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Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.).

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1829 AD (search for this): chapter intro
observed in his brilliant picture of the revolutions of the European political system. I am decided then upon the publication of this Summary, preceding it by some explanations upon the divers metamorphoses which it has undergone, and upon the motives which have prompted them. His Majesty the Emperor having ordered the translation of my Treatise upon grand military operations, which had never been terminated as a complete work, I resolved first to fill the omissions in it by writing, in 1829, the Analytical Compend of the principal combinations of war. Executed rather precipitately, and conceived with the only object of serving as an appendant to my aforesaid Treatise, this first essay ought not to be considered as a separate work. Called last year to give it some developments in order to make it serve for the instruction of an august prince, I rendered it sufficiently complete to accord it a brevet d'emancipation and to make of it a work independent of every other. Several
1837 AD (search for this): chapter intro
aving pushed rather far the mania for definitions; but I own I make a merit of it: for in order to lay down the basis of a science until now little known, it is essential to have an understanding before all upon the different denominations that must be given to the combinations of which it is composed; otherwise it would be impossible to designate them and to qualify them. I do not dissemble that some of mine might yet be ameliorated, and as I have no pretension to infallibility, I am quite ready to be the first to admit those which should be more satisfactory. Finally, if I have often cited the same events as examples, I have decided to do so for the convenience of readers who have not all the campaigns in their memory or in their library. It will suffice thus to be acquainted with the events cited in order to render the demonstrations intelligible; a greater series of proofs will not be wanting to those who are acquainted with modern military history. G. J. march 6th, 1837.
1791 AD (search for this): chapter intro
tisfactory idea of the elevated branches of the science. Finally even Mirabeau who, having returned from Berlin, published an enormous volume upon the Prussian tactics, an arid repetition of the regulation for platoon and line evolutions to which some had the simplicity to attribute the greater part of the successes of Frederick! If such books have been able to contribute to the propagation of this error, it must be owned however that they contributed also to perfecting the regulations of 1791 on manoeuvres, the only result which it was possible to expect from them. Such was the art of war at the commencement of the 19th century, when Porbeck, Venturini and Bulow published some pamphlets on the first campaigns of the Revolution. The latter especially made a certain sensation in Europe by his Spirit of the System of Modern Warfare, the work of a man of genius, but which was merely sketched, and which added nothing to the first notions given by Lloyd. At the same time appeared a
1815 AD (search for this): chapter intro
ishing to pass a stone bridge, should cause it to be visited by carpenters and architects, and that Darius would not have been conquered if, instead of opposing all his forces to Alexander, he had fought him with but the half! Astonishing maxim of military policy. Maizeroy has had some ideas quite as vague, in what he calls the dialetics of war. Lloyd has gone fartherest into the question; but how much his work leaves to be desired, and how much it has been belied by the events from 1792 to 1815! Although this belongs more especially to the science of the statesman, than to that of the warrior, since we have imagined to separate the gown from the sword, it cannot be denied, however, that if it be useful to a subaltern general, it is indispensable to every general-in-chief of an army: it enters into all the combinations which can determine a war, and into those of the operations which may be undertaken; hence it belongs necessarily to the science of which we treat. From these consi
1807 AD (search for this): chapter intro
eory, and the part which I may have had in it, without saying how I have conceived it myself. As I have said in my chapter of principles, published by itself in 1807, the art of war has existed in all time, and strategy especially was the same under Caesar as under Napoleon. But the art, confined to the understanding of great ience, of which Lloyd and Bulow had first raised the veil, and of which I had indicated the first principles in 1805, in a chapter upon lines of operations, and in 1807, in a chapter upon the fundamental principles of the art of war, printed by itself at Glogau in Silesia. The fall of Napoleon, by giving up many studious office between us. It is extraordinary enough to accuse me of having said that the art of war did not exist before me, when in the chapter of Principles, published in 1807, of which I have before spoken, and which had a certain success in the military world, the first phrase commenced with these words: the art of war has existed from
1750 AD (search for this): chapter intro
guerre), this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war. I could not doubt this truth in reading again, subsequently, the campaigns of Turenne, of Marlborough, of Eugene of Savoy, and in comparing them with those of Frederick, which Tempelhoff had just published with details so full of interest, although somewhat heavy and by far too much repeated. I comprehended then that Marshal de Saxe had been quite right in saying that in 1750 there were no principles laid down upon the art of war, but that many of his readers had also very badly interpreted his preface in concluding therefrom that he had thought that those principles did not exist. Convinced that I had seized the true point of view under which it was necessary to regard the theory of war in order to discover its veritable rules, and to quit the always so uncertain field of personal systems, I set myself to the work with all the ardor of a neophyte. I wrote i
1792 AD (search for this): chapter intro
od, without doubt, for fields of combat, but very useless in the history of a whole war, since they are represented almost every day under the same form. Purely military history has furnished, in France as in Germany, writings so numerous since 1792, that their nomenclature alone would form a pamphlet. I shall, nevertheless, signalize here the first campaigns of the Revolution by Grimoard; those of General Gravert; the memoirs of Suchet and of Saint-Cyr; the fragments of Gourgaud and of Montxim of military policy. Maizeroy has had some ideas quite as vague, in what he calls the dialetics of war. Lloyd has gone fartherest into the question; but how much his work leaves to be desired, and how much it has been belied by the events from 1792 to 1815! Although this belongs more especially to the science of the statesman, than to that of the warrior, since we have imagined to separate the gown from the sword, it cannot be denied, however, that if it be useful to a subaltern general, it
1829 AD (search for this): chapter intro
icle of the combined or partial employment of the three arms, which makes the basis of the theory of combats, and rendered thereby a real service to young officers. In France, Gay-Vernon, Jacquinot de Presle and Roquancourt, published courses which were not wanting in merit. Under these circumstances, I was assured by my own experience, that there was wanting, to my first treatise, a collection of maxims like that which preceded the work of the Arch Duke; which induced me to publish, in 1829, the first sketch of this analytical compend, adding to it two interesting articles upon the military policy of States. I profited of this occasion to defend the principles of my chapter on lines of operations, which several writers had badly comprehended, and this polemic brought about at least more rational definitions, at the same time maintaining the real advantages of central operations. A year after the publication of this analytical table, the Prussian General Clausewitz died, le
1799 AD (search for this): chapter intro
ions, appeared the important work of the Arch Duke Charles, which united the two kinds, didactic and historic; this prince having at first given a small volume of strategic maxims, then four volumes of critical history on the campaigns of 1796 and 1799, for developing their practical application. This work, which does as much honor to the illustrious prince as the battles which he has gained, put the complement to the basis of the strategic science, of which Lloyd and Bulow had first raised theritical historian, he has been an unscrupulous plaigerist, pillaging his predecessors. copying their reflections, and saying evil afterwards of their works, after having travestied them under other forms. Those who shall have read my campaign of 1799, published ten years before his, will not deny my assertion, for there is not one of my reflections which he has not repeated. Okounieff, Valentini, Ruhle; those of Messrs. de Laborde, Koch, de Chambrai, Napier; finally, the fragments published by
1803 AD (search for this): chapter intro
laid down upon the art of war, but that many of his readers had also very badly interpreted his preface in concluding therefrom that he had thought that those principles did not exist. Convinced that I had seized the true point of view under which it was necessary to regard the theory of war in order to discover its veritable rules, and to quit the always so uncertain field of personal systems, I set myself to the work with all the ardor of a neophyte. I wrote in the course of the year 1803, a volume which I presented, at first, to M. d'oubril, Secretary of the Russian legation at Paris, then to Marshal Ney. But the strategic work of Bulow, and the historical narrative of Lloyd, translated by Roux-Fazillac, having then fallen into my hands, determined me to follow another plan. My first essay was a didactic treatise upon the orders of battle, strategic marches and lines of operations; it was arid from its nature and quite interspersed with historical citations which, grouped b
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