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oved to Yanceyville, on the South Anna, where we were joined by General Gregg, Colonel Wyndham, and Captains Merritt and Drummond, each with his command. The operations of the column under General Averell are thus described by him in a communication to the editors dated May 11th, 1888: We encountered the enemy's cavalry, two thousand strong, under General W. H. F. Lee on the morning of the 30th, and drove it through Culpeper Court House in the direction of Rapidan Station. On the 1st we pressed the enemy's cavalry and pushed our right to within three miles of Orange Court House in an effort to dislodge the enemy from a strong position occupied by him on the south bank of the Rapidan, after he had crossed and destroyed the bridge. While thus engaged on the morning of the 2d we were recalled to the Army of the Potomac at U. S. Ford by orders from General Hooker. We reached Ely's Ford of the Rapidan after dark on the evening of the 2d, and were fired upon by the enemy's
urg. Thus suddenly ended Ewell's Harrisburg The Lutheran Seminary. The upper picture from a War-time photograph. Both pictures show the face of the seminary toward the town, and in the right-hand view is seen the Chambersburg Pike. On the first day, Buford and Reynolds used the cupola for observations; thereafter it was the chief signal-station and observatory for the Confederates--editors. expedition. One object was to collect supplies, and contributions were accordingly levied. Muc, being well fortified and sufficiently garrisoned, or with available troops within reach, without drawing on Hooker; and to take Richmond and scatter the Confederate Government was the surest way to ruin Lee's army--his true objective. On the first appearance of danger of invasion, Pennsylvania's vigilant governor, Curtin, warned the people of the State and called out the militia. General Couch was sent to Harrisburg to organize and command them, but disbelief in the danger — due to previo
the 1st and again on the morning of the 2d. General Wilcox confesses want of personal information of the order for daylight or early attack, but expresses his confidence that the order was given. That is, he, occupying our extreme right on the 1st, on picket at a point considerably west of the Emmitsburg road, believes that General Lee ordered troops some fifteen or twenty miles off, and yet on the march, to pass his picket guard in the night to the point of attack, east of the Emmitsburg r experience knows that the best of veteran soldiers, with bloody noses from a fresh battle, are never equal to those going in fresh in their first stroke of the battle. Had Pickett's men gone through the same experience as the other troops on the 1st, they could not have felt the same zest for fighting that they did coming up fresh and feeling disparaged that the army had won new laurels in their absence. There is no doubt that the North Carolinians did as well as any soldiers could have done
n that of General A. L. Long, then military secretary to General Lee. He says in his recently published Memoirs of R. E. Lee (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st, when General Lee had decided not to renew the attack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill: Gentlemen, we will attack the 9 A. M., at Longstreet's delay. General Longstreet is wrong, too, in giving the impression that his divisions were fifteen or twenty miles away on the night of the 1st, for in his official report he says that McLaws's division . . . reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division [except L, not to command his corps). No time need be wasted on these. The fact is that General Longstreet, though knowing fully the condition of things on the night of the 1st, knowing that Lee had decided to attack that part of the Federal army in his front, knowing that every hour strengthened Meade and diminished the chances of Confede
ithdraw, in order to rejoin its own corps, the Twelfth, on the extreme right. Little Round Top, which forms a natural bastion, enfilading the low curtain known as Cemetery Ridge, strongly attracted the attention of Hancock on the afternoon of the 1st, and he dispatched that division, the first of the Twelfth Corps to arrive, with instructions to take position on the left of the First Corps and extend its own left to the hill. These instructions Geary had intelligently carried out, some of hisGeneral Meade testified as follows; I deny under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be known — I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies, which the future should develop during the course of the day, might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. Of the witnesses referred to by General Meade
and three were captured and burnt by his vessels. Navigation in the Yazoo Valley was broken up, and the destruction of military supplies and provisions was enormous. During Grant's assault on the 22d of May, the fleet below Vicksburg kept up a heavy fire on the hill and water batteries, and during the siege the mortar-boats were incessantly at work, shelling the city and the batteries. From time to time the gun-boats joined in the bombardment, notably on May 27th and June 20th. On the first of these occasions, the Cincinnati, Lieutenant George M. Bache, engaged alone the battery on Fort Hill, the principal work above Vicksburg, while the other iron-clads, under Commander Woodworth, were similarly occupied below. The fire from the upper battery was too much for the Cincinnati, which sank not far from the shore, losing a considerable number of her crew. On the second occasion three heavy guns mounted on scows were placed in position on the point opposite Vicksburg, where they d
at helped me more. (McCook was too far away for any protection to my flank.) Rousseau's men were driven out of the woods, a regular dense thicket, and Shepherd's regu lars suffered fearfully in there. They moved in by the head of column. There was no fighting of consequence on the 1st of January. The last attack made by the enemy was upon my extreme left, on the 2d of January, and it was disastrous to them. Van Cleve's division, under Colonel Samuel Beatty, had crossed the river on the 1st, and Grose and Hazen had followed with their brigades on the 2d. The fight opened on Colonel Beatty's line and lasted about twenty minutes. Before this battle I had been inclined to underrate the importance of artillery in our war, but I never knew that arm to render such important service as at this point. The sound judgment, bravery, and skill of Major John Mendenhall, who was my chief-of-artillery, enabled me to open 58 guns almost simultaneously on Breckinridge's men and to turn a dashi
pply. The cartridge-boxes of both our own and the enemy's dead within reach had been emptied by our men. When it was not yet 6 o'clock, and Thomas was still on the left of his line, Brannan rushed up to Granger, saying, The enemy are forming for another assault; we have not another round of ammunition — what shall we do? Fix bayonets and go for them, was the reply. Along the whole line ran the order, Fix bayonets. On came the enemy — our men were lying down. Forward, was sounded. In one instant they were on their feet. Forward they went to meet the charge. The enemy fled. So impetuous was this counter-charge that one regiment, with empty muskets and empty cartridge-boxes, broke through the enemy's line, which, closing in their rear, carried them off as in the undertow. One more feeble assault was made by the enemy; then the day closed, and the battle of Chickamauga was over. Of the 3700 men of the Reserve Corps who went into the battle that afternoon, 1175 were killed and
by excellent interior roads, and favorable ground for battle was available wherever attack was probable. The base at Bryantsville was secure, and was an exceedingly strong natural position. The aggregate strength of the Confederate armies was little, if any, less than 61,000 men. On October 1st Buell moved out of Louisville with 58,000 effective men, of whom 22,000 were raw troops. Under the impression that Buell was about to throw his entire army upon Smith at Frankfort, Bragg, on the 2d, ordered Polk to march with the Army of the Mississippi from Bardstown via Bloomfield toward Frankfort in order that he might strike the enemy in rear, while Kirby Smith should assail him in front. Until the 7th he remained apparently under the impression that Buell was advancing to attack Smith. But on the evening of the 7th, Gilbert, in command of Buell's center, came in contact with Hardee near Perryville, and compelled him to prepare for action. Hardee called for reinforcements, and Che
ted, and there was no more evidence of his approach than at first. He was, of course, to be expected any day, but he might not come in two weeks. Under the circumstances it was plainly necessary to concentrate nearer Nashville, where we could get to work on the railroad, and at the same time be ready for the enemy when he should come. Orders were accordingly given on the 30th of August for concentrating at Murfreesboro' on the 5th of September. Thomas, at McMinnville, was to march on the 2d, and other commands according to their position. To the last Thomas had no definite information of the approach of the enemy. It turned out that Bragg crossed at Chattanooga on the 28th of August, entered Sparta on the 3d of September, and made his way to Glasgow, where he arrived on the 14th, having crossed the Cumberland at Carthage and Gainsboro‘. Something of these movements, though not of the entire force, was learned on the 6th, and that Bowling Green was threatened. Two divisions wer
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