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rally such, are not a very great number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior,The text is: ei) de\ mh\ ou) xei/rwn. The sense seems to be: Epictetus is not superior to Socrates, but if he is not worse, that is enough for me. On the different readings of the passage and on the sense, see the notes in Schweig.'s edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative mh/. this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, Epp. i. 1, 28, &c.: Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra. and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.
, but if he is not worse, that is enough for me. On the different readings of the passage and on the sense, see the notes in Schweig.'s edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative mh/. this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, Epp. i. 1, 28, &c.: Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra. and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in aon the sense, see the notes in Schweig.'s edition. The difficulty, if there is any, is in the negative mh/. this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo,Milo of Croton, a great athlete. The conclusion is the same as in Horace, Epp. i. 1, 28, &c.: Est quodam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra. and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.
Upton (United Kingdom) (search for this): text disc, book 1
; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal? Seeo(ra=te kai\ prose/xete mh/ ti tou/twn a)pobh=te tw=n a)tuxhma/twn. Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6: o(ra=te kai\ prose/xete a)po\ th=s zu/mhs, Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching. Schweighaeuser al than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal? Seeo(ra=te kai\ prose/xete mh/ ti tou/twn a)pobh=te tw=n a)tuxhma/twn. Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6: o(ra=te kai\ prose/xete a)po\ th=s zu/mhs, Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which Epictetus was teaching. Schweighaeuser also refers to Wetstein's New Testament. then and take care that you do not become some one of these miserable things.
Jupiter (Canada) (search for this): text disc, book 1
How a man should proceed from the principle of god being the father of all men to the rest. IF a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he ought, that we are all sprung from GodEpictetus speaks of God o( qeo/s and the gods. Also conformably to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. Father of men and gods, says Homer of Zeus; and Virgil says of Jupiter, Father of gods and king of men. Salmasius proposed a)po\ tou= qeou=. See Schweig.'s note. in an especial manner, and that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man, body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence
progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word suggra/mmata means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B. C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What ki
Cilicia (Turkey) (search for this): text disc, book 1
rfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word suggra/mmata means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B. C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are
Seneca (Ohio, United States) (search for this): text disc, book 1
Of progress or improvement. HE who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happinessto\ eu)/roun or h( eu)/roia is translated happiness. The notion is that of flowing easily, as Seneca (Epp. 120) explains it: beata vita, secundo defluens cursu. and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it,u(perte/qeitai. The Latin translation is: in futurum tempus rejicit. Wolf says: Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est: philosophies tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium. but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with s
Athens (Greece) (search for this): text disc, book 1
nt. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word suggra/mmata means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B. C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress. What kind of progress? But why do you mock the ma
oint the perfecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word suggra/mmata means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B. C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir
Tarsus (Turkey) (search for this): text disc, book 1
ything leads us, progress is an approach towards this point. How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improvement? Is it he who has read many books of Chrysippus?Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii.) states that Chrysippus wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word suggra/mmata means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, in B. C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. But does virtue consist in having understood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress or improvement. Such a person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great pr
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