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January 15th (search for this): chapter 8.81
g party, under Major Chivington, of the 1st Colorado Volunteers, and Captain W. H. Lewis, 5th U. S. Infantry, succeeded in destroying the Texan train. The rumor is said to have spread among the Texans that they were being attacked in rear by Canby's column. This caused a panic among part of their force, and prevented an effective pursuit of Slough's defeated troops. After the junction with the troops from Fort Union, and the overtaking and surprising of the enemy at Peralta, on the 15th of January, Canby had it in his power to capture the entire column. But this was impracticable, because he could not have fed his prisoners. The country was stripped of provisions of all sorts, his own troops were on short rations, and he was at Peralta, one thousand miles from his base of supplies. His only alternative was to force the Texans into their disastrous retreat. The account of the battle of Valverde in Greeley's American conflict is erroneous in two important statements. First,
January 21st (search for this): chapter 8.81
hould the enemy refuse to attack us in any of these strong positions until he passed Albuquerque, Canby could then form a junction with the reinforcements at Fort Union, and Sibley's fate would have been sealed. The late Major H. R. Selden, who was present at the meeting, is the w riter's authority for this outline of Canby's intended plan of campaign. This plan was marred at the very outset by the impetuosity of that rash old fighter, Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Roberts, who, at Valverde, January 21st, precipitated a decisive engagement with the enemy, where the latter had the advantage of position. It must be said in justice to Colonel Roberts, however, that had not two of his subordinates shown a lack of their commander's dash, the result of that day's battle would have been different. Mr. Pettis intimates that all went well on the field until Canby arrived. Such was not the case. Roberts had failed to dislodge the enemy from his strong position behind the sand hills. Had it not
March 28th (search for this): chapter 8.81
For this, of course, Canby was not responsible. His plan of pivoting on his left and doubling up the enemy's left flank so as to sweep him out of his natural intrenchment was an admirable one. After the reverse at Valverde nothing remained for Canby but to strive for a junction with the troops at Fort Union. In this he was thwarted for a time by the fact that Colonel John P. Slough, against his instructions, brought on a decisive engagement with the enemy at Cañon Glorietta on the 28th of March. Slough's main force was driven from the field, and the defeat would have been a disastrous one had not the flanking party, under Major Chivington, of the 1st Colorado Volunteers, and Captain W. H. Lewis, 5th U. S. Infantry, succeeded in destroying the Texan train. The rumor is said to have spread among the Texans that they were being attacked in rear by Canby's column. This caused a panic among part of their force, and prevented an effective pursuit of Slough's defeated troops. Af
September 20th (search for this): chapter 8.81
o escape capture had it been routed. However superb the material of which the California volunteers were composed, A remarkable march through the hostile Indian country of Arizona to join Canby was made by eleven companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and two batteries, under Colonel J. H. Carleton, which were dispatched by General George Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific, overland from Southern California. The column started April 13th, 1862, and arrived at Santa Fe; September 20th.--Editors. they were raw troops and would have been confronted by larger numbers of men, many of them already seasoned to war in a victorious campaign, who would, moreover, have been compelled to fight with desperation because they had the desert at their backs. It is true the fortunes of war are uncertain, and none of these things might have happened; but, in view of the above facts, the probabilities seem altogether in favor of the success of the Confederates, backed by an army which
1200 AD (search for this): chapter 8.81
o, Arizona, and Utah--and, above all, the possession of the gold supply of the Pacific coast, a source of strength considered by Mr. Lincoln to be essential to the successful prosecution of the war. The truth of this view will be apparent when we consider what the relative positions of the two governments would have been had Sibley succeeded in his enterprise. The Confederacy would have controlled the Gulf of California alnd the two finest harbors on the Pacific coast with a coast-line of 1200 or 1500 miles. The conquest alone of this vast domain, in all probability,would have insured the recognition of the Confederacy by the European powers. Owing to the remoteness of this coast it would have been impossible for us to have effectually blockaded it. In fact the Confederates could have overpowered us in the Pacific Ocean, as all the advantages of position and materials would have been on their side. Finally, the current of gold, that, according to Mr. Lincoln, formed the life-bloo
April 13th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 8.81
it would have been very difficult for it to escape capture had it been routed. However superb the material of which the California volunteers were composed, A remarkable march through the hostile Indian country of Arizona to join Canby was made by eleven companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and two batteries, under Colonel J. H. Carleton, which were dispatched by General George Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific, overland from Southern California. The column started April 13th, 1862, and arrived at Santa Fe; September 20th.--Editors. they were raw troops and would have been confronted by larger numbers of men, many of them already seasoned to war in a victorious campaign, who would, moreover, have been compelled to fight with desperation because they had the desert at their backs. It is true the fortunes of war are uncertain, and none of these things might have happened; but, in view of the above facts, the probabilities seem altogether in favor of the success of
Latham Anderson (search for this): chapter 8.81
Canby's services in the New Mexican campaign. by Latham Anderson, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. The account in this work by Captain Pettis of The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona, For Captain Pettis's article and accompanying maps, see Vol. II., p. 103.--Editors. is accurate as to most details. It is open to criticism, however, in two particulars: it fails to recognize the political as well as the military importance of the campaign, and it does injustice to General Canby. The remote and unimportant territory of New Mexico was not the real objective of this invasion. The Confederate leaders were striking at much higher game — no less than the conquest of California, Sonora, Chihuahua, New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah--and, above all, the possession of the gold supply of the Pacific coast, a source of strength considered by Mr. Lincoln to be essential to the successful prosecution of the war. The truth of this view will be apparent when we consider wha
John R. Baylor (search for this): chapter 8.81
This was quickly followed by the intelligence that two expeditions were forming to attack him,--one in Northern Texas under Van Dorn, to enter by the Canadian route against Fort Union; the other at San Antonio, under Sibley, intended to reinforce Baylor at El Paso. He was therefore compelled to keep a strong force at Fort Union, another at Fort Craig, and to hold a third at an intermediate point whence he could succor the division first attacked. This prevented him from acting aggressively against Baylor early in the campaign. After Sibley had passed Fort Craig, Canby called a meeting of his senior officers and outlined to them his plan of campaign, which was to follow the enemy closely in his march up the valley, harass him in front, flanks, and rear with the irregular troops and cavalry — burn or remove all supplies in his front, but avoid a general engagement, except where the position was strongly in our favor. The numerous adobe villages along the line gave admirable opportuni
Edward R. S. Canby (search for this): chapter 8.81
Canby's services in the New Mexican campaign. by Latham Anderson, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. the hostile Indian country of Arizona to join Canby was made by eleven companies of infantry, two etailed account of that retreat. Soon after Canby assumed command of the department, and before ng out this plan at intervals of a few miles. Canby had no confidence in the capacity of the New M strong positions until he passed Albuquerque, Canby could then form a junction with the reinforcemis the w riter's authority for this outline of Canby's intended plan of campaign. This plan was ma move forward into line. For this, of course, Canby was not responsible. His plan of pivoting on r the reverse at Valverde nothing remained for Canby but to strive for a junction with the troops aexans that they were being attacked in rear by Canby's column. This caused a panic among part of t the enemy at Peralta, on the 15th of January, Canby had it in his power to capture the entire colu[4 more...]
James H. Carleton (search for this): chapter 8.81
ander to meet Sibley with equal forces. For the Union army defeat under these circumstances in Southern California would have been defeat in an enemy's country, and it would have been very difficult for it to escape capture had it been routed. However superb the material of which the California volunteers were composed, A remarkable march through the hostile Indian country of Arizona to join Canby was made by eleven companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and two batteries, under Colonel J. H. Carleton, which were dispatched by General George Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific, overland from Southern California. The column started April 13th, 1862, and arrived at Santa Fe; September 20th.--Editors. they were raw troops and would have been confronted by larger numbers of men, many of them already seasoned to war in a victorious campaign, who would, moreover, have been compelled to fight with desperation because they had the desert at their backs. It is true the fortu
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