hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Napoleon 378 0 Browse Search
France (France) 164 0 Browse Search
Austria (Austria) 120 0 Browse Search
Europe 90 0 Browse Search
England (United Kingdom) 64 0 Browse Search
Ulm 52 0 Browse Search
Moreau 50 4 Browse Search
Preussen 46 0 Browse Search
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) 42 0 Browse Search
Ney 39 3 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

Found 305 total hits in 87 results.

... 4 5 6 7 8 9
perate in common with them, either to the right or to the left, but never tracing for them the ensemble of the operations of the whole army. I think that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, and at the beginning of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated from his custom by sketching a general order. I have had reason to be convinced that he acted thus systematically, either for covering the ensemble of his combinations by a mysterious veil, or from the fear that orders more gene he was as to the course which it was necessary to take. Irresolution must be the accompaniment of minds which doubt everything. Returning to our subject I must confess that espionage has been singularly neglected in many modern armies, and in 1813 among others the staff of the Prince of Schwartzenburg not having a sou at its disposition for this service, the Emperor Alexander had to furnish funds from his chest to give to that staff the means of sending agents into Lusace to learn where Nap
ons could be in truth but very brief, and cloudy weather might make them sometimes uncertain: meanwhile as the vocabulary of similar reports could be reduced to a score of phrases, for which it would be easy to have conventional signs, I think that the mode should not be despised, though even we should be obliged to send the duplicate of its transmissions, by officers capable of well rendering verbal orders. We would always gain rapidity thereby. A trial of another nature was attempted in 1794, at the battle of Fleurus, where General Jourdan employed an aeronaut for reconnoitering and making signals of the movements of the Austrians. I do not know whether he had occasion to congratulate himself on this trial, which was not again renewed, although it was pretended at the time that it had assisted in the victory, which I very much doubt. It is probable that the difficulculty of having an aeronaut all ready to make his ascension at the moment when it should be opportune, that of obs
June 14th (search for this): chapter 6
n Blucher cantoned peaceably between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington gave or received fetes at Brussels, both awaiting the signal to invade France, Napoleon, whom they believed at Paris quite occupied with ostentatious political ceremonials, accompanied by his guard, which had just scarcely been reformed at the capital, burst like lightning upon Charleroi and upon the quarters of Blucher, with columns converging from all points of the horizon, to arrive, with rare punctuality, the 14th June in the plains of Beaumont upon the borders of the Sambre, (Napoleon had not departed until the 12th from Paris.) The combinations of those two operations reposed upon a skillful strategic calculation; but their execution was undeniably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations
duty to refer to some remarkable events in order to cause to be appreciated all the importance of good logistics: the one is the miraculous assembling of the French army in the plains of Gera in 1806 ; the second is the opening of the campaign in 1815. In both of these events Napoleon knew how to collect together, with an admirable precision, upon the decisive point of the zone of operations, his columns which had departed from the most divergent points. The choice of this decisive point en, when no person in the army, nor in Germany, conceived anything of those movements in appearance so complicated. I except, however, a small number of officers capable of penetrating them by analogy with precedents. In the same manner, in 1815, when Blucher cantoned peaceably between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington gave or received fetes at Brussels, both awaiting the signal to invade France, Napoleon, whom they believed at Paris quite occupied with ostentatious political cerem
oming from Hungary, that of Marmont coming from Styria, and that of Bernadotte coming from Linz, are less astonishing still than the famous resolution or imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and of the formation in the plains of Enzersdorf, in the presence of a hundred and forty thousand Austrians, and of five hundred pieces of artillery, as though it had been a military fete. All those masses were found united on the island the evening of the 4th of July, three bridges were thrown in the twinkling of an eye upon an arm of the Danube a hundred and forty yards wide, in the darkest of nights and in the midst of torrents of rain; a hundred and fifty thousand men there defiled in presence of a formidable enemy, and are formed before noon in the plain, at a league in advance of the bridges, which they covered by a change of front; the whole in less time than would have been necessary for doing it in a manoeuvre of instruction several times repe
ted all the importance of good logistics: the one is the miraculous assembling of the French army in the plains of Gera in 1806 ; the second is the opening of the campaign in 1815. In both of these events Napoleon knew how to collect together, witnd the most probable chances. I shall allow myself to cite a few examples of them taken in my own experience. When, in 1806, they were yet undecided in France upon the war with Prussia, I made a memoir upon the probabilities of the war, and the oons. His three volumes upon war prove evidently that in a situation like that in which the Duke of Brunswick was found in 1806, he would have been quite as embarrassed as he was as to the course which it was necessary to take. Irresolution must be taff the means of sending agents into Lusace to learn where Napoleon was. General Mack at Ulm and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806 were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often paid dear for the impossibility of having spies and inform
ion was undeniably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of having war with that power, despatched Berthier to Bavaria with the delicate mission of assembling the army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Fe are several kinds of them, and at the head of all we should naturally place telegraphs. It was to the idea he had of establishing a telegraphic line between his head quarters and France, that Napoleon owed his astonishing success at Ratisbon in 1809. He was found yet at Paris when the Austrian army passed the Inn at Braunau, for invading Bavaria and piercing his cantonments. Informed in twenty-four hours of what passed at two hundred and fifty leagues from him, he threw himself instantly in
... 4 5 6 7 8 9