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ore an exit could be made and supplies obtained. But the rebels at once attacked the national railroad south of the Etowa, and Sherman was obliged to follow with his army. His whole attention for a while was concentrated upon the rear, and the new suggestion remained for a week or more unanswered. During this time, however, Grant was considering Sherman's future and arranging to facilitate his operations, though without his knowledge. Sherman's telegram was dated October 1st, and on the 4th, the general-in-chief wrote to Halleck: When this campaign was commenced nothing else was in contemplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile. Drawing the Nineteenth corps from Canby, however, and the movements of Kirby Smith demanding the presence of all of Canby's surplus forces in another direction, has made it impossible to carry out the plan as early as was contemplated. Any considerable force to co-operate with Sherman on the sea-coast must
an advance, make it. No further movement of importance, however, occurred on either front. The enemy modified his defensive line north of the James, and Grant strengthened Fort Harrison and turned its guns against those who had constructed it, while Butler pushed out his cavalry as far as the fortifications on the Charles City road; but neither army attempted another assault. On the 1st of October, Warren and Gregg were each attacked on the extreme left, but each repulsed the enemy; on the 2nd, Meade advanced his whole force and discovered the rebels, withdrawn to their main line, and refusing battle outside of fortifications. The necessary works were then laid out, and the national line was extended from the Weldon road to the position gained at Peeble's farm. This was a little more than a mile from the Boydtown road, and not more than two miles from the Southside railroad. In these operations there were about sixty-six thousand men engaged on a side. Butler lost on the 29t
October 18th (search for this): chapter 2
nal forces had achieved in every other theatre of war. It was this that made Grant pause; it was this that alarmed the government, which opposed the movement from the beginning. It was this that made Thomas himself declare that he did not wish to be left behind to command the forces in defence of Tennessee. There is one thing, however, I don't wish — to be in command of the defence of Tennessee, unless you and the authorities in Washington deem it absolutely necessary.—Thomas to Sherman, October 18. It was this that made the great and supreme responsibility which the general-in-chief alone could and did assume. Sherman's proposed attempt was like, and also unlike, Grant's Vicksburg campaign. It was like, because it was abandoning one base, and seeking another; plunging into an enemy's country, and relying on a hostile region for resources. It was unlike, because Sherman did not expect an enemy in his front, while Grant penetrated between two hostile forces; and because Sherman w
August 13th (search for this): chapter 2
ce to Mobile bay, and during the month of August all the defences of the harbor were either evacuated or surrendered. By the 23rd, the fleet had complete possession of the bay, but the city itself remained in the hands of the rebels. On the 13th of August, rumors of these events reached Sherman, at that time contemplating his final circuit around Atlanta, and he telegraphed at once: If there be any possibility of Admiral Farragut and the land forces under Gordon Granger taking Mobile, and furmery, my best plan would be to wait awhile, as now, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there. This was just at the time when Hood's cavalry under Wheeler had been sent to cut the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and on the 13th of August, Sherman learned that Wheeler was threatening Dalton. Before cutting loose, as proposed, he continued, I would like to know the chance of my getting the use of the Alabama river. I could easily break up the railroad back to Chattanooga, and
August 17th (search for this): chapter 2
f the plan which occurred to his subordinate. As it was, the thought had passed between them, and was for weeks developing before it took actual and definite form; affected, in the first place, by the idiosyncrasies of each, and afterwards, as the thoughts and plans of all great soldiers are, by the varying circumstances of war; and in this instance, especially liable to change, when so many campaigns were combined and involved, and so many and distant armies were cooperating. On the 17th of August, Sherman reverted to the primitive idea: We must have the Alabama river . . . but of course I must trust to Admiral Farragut and General Canby. To Canby he said on the same day: If possible, the Alabama river should be possessed by us in connection with my movements. I could easily open communication with Montgomery. On the 4th of September, after Atlanta had fallen, he proposed that he and Canby should each be reinforced by fifty thousand men; that Canby should move to Montgomery, an
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