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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Italy (Italy) (search for this): chapter 5
sufficiently so not to be exposed to the enemy. A country where there is an abundance of large cities, like Lombardy, Saxony, the low countries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resources there found for the subsistence of troops, but shelters are found near to each other, which permit the maintaining divisions together. In Poland, in Russia, in a part of Austria and France, in Spain, in Southern Italy, it is more difficult to establish ourselves in winter quarters. Formerly, each party entered them respectively at the end of October, and contented themselves with taking reciprocally a few battalions too isolated at advanced posts; it was a partisan warfare. The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters by Turenne, in Upper Alsace, in 1674, is one of the operations which best indicate what can be undertaken against hostile cantonments, and the precautions which should be taken on
Manheim (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 5
ter the passages, is to cover the bridges against the enemy without meanwhile con straining too much the enterprises which the army might wish to undertake. When they have place, with a great numerical superiority, or at the end of great victories already gained, the thing is not so embarrassing; but when they are executed at the beginning of a campaign, in presence of an enemy almost equal in forces, the case is different. If a hundred thousand French pass the Rhine at Strasburg, or at Manheim, in presence of a hundred thousand Germans, the first thing they will have to do will be to push the enemy in three directions, the first to the front of them, even to the mountains of the Black Forest; the second to the right, for covering the bridges on the side of the Upper Rhine; and the third to the left, to cover those on the side of Mayence and of the Lower Rhine. This necessity leads to a deplorable parceling of forces; but in order to diminish its inconvenience it is necessary to
Castile, N. Y. (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 5
uld have become of the army if a gale of wind dispersed the fleet of war vessels, and if the English, returned in force in La Manche, defeated it or constrained it to regain its ports? Posterity will regret, for the sake of the example to ages to come, that this immense enterprise had not been brought to its close, or at least attempted. Doubtless many a brave man would have perished in it; but have not those brave men been less usefully destroyed on the plains of Suabia, of Moravia, of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal, or in the forests of Lithuania? What mortal would not be glorified for contributing to the decision of the greatest cause that has ever been debated between two great nations? At least will our posterity find, in the preparations which were made for this descent, one of the most important lessons which this memorable age has furnished for the study of military men and statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805, w
Schaffhausen (Switzerland) (search for this): chapter 5
of a military position, and as a manoeuvre of war. The passage, in itself, is a tactical operation, but the determination of the point where it ought to be made, is connected with the grand operations which embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an example for causing to be appreciated this assertion. Napoleon, more skillful in strategy than his lieutenant, wished him to pass in mass at Schaffhausen to take in reverse the whole army of Kray, to anticipate it at Ulm, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more commodiously upon the front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left, the tactical advantage appeared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same c
Poland (Poland) (search for this): chapter 5
wever compactly they may be made, it is always difficult to have them sufficiently so not to be exposed to the enemy. A country where there is an abundance of large cities, like Lombardy, Saxony, the low countries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resources there found for the subsistence of troops, but shelters are found near to each other, which permit the maintaining divisions together. In Poland, in Russia, in a part of Austria and France, in Spain, in Southern Italy, it is more difficult to establish ourselves in winter quarters. Formerly, each party entered them respectively at the end of October, and contented themselves with taking reciprocally a few battalions too isolated at advanced posts; it was a partisan warfare. The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters by Turenne, in Upper Alsace, in 1674, is one of the operations which best indicate what can be undertaken again
Preussen (search for this): chapter 5
eat of M. de Bellisle from Prague, does not merit the eulogies which have been lavished upon it. Those which the King of Prussia executed after the raising of the siege of Olmutz, and after the surprise of Hochkirch, were very well directed, but couthe side of the Tyrol, and inBohemia also against an enemy coming from Saxony. But it is especially in applying it to Prussia that this system of parallel retreats offers all the variations of which it is susceptible, for it would be perfect agaiether impossible, against a French army coming from the Rhine, or against a Russian army coming from the Vistula, unless Prussia should be allied to Austria. The cause of this difference is in the geographical configuration of the country, which pethe enemy. A country where there is an abundance of large cities, like Lombardy, Saxony, the low countries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resource
Scotia (search for this): chapter 5
the only colossal enterprise until that which Napoleon formed against England in 1803. All the other expeditions beyond the sea were partial operations; those of Charles V, and of Sebastian of Portugal, upon the Coast of Africa; several descents, like those of the French upon the United States of America, upon Egypt and St. Domingo; those of the English upon Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, Philadelphia, all enter into the same category. I do not speak of the project of Hoche against Ireland, for it did not succeed, and it shows all the difficulty of these kinds of enterprises. The large armies which the great States keep up at this day, does not admit of their being attacked by descents of thirty or forty thousand men. We can then only form similar enterprises against secondary States, for it is very difficult to embark a hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand men, with the immense equipment of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. Meanwhile, we have been on the point of s
Osterode (Poland) (search for this): chapter 5
s; to fix upon places of concentration which may in every case be attained in advance of the enemy; to cause the avenues to the army to be scoured by permanent patrols of cavalry; finally, to establish alarm signals for the case of a serious attack. These are, in my opinion, the best maxims that could be given. In the winter of 1807, Napoleon cantoned his army behind the Passarge in the face of the enemy; the advanced guards alone were barracked in proximity with the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. This army exceeded a hundred and twenty thousand men, and there was much skill necessary to maintain and nourish it in this position until the month of June. The country favored, it is true, this system, and we do not find everywhere one as suitable. An army of a hundred thousand men may find compact winter quarters in countries where cities abound, and of which we have spoken above. When the army is more numerous, the difficulty is increased; it is true, however, that, if the ext
Saxony (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 5
yrol, leaving the route of Vienna open, the plan would be very dangerous in presence of an enterprising enemy. In Italy beyond the Mincio the lateral defense would be easy on the side of the Tyrol, and inBohemia also against an enemy coming from Saxony. But it is especially in applying it to Prussia that this system of parallel retreats offers all the variations of which it is susceptible, for it would be perfect against an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or upon the Oder, whilst open war are, in general, a rather delicate operation; however compactly they may be made, it is always difficult to have them sufficiently so not to be exposed to the enemy. A country where there is an abundance of large cities, like Lombardy, Saxony, the low countries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resources there found for the subsistence of troops, but shelters are found near to each other
Cassano (Italy) (search for this): chapter 5
o the defence of a passage, its rules should be of the same nature with those of the attack; they ought then to have for their object the opposing of the measures above indicated; the essential thing is to cause the course of the river to be watched by light corps, without pretending to defend it everywhere; then to concentrate rapidly upon the menaced point, in order to burst upon the enemy when a part only of his army shall have crossed. It is necessary to do like the Duke of Vendorle at Cassano, and as did the Arch-Duke Charles on a larger scale at Essling in 1809--a memorable example, which cannot be too strongly recommended, although the conqueror did not derive from it all the fruit he expected. We have already pointed out in article 21, the influence which the passages of rivers at the commencement of an enterprise or of a campaign may exercise upon the direction of lines of operations, it remains for us to examine that which they may have upon the strategical movements whi
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