Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for Washington or search for Washington in all documents.

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nce were, after all, few in number; and, as usual, the men who talked the loudest were laggard in action. But above all, at this crisis, the victory of Atlanta revived the drooping spirits of the nation and gave stamina to the government; and coming, as it did, the very day after McClellan's nomination, was a disastrous blow to the Democrats. Volunteering at once revived, and troops again began pouring into the armies. Meanwhile, the country and even the government still believed that Washington was in danger. It has, however, already been seen that from the outset all of Grant's orders and plans had contemplated the complete protection of the capital. The route from the Rapidan had been selected with this view, and the expedition of Sigel was especially intended to close the avenue which the Shenandoah Valley would otherwise offer to the enemy. The movements of the Wilderness campaign, the constant retreat of Lee and the advance of Grant after every battle, had accomplished th
ng for developments at the other end of his line. At 3.50 P. M., he said to Butler: I send you a despatch just received from General Meade. It would seem probable the enemy have sent but one division from Petersburg. It would be well under such circumstances to hold all the ground we can to-night, and feel out to the right in the morning. During the day, the President sent an anxious despatch about Sheridan, who had reached the head of the Valley and could no longer communicate with Washington. To this Grant replied: I am taking steps to prevent Lee sending reinforcements to Early, by attacking him here. At four o'clock, he telegraphed again: I did not expect to carry Richmond, but was in hopes of causing the enemy so to weaken the garrison of Petersburg as to be able to carry that place. The great object, however, is to prevent the enemy sending reinforcements to Early: and still later: Operations to-day prevented getting Richmond papers, Information in regard to national
nced Grant, they never seemed to occur to him. He went on soberly and steadily with his work, careless whether it brought him into prominence or left him in the shade; and as glad of any success of the national cause when won by another, as if it had been his own. Nevertheless, when events over the whole theatre of war were ripe; when Sherman should have reached a base, and the rebel army at the West be destroyed or rendered harmless; when the Presidential election should be over, while Washington remained secure against attacks from the Shenandoah—then, if the extension had not yet reached Lee's last line of supply, Grant intended to force the hand of Lee. He was like a chess-player, looking forward to a daring, but if successful, a finishing move, and clearing the board in advance of the pieces of his adversary which might obstruct his plan. When he telegraphed to Stanton: This reconnoissance, which I had meant for more, points out to me what is to be done, he meant, if Lee's lin
ght him by far the greatest man who had occupied the Presidential chair since Washington. And in those qualities not purely intellectual, and yet far from devoid of sand. His enemies were ten times as numerous in the field as those with whom Washington contended. He had the great problem of emancipation to solve, which was not presented to Washington. He had a violent, numerous, dangerous party in his rear, constantly watching to thwart and defeat him; and though Washington knew something Washington knew something of this difficulty, the opposition to him was insignificant compared with that offered to Lincoln. America in Washington's time was an isolated and inconsiderable co. On the 14th of October, when Sherman was at Resaca, Grant telegraphed to Washington: It looks to me now that Hood has put himself into a position where his army homas, however, knew what was expected of him, and sent frequent telegrams to Washington, assuring the general-in-chief and the government of his own anxiety to under
fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme. The next day Sherman published an order to his troops, beginning: The general commanding announces to the army a suspension of hostilities, and an agreement with General Johnston and high officials, which, when formally ratified, will make peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. A messenger was instantly sent to convey these terms to Washington, under cover to Grant. The dispatches were received by the general-in-chief on the night of April 21st. He at once perceived that the terms were such as could not possibly be approved, and accordingly wrote the following note to the Secretary of War: I have received and just completed reading the dispatches brought by the special messenger from General Sherman. They are of such importance that I think immediate action should be taken on them, and that it should be done by the President
e lust for power in political minds is the strongest passion of life, and impels ambitious men ( Richard III. ) to deeds of infamy. Ever your friend, W. T. Sherman. Endorsement by General Sherman on above. March 16, 1876. I recall from the within letter the feelings of bitterness that filled my soul at that dread epoch of time. The letter must have been written hastily and in absolute confidence — a confidence in General Grant that I then felt and still feel. Because I sent to Washington terms that recognized the war as over, and promising the subjugated enemy a treatment that would have been the extreme of generosity and wisdom, I was denounced by the Secretary of War as a traitor, and my own soldiers commanded to disobey my orders; and this denunciation was spread broadcast over the world. Now, after twelve long eventful years of political acrimony, we find ourselves compelled to return to the same point of history, or else permit the enemy of that day to become the a