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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Lacus Benacus (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
n. As another example, I will cite his position around Mantua in 1796. His front of operations extended, in reality, from the mountains of Bergamo to the Adriatic Sea, whilst that in need his true line of defense was upon the Adige, between Lake Garda and Legnano, afterwards on the Mincio, between Peschiera and Mantua. In a first edition of this chapter, I cited for examples, the lines of the Lech, of the Iser, and of the Inn, as fronts of operations for a French army acting in Bavaria, foints much less removed from each other than Dusseldorf and Strassburg, this risk may be run. What was the fate experienced by the concentric columns of Wurmser and Quasdanovich, wishing to direct themselves upon the Mincio by the two shores of Lake Garda? Will the catastrophe which was the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy upon Brussels have been forgotten? Both having started from Sombref, they wished to move concentrically upon that city, the one by Quatre-Bras, and the other by W
Brescia (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
by the battle of Millesimo, in making them take two exterior strategic lines, and beats them afterwards in detail, at Mondovi and at Lodi. A formidable army is assembled at the Tyrol, for saving Mantua, which he besieges; it commits the imprudence of marching there in two corps, separated by a lake. The lightning is less prompt than the French general; he raises the siege, abandoning every thing, directs himself, with the better part of his forces, upon the first column which debouches by Brescia, beats it and throws it back into the mountains. The second column arrived upon the same ground, is there beaten in its turn, and forced to retire into the Tyrol, in order to communicate with its right. Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, wishes to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Bonaparte, after having overthrown and repulsed the first upon the Lavis, changes direction then to the right, debouches by the gorges of the Brenta upon the line of the left, (Austrian) and f
Bergen county (New Jersey, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
n would have been desperate if a second army of fifty thousand men had not arrived at Olmutz to receive him. Meanwhile the battle of Austerlitz, the result of a fault of the chief of staff, Weyrotha, compromised anew the Russian army far from its base; it came thus near becoming the victim of a distant alliance, and peace alone gave it time to regain its frontier. The fate of Suwarof after the victory of Novi and especially in the expedition to Switzerland, that of the corps of Hermann at Bergen in Holland, are lessons which every chief called to such a command ought carefully to meditate. General Beningsen had less disadvantages in 1807, because, combatting between the Vistula and the Niemen, he supported himself on his own base and the operations depended in nothing upon his Allies. We recollect also the fate which the French experienced in Ba varia and Bohemia in 1742, when Frederick the Great abandoned them to their fate to make a separate peace. In truth those last made war
Charleroi (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 3
d a hundred and fifty squadrons; it had on its right flank, the corps of Clairfayt to cover Flanders, and on its left the corps of the Prince de Kaunitz to cover Charleroi. The gain of the battle under the walls of Landrecics caused it to open its gates, there was found upon General Chapuis the plan of the diversion in Flanders, a detail, enabling the French to consolidate in Belgium? Finally, the army was put in motion, after having sent a part of its forces to the Prince de Kaunitz, at Charleroi, and left a division at Cateau. If, instead of scattering this great army, it had been directed at once upon Turcoing, there could have been united in it a hundly the radical defect of all exterior lines, it was faulty also in execution; the diversion on Courtrai took place the 26th of April, and Jourdan only arrived at Charleroi the 3d of June, more than a month afterwards. What a fine occasion for the Austrians to profit from their central position! I think, that had the Prussian army
Pavia (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
ral-in-chief, and I shall be permitted to cite two examples of it, to make myself better understood. For example, if Napoleon, in 1800, after having passed the St. Bernard, had marched direct by Turin upon Asti or Alexandria, and had received battle at Marengo, without being assured previously of Lombardy and the left bank of the Po, he would have been cut off from his line of retreat more completely than Melas was from his, whilst that having at need the two secondary points of Casal and Pavia on the side of the St. Bernard, and those of Savona and Zendi on the side of the Appenines, he had, in case of reverse, all the means of regaining the Var or the Valais. In the same manner in the campaign of 1806, if he had marched from Gera straight to Leipzig; and had there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have been cut off from his base of the Rhine, as well as the Duke of Brunswick from that of the Elbe; whereas by moving from Gera to the west in the direction
Germany (Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
risk of a total loss. In the same manner, the valley of the Danube presents a series of important points, which have caused it to be regarded as the key to Southern Germany. Geographical decisive points are also those which would control the junction of several valleys, and the centre of the great communications which interseh, it may well be supposed, does not accord with that of this summary; the Arch-Duke Charles has given an excellent model of this study in his description of Southern Germany. But we name strategic lines also, all the communications which lead by the most direct or the most advantageous way from one important point to another, h-Duke Charles, that judge so enlightened and so competent, has inclined to the last assertion, and demonstrated that the valley of the Danube was the key of Southern Germany. Meanwhile, it must be admitted, every thing must depend in these kinds of questions upon the relative forces and upon the dispositions of the country. If
Poland (Poland) (search for this): chapter 3
would be less extended, consequently more easy to take up. The theatre of war in Prussia and Poland, of which we have just spoken, was actually similar to this, for the frontiers of Gallicia, prolts, could not be compared with one which has not. When Napoleon applied this system in Italy, in Poland, in Prussia, and in France, he was not thus exposed to the blows of an enemy established on his e formed, to occupy the country between the Rhine and the Elbe, whilst Mortier was called into Pomerania. When Napoleon decided to push upon the Vestula at the end of the same year, he ordered, withhousand men; but it becomes very difficult in other countries, and impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and in Turkey. It is conceived with how much more velocity and impetuosity an army acts, when ich left Berlin exposed to the whole weight of his power. As for what concerns the first war in Poland, already counted in the number of remote invasions, we have said elsewhere that his success was
Olmutz (Czech Republic) (search for this): chapter 3
We have given, in Chapter X. of the Treatise on grand operations, an example of such a change, executed by Frederick in the course of the raising of the siege of Olmutz. Napoleon projected several of them, for he was accustomed, in his adventurous invasions, to have such a project ready for parrying unexpected events. At the ain the great detachment which Prince Eugene had made under Albemarle. The destruction of the great convoy which Laudon took from Frederick during the siege of Olmutz, obliged the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut, in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen, in 1795, equally attests how difficf three hundred leagues separates Kutusof from his frontiers. Such a position would have been desperate if a second army of fifty thousand men had not arrived at Olmutz to receive him. Meanwhile the battle of Austerlitz, the result of a fault of the chief of staff, Weyrotha, compromised anew the Russian army far from its base; it
Bern (Switzerland) (search for this): chapter 3
he gorge of the Mouse-trap in which the French army found itself engaged. There then was the pivot of the defense; but was Schaffhausen to be left uncovered how were Rheineck and the St. Gothard to be abandoned, how open Valais and the access to Berne, without giving up all Helvetia to the coalition? And if it were wished to cover all even by simple brigades, where would be the army when it should be required to deliver a decisive battle to any hostile mass which might present itself? To conrter than that of the Rhine, but which left him yet exposed, upon an immense line, to the blows which the Austrians might deliver him. And if, instead of pushing Bellegarde upon Lombardy by the Valteline, the Aulic Council had made him march upon Berne, or unite with the Arch-Duke, all would have been over with Massena. Those events seem then to prove that, if countries with high mountains are favorable to a tactical defense, it is not the same for a strategical defense, which, obliged to be d
Augsburg (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
hilst he filed with nine divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face to the side of Schaffhausen, which brought him, in a few marches, to the gates of Augsburg, after the two detached divisions had already rejoined him. Napoleon, in 1806, had also the double base of the Main and the Rhine; forming almost a right reens essential, whilst the bulk of the army marches to great enterprises; thus the corps of Ney was the pivot of the manoeuvre which Napoleon made by Donauwerth and Augsburg, to cut off Mack from his line of retreat; this corps increased to five divisions, masked Ulm, and held the left bank of the Danube. The manoeuvre finished, theurrow Suabia in all directions; if it had been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal routes for making the long tour from Donanwerth by Augsburg upon Memmingen, it must be admitted also that, by favor of those hundred roads, Mack would equally have been able to make his retreat more easily than if he had
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