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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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es when Frederick encamped with all his army lying around him; but upon the scale on which Napoleon manoeuvred, and with the present mode of making war, what harmony could be expected on the part of generals who should be absolutely ignorant of what passes around them. Of these two systems, the last appears to me preferable; however, a medium might be adopted between the laconism often carried to excess by Napoleon, and the minute verbiage which prescribed to experienced generals such as Barclay, Kleist and Wittgenstein, the manner in which they should break by platoons, and reform on arriving at their positions; a puerility all the more lamentable that it became impracticable in the face of the enemy. I shall be repreached, perhaps, for interdicting here to chiefs of the general staff, those same details which I place above in the number of their important duties; which would be unjust. Those details are, in fact. within the range of the staff, which is not saying that the Ma
Boutourlin (search for this): chapter 6
ound more appropriate to the old methods than to the new system. This work is for the rest, the only one of that kind which has reached me; I do not doubt that there exist others, either published, or secret; but I frankly own my ignorance upon this subject. A few generals, like Grimoard and Thieubaut, have brought to light staff manuels; the new royal corps of France has caused to be printed several partial instructions, but a satisfactory whole exists yet nowhere. I believe that General Boutourlin has the project of publishing soon an instruction addressed to his officers when he was quarter-master general, and we can only wish that it be realized without delay, for it cannot fail to throw much light upon this interesting subject, upon which there yet remains much to say. If it be acknowledged that the ancient logistics was only a science of details for regulating every-thing material in regard to marches; if it be asserted that the functions of the staff embrace at this day
known by what prodigies he rallied it, and triumphed in the five glorious days of Abensberg, of Siegenburg, of Landshut, of Eckmuhl, and of Ratisbon, which repaired the faults of the miserable logistics of his chief of the staff. We shall terminate these citations by the events which preceded and accompanied the passage of the Danube, before Wragram; the measures for causing to arrive at a given point on the island of Lobau, the corps of the Viceroy of Italy coming from Hungary, that of Marmont coming from Styria, and that of Bernadotte coming from Linz, are less astonishing still than the famous resolution or imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and of the formation in the plains of Enzersdorf, in the presence of a hundred and forty thousand Austrians, and of five hundred pieces of artillery, as though it had been a military fete. All those masses were found united on the island the evening of the 4th of July, three bridges were throw
ably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of having war with that power, despatched Berthier to Bavaria with the delicate mission of assembling the army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Frankfort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long time since, were able easily to pierce this web and to destroy or disperse the parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to unite it farther in rear near Ulm. The
ocure him all the documents for basing his operations. Associated in his combinations, called upon to transmit them, to explain them, and even to watch over their execution as a whole, as well as of their least details, his functions extend necessarily to all the operations of a campaign. From that time, the science of a chief of staff was to embrace also the different parts of the art of war, and if it be this which is designated under the name of logistics, the two works of the Arch-Duke Charles, the voluminous treatise of Guibert, of Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard, and of the Marquis de Ternay, would scarcely suffice to sketch the incomplete course of such a logistique, for it would be nothing less than the science of the application of all the military sciences. From what precedes, it seems to result naturally that the ancient logistics could no longer suffice to designate the science of the staff, and that the present functions of this corps would still require to be reduced to fo
or scattered by a mass of a hundred and eighty thousand enemies. It is known by what prodigies he rallied it, and triumphed in the five glorious days of Abensberg, of Siegenburg, of Landshut, of Eckmuhl, and of Ratisbon, which repaired the faults of the miserable logistics of his chief of the staff. We shall terminate these citations by the events which preceded and accompanied the passage of the Danube, before Wragram; the measures for causing to arrive at a given point on the island of Lobau, the corps of the Viceroy of Italy coming from Hungary, that of Marmont coming from Styria, and that of Bernadotte coming from Linz, are less astonishing still than the famous resolution or imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and of the formation in the plains of Enzersdorf, in the presence of a hundred and forty thousand Austrians, and of five hundred pieces of artillery, as though it had been a military fete. All those masses were found united
Ruhle Lilienstern (search for this): chapter 6
since the interest was always the same? Thus well convinced of these truths, I did not hesitate to announce--a month before the war--that it would be what Napoleon would undertake, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale, it would be at Jena and at Naumburg that they would fight. What suppositions did the Duke of Brunswick and his counsellors make at the same instant that I saw so accurately? In order to credit it, it is necessary to read them in the works of Mm. C. de W. and Ruhle de Lilienstern, (Operations plan an Bericht eines Augenzeugen..) If I recall this circumstance, already more than once cited, it is not a feeling of vanity which leads me to it, because I would have other citations of this nature to make; but I have only desired to demonstrate that we may often act in war after problems well considered, without pausing too long at the details of the movements of our adversary. If General Clausewitz had been as often as myself in the position to weigh these probl
Doctoroff (search for this): chapter 6
hich advised the Allies of the project formed by the French Emperor for throwing himself upon their com munications with all his united forces, by basing himself on the belt of strong places of Lorraine and Alsace. This precious information decided the union of the armies of Blucher and Schwartzenburg, which all seeming strategic remonstrance had never succeeded in making act in concert, excepting at Leipsic and Brienne. It is known also that it was information given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff, which prevented the latter from being overwhelmed at Borowsk by Napoleon who had just left Moscow with all his army to commence his retreat. He was not at first believed and it was necessary that Seslawin, piqued, should go and carry off an officer and some soldiers of the guard, in the midst of the French bivouacs, to confirm his report. This information which decided the march of Kutusoff upon Malo-Jaroslawitz, prevented Napoleon from taking the route of Kalouga, where he would ha
ion; and the aid de camp of the Prince de Schwartzenburg whom I conducted there, could not deny that it was our solicitations which decided the prince to leave the confined place between the Pleisse and the Elster. Doubtless one is more at his ease upon a steeple than in a frail aerial car, but one does not always find steeples situated in such a manner as to be able to overlook the whole field of battle, and they cannot be transported at will. It would besides remain for Messrs. Green or Garnerin to tell us how objects are seen at five or six hundred feet of perpendicular elevation. There is a kind of signals more substantial, which are those given by fires lighted upon the elevated points of a country: before the invention of the telegraph they had the merit of being able to bear rapidly the news of an invasion, from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss use them for calling the militia to arms. They are also used sometimes for giving the alarm to winter cantonments,
bring the troops from the order of march to the different orders of battle, it is a study as important as it is minute. The three works which we have cited, have sufficiently sifted this matter to dispense with our following them on grounds so arduous; those questions could only be treated by taking up those details which make the merit of these works, and which are altogether beyond the limits of this. Besides, what would remain to us to say after the two volumes which M. de Ternay and Colonel Koch, his commentator, have devoted to the demonstration of all the logistical combinations of the movements of troops, and of the different processes of formation? And if many of those processes are very difficult to put in practice before an enemy, their utility will be acknowledged, at least, for the preparatory movements executed cuted out of his reach; thanks to that excellent manual, to the treatise of Guibert, and to the first work of the Arch-Duke (Gransatze der hoheren Kriegskunst) w
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