of public, interest.
The negligence which could expose Sheridan's victorious army to the possibility of such a surprise, humiliation and rout, especially after the distinct warning of three days before, stands without explanation, and without excuse.
Forty-one hundred men killed and wounded are a heavy price to pay for the failure to keep one's eyes open, and make a timely reconnoissance.
Early's neglect to relentlessly press his advantage during the forenoon of the 19th, before Sheridan reached the field, and while there was in his immediate front, for much of the time, only one battered division of infantry and two divisions of cavalry, indicates that he was overcome with causeless timidity in the hour of his greatest triumph — an experience not uncommon to commanders whose persistent courage (not personal bravery) in the open field does not equal their genius for unusual strategic enterprises.
Several of Early's most intelligent subordinates attribute the