Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. You can also browse the collection for 13th or search for 13th in all documents.

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o far as I can learn, was to send a column direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. This was frustrated by Early being compelled to fall back, and your operations on the north side of the James.—Sheridan to Grant, August, 20. Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasburg. The road between was held by Sheridan; but Masanutten mountain also intervened, and concealed the presence of Anderson. FitzLee therefore rode across the mountain i
pi, he fully intended to turn and crush Pemberton, as soon as Johnston was destroyed. Had he been in Sherman's place now, he would have been quite as determined to make the march, but not until Hood was annihilated. He felt, however, that he was able to supervise all; to provide troops for Thomas sufficient to withstand Hood, and supplies to meet Sherman when he emerged; and his confidence in Sherman's generalship determined him to permit the move. Such an army, he said to Stanton on the 13th, and with such a commander, is hard to corner or to capture. This confidence was reciprocal. If Sherman could not have reposed absolutely on Grant, if he had not felt certain that the chief would provide supplies to meet him, wherever, on the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico, he should strike the coast; if he had not been equally sure that Grant would protect the forces and the country that were left behind—he would no more have attempted the march than Grant would have allowed it, without h
stimate of Fitz-Lee or Lomax's strength, and says not a word of Breckenridge or the reserves; but declares that these reinforcements about made up my losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill. The returns, however, tell a different tale. The latest from these commands, prior to Sept. 27, were as follows:— July 10Fitz-Lee1,706 effective. Aug. 31Kershaw3,445 effective. Sept. 10Lomax3,568 effective. Breckenridge succeeded late in September to the command in South-West Virginia, and on the 13th of that month, Echols, his predecessor, reported 3,904 effective men. I can find no return of Rosser's force, nor of the reserves; but Grant telegraphed to Halleck, Sept. 30: Rosser's brigade of cavalry has gone to Early. The brigade numbered 1,400 men. It has already been shown that the rebels never include the reserves in any statement of their strength, although these were always put into battle, and fought as well as any. Early speaks, page 97 of his Memoir, of two companies of reserv
e road. On reflection, he said, I think better of your proposition. It will be much better to go south than to be forced to go north. You will no doubt clear the country where you go, of railroad tracks and supplies. I would also move every wagon, horse, mule, and hoof of stock, as well as the negroes. As far as arms can be supplied, either from surplus or by capture, I would put them in the hands of negro men. Give them such organization, as you can. They will be of some use. On the 13th, at 3.30 P. M., he announced his decision to the government. On mature reflection, I believe Sherman's proposition is the best that can be adopted. With the long line of railroad in rear of Atlanta, Sherman cannot maintain his position. If he cuts loose, destroying the road from Chattanooga forward, he leaves a wide and destitute country to pass, before reaching territory now held by us. Thomas could retain force enough to meet Hood's army, if it took the other and more likely course. The
hed, with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the number of horses falling with their riders on the roads. Under these circumstances, I believe an attack at this time would only result in an useless sacrifice of life. On the 13th, again: There is no change in the weather, and as soon as there is, I shall move against the enemy, as everything is ready and prepared to assume the offensive. On the 14th, at 12.30 P. M., Halleck telegraphed, without Grant's knowledge, but dooved to the Ohio, and compelled Thomas to follow, that officer would never have been forgiven. As it was, the rebels lived upon the country for a fortnight; On the 12th, Forrest destroyed the railroad from Lavergne to Murfreesboroa, and on the 13th, captured a train of 17 cars loaded with 60,000 rations sent from Stevenson, and 200 prisoners. they fortified strongly in front of Nashville, and doubled the loss of life that Thomas incurred to oust them; they gave extreme uneasiness to the coun
tle sound, a long and shallow piece of water, separated from the ocean by a sandspit not more than a hundred yards across. Since the bombardment on Christmas day, Hoke had remained with his division in the neighborhood of Wilmington, and on the 13th, during the landing, he approached the shore, and drew up his troops parallel with Terry's command, to watch, and, if possible, intercept the operation; but the cover afforded by the naval fire prevented the rebels from offering any opposition; ast Cause, and Southern History of the War; also, correspondence of the London Times.—Charleston and Wilmington, 1864-5. Porter this day pursued a somewhat different plan from that he had adopted at the first bombardment. At half-past 7 on the 13th, he sent the iron-clads in alone, thus tempting the enemy to engage them that he might ascertain what guns the rebels had, and be able to dismount them; for so much had been said about the guns not being dismounted, although silenced, in the first
ginia Central railroad, and possibly the canal, when the weather will permit you to move. On the 13th, however, he said: I do not care about your moving until the weather and roads are such as to givr four or five days, I can have the cavalry in the right place. To Sheridan he said, also on the 13th: Information just received from Richmond indicates that everything was being sent from there to Lu can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken. On the 13th, he said to Halleck: I received a letter from General Canby to-day, of the 1st of March. At thatr, his wagons were arriving, and he was going to start without waiting for full supplies. On the 13th, he said, also to Stanton: I am in receipt of a letter of the 7th, from General Schofield. At th or cotton parapets to carry, and cypress swamps to cross; but nothing stayed his course. On the 13th, he learned that there was no enemy in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. Hardee, at Charleston,
ugurated on the same day. These astounding events imposed unforeseen and important duties on all connected with the government, and Grant, of course, remained at the capital. Meanwhile, the expected sequel to the surrender of Lee had come to pass. On the 10th of April, in obedience to Grant's orders to push on and finish the job with Lee and Johnston's armies, Sherman advanced against Smithfield, and Johnston at once retreated rapidly through Raleigh, which place Sherman entered on the 13th. On the 14th, he received a message from Johnston, dictated by Jefferson Davis, who was living in a box car on the railroad, at Greensboro, the inhabitants refusing him any other shelter. The rebels had learned the surrender of Lee, and their communication was to inquire whether Sherman was willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he would take like action in re
E. Lee, commanding Army of Northern Virginia: General: The telegraph has already informed you of the disaster of the 19th. I now write to give you a fuller account of the matter. Having received information that the enemy was continuing to repair the Manassas road, and that he had moved back from Fisher's Hill, I moved on the 12th towards Strasburg, for the purpose of endeavoring to thwart his purposes if he should contemplate moving across the Ridge, or sending troops to Grant. On the 13th I made a reconnoissance in force beyond Strasburg, and found the enemy on the north bank of Cedar creek, and on both sides of the pike; this was too strong a position to attack in front; I therefore encamped my force at Fisher's Hill, and waited to see whether the enemy would move; but he commenced fortifying. On the night of the 16th, Rosser, with two brigades of cavalry and a brigade of infantry mounted behind his men, was sent around the left to surprise what was reported by his scouts t