubborn vigilance. On the 9th of September, he said: Should the enemy come, I will be as ready as possible with the means at hand. I do not believe that a force can be brought against us at present that cannot be successfully resisted. On the 13th, Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, twenty-one miles east of Corinth; Colonel Murphy, who was in command, making no resistance, but evacuating the place on the approach of the enemy. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the 15th: If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses Bear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will pre. vent the design either to go north, or to unite forces and attack here. Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had rep
rapidly, I will attack as I am. On the 10th, he got more restive, and inquired: Am I to understand that I lie here still, while an expedition is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman subject to my orders, or is he and his force reserved for some special service? Halleck replied promptly: You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have permission to fight the enemy when you please. This was on the 12th, and on the 13th, Grant's cavalry entered Holly Springs, driving the enemy south of the Tallahatchie. On the 14th, he informed Sherman: I have now complete control of my department, and accordingly ordered him to move with two divisions of twelve full regiments each, and, if possible, with three divisions, to Oxford, or the Tallahatchie, as soon as possible. 1 am now ready to move from here (La Grange), any day, and only await your movements. Sherman was to notify Grant when he could march, and to which o
ambition and conceit of his subordinate, he had given him command of the advance, and charged him with an operation, which, if successful, would have rendered McClernand famous at once. On the 12th of April, he wrote to that officer: It is my desire that you should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest practicable moment. . . . I wanted particularly to see you about the facilities for getting troops from Smith's plantation to New Carthage, and the chances for embarking there. On the 13th: It is not desirable that you should move in any direction from Grand Gulf, but remain under the protection of the gun. boats. The present plan, if not changed by the movements of the enemy, will be to hold Grand Gulf. On the 18th: I would still repeat former instructions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at the earliest possible moment. Again: I will be over here in a few days again, and hope it will be my good fortune to find you in safe possession of Grand Gulf. But McClernand's
e road north of Fourteen-mile creek, to this place (Dillon's), and on to Raymond. It was fortunate that Grant acted with such promptness, for, on the night of the 13th, Johnston arrived at Jackson, and took supreme command of all the rebel forces in the state; and he was a man of far more genius and energy than his subordinate. the east; for he had urged the rebel government to make every effort, if they hoped to retain Vicksburg and the command of the Mississippi. Ascertaining, on the 13th, the approach of the national army, Johnston that night ordered Pemberton, who was now at Edward's station, Pemberton did not arrive in person at Edward's till his whole force in an attack both in front and rear of Grant. But the movements of the national commander were not cooperative with those of the enemy. On the 13th, in obedience to orders, McPherson moved cautiously but rapidly towards Clinton, for it was important to deprive the rebels as speedily as possible of the use of
hope, he telegraphed to the rebel president that it was impossible to stand a siege. If the enemy will not attack, we must, or, at the last moment, withdraw. We cannot attack seriously without risking the army. Brisk skirmishing and light cannonading continued for several days; and on the 12th, an affair occurred in which Lauman's division only was engaged; it resulted in the loss of nearly five hundred men to Sherman, and was occasioned by Lauman's misinterpretation of his orders. On the 13th, both flanks of the army extended to the Pearl river, and Sherman sent back for ammunition for a siege. On the 12th and 13th, three thousand rounds of ammunition were thrown into Jackson, and on the 14th, Johnston telegraphed that he should be compelled to abandon the place. It would be madness to attack. Meanwhile, Sherman sent out expeditions to the right and left, destroying the railroads in every direction—cars, locomotives, turn-tables, and shops, as well as tracks and bridges—and d
dgeport, with your four divisions. I want your command to aid in a movement to force the enemy back from their present position, and to make Burnside secure in his. He proceeded at once with his four divisions, along different roads, and, on the 13th, at night, arrived at Bridgeport. From that point, he immediately telegraphed his arrival to the commanding general, and was summoned in person to Chattanooga. This urgency of Grant had been caused by the movements of Bragg. As soon as the re, we will probably suffer very much during the winter, even if we are able to keep possession of the country. We are threatened by a considerable force of the enemy on each flank, but I have no serious apprehension of immediate trouble. On the 13th, he informed Grant that Longstreet was certainly on the Tennessee, opposite Loudon, with Wheeler's cavalry, and intending to cross the river. Burnside, accordingly, proposed to concentrate his forces and fall back, so as to draw Longstreet as far
ollowing day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and reenforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On the evening of the 13th, the gunboats and reenforcements arrived. On the 14th, a gallant attack was made by Flag-Officer Foote upon the enemy's river batteries with his fleet. The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably, when tral orders, no. 2. headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst. For four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safegu
t trophies of that victory. Hastening to bridge the south branch of Bayou Pierre, at Port Gibson, you crossed on the morning of the 3d, and pushed on to Willow springs, Big Sandy, and the main crossing of Fourteen-mile creek, four miles from Edward's station. A detachment of the enemy was immediately driven away from the crossing, and you advanced, passed over, and rested during the night of the 12th, within three miles of the enemy in large force at that station. On the morning of the 13th, the objective point of the army's movement having been changed from Edward's station to Jackson, in pursuance of an order from the commander of the department, you moved on the north side of Fourteen-mile creek towards Raymond. This delicate and hazardous movement was executed by a portion of your numbers under cover of Hovey's division, which made a feint of attack, in line of battle, upon Edward's station. Too late to harm you, the enemy attacked the rear of that division, but was prom