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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Duke (search for this): chapter 7
general principles of war published in 1807; the brave cavalry of Bessieres could do nothing against those little masses. M. de Wagner seems to call in question that I contributed to the adoption of this formation. His Royal Highness, the Arch-Duke himself. assured me of it in the meanwhile, in 1814; for, in the Austrian as well as in the French regulations. it was used only for the attacks of posts, and not for lines of battle. In order to give more solidity to the column proposed, we. This was one of the causes of the small success of the French at Waterloo. If the column of Macdonald succeeded better at Wagram, it paid dearly for it, and but for the success of the attacks of Davoust and of Oudinot upon the left of the Arch-Duke, it is not probable that it would have came out victorious from the position in which, for a moment, it saw itself placed. When it is decided to risk such a mass, it is necessary, at least, to take care to establish upon each flank a battalion
Marlborough (search for this): chapter 7
arging en muraille, and the lines of which uselessly accumulated the one behind the other, would be swept away as soon as the first should chance to retreat. M. Wagner, in order to combat this assertion, cites the battle of Ramilies, where Marlborough conquered by a grand cavalry charge in lines, without intervals, against the French en echiquier. But, if my memory serves me, I think that the allied cavalry was at first formed en echiquier on two lines; the true cause of the suceess was that Marlborough. seeing that Villerol had paralyzed the half of his army behind Anderkirch and the Gette, had the good sense to draw thirty-eight squadrons from that wing in order to reinforce his left, which had thus twice as many cavalry as the French. As for the rest, 1 willingly admit many exceptions to a maxim which I do not give as more absolute than all other maxims of cavalry tactics, a tactics as changeable as that arm. For the rest, in cavalry more still than in the infantry, the
Charles (search for this): chapter 7
ion will become null, and the attack will fail. Besides that, this reduced order would be advantageous only against infantry, for the column of four sections of three ranks, forming a kind of solid square, is better against cavalry. The Arch-Duke Charles was fortunate at Essling, and especially at Wagram, in having adopted this last order, which I proposed in my chapter upon the general principles of war published in 1807; the brave cavalry of Bessieres could do nothing against those little maumn of Macdonald; the system employed at Cannae by Hannibal, could all the better find here its application, as such a mass battered by the concentric fires of an artillery equal in number, and disposed in a concave line, like that of the Arch-Duke Charles at Essling, would be much compromised. Finally, in order to avoid cutting the army in two parts, who knows if one of those movements of conversion which the author would repudiate, would not be an excellent means to oppose to his system, sinc
M. Jaquinot (search for this): chapter 7
ourse of tactics of the latter presents nevertheless, for orders of battle especially, valuable developments, not for prescribing absolute rules, but for familiarizing us with the different combinations which may result from them; this is all the advantage that can be promised from a tactical work. The Prussian Major Decker, has written in German, a work equally good to consult, under the title of Tactics of the Three Arms; but it presents a system of masses too accumulated. In France M. Jaquinot has also given a good elementary course. General Okounief, in his argued disquisition upon the three arms, has not shown less penetration, nor obtained less success. Perhaps he has not been sufficiently conclusive and has allowed yet some uncertainty to hover over the solution of the problem. Like his predecessors, he has not enquired whether the French columns, repulsed by the fire of the deployed English, were not masses much too deep, instead of being merely columns of a single b
Oudinot (search for this): chapter 7
, (fig. 3.) We have seen in the late wars, divisions of twelve battalions deployed and compressed behind each other, forming thirty-six crowded and accumulated ranks. Such masses are exposed to the ravages of artillery, diminish mobility and impulsion, without adding any strength. This was one of the causes of the small success of the French at Waterloo. If the column of Macdonald succeeded better at Wagram, it paid dearly for it, and but for the success of the attacks of Davoust and of Oudinot upon the left of the Arch-Duke, it is not probable that it would have came out victorious from the position in which, for a moment, it saw itself placed. When it is decided to risk such a mass, it is necessary, at least, to take care to establish upon each flank a battalion marching by files, in order that if the enemy chanced to charge in force upon those flanks, it would not oblige the column to halt, (see fig. 3;) protected by those battalions which will face to the enemy, it will be
Benningsen (search for this): chapter 7
l not to post it upon too elevated eminences, but rather upon flat grounds or slopes like a glacis; this is what every sous-lieutenant ought to know. 3. If the horse artillery be principally joined to the cavalry, it is well, however, that each army corps have its own, for gaining rapidly a point essential to occupy. Besides that, it is proper that there be some of it in the artillery reserve, in order to be able to direct it with more promptitude to the succor of a menaced point. General Benningsen had cause to congratulate himself at Eylau for having united fifty-eight pieces in reserve, for they contributed powerfully to re-establishing affairs between the centre and the left where his line chanced to be broken. 4. If one be on the defensive, it is proper to place a part of the batteries of heavy calibre upon the front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is the object to batter the enemy at the greatest possible distance, in order to arrest the impulsion of his att
Marmont (search for this): chapter 7
necessitate. The grand army at Boulogne, which we have just cited, is the most evident proof of it. It seemed that its perfect organization should have secured it from every possible vicissitude. The centre under Marshal Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, the reserve under Lannes, presented a regular and formidable battle corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and of the united grenadiers. Besides that, the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, detached to the right, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805
Paulus Aemilius (search for this): chapter 7
rching by files, in order that if the enemy chanced to charge in force upon those flanks, it would not oblige the column to halt, (see fig. 3;) protected by those battalions which will face to the enemy, it will be able at least to continue its march to the object assigned it, otherwise this great mass, battered by converging fires to which it has no means of opposing even a proper impulsion, will be put in disorder like the column at Fontenoi, or broken as the Macedonian phalanx was by Paulus Aemilius. Squares are good in plains and against an enemy superior in cavalry. They were made formerly very large, but it is acknowledged that the square by regiment is the best for the defensive, and the square by battalion for the offensive. We can, according to circumstances, form them into perfect squares or into long squares, in order to present a greater front, and obtain more fire on the side from whence the enemy is expected to come, (see fig. 8 and 9.) A regiment of three battalion
Thierry (search for this): chapter 7
dy of cavalry to the combat. Whatever order may be adopted, it is necessary to guard against deploying large bodies of cavalry in full lines; for they are masses difficult to handle, and if the first is driven back, the second will be dragged along with it without being able to draw a sabre. To the number of a thousand proofs that the late war has give us of this, we will cite the attack executed by Nansouty in columns by regiments, upon the Prussian cavalry deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry. In the first edition of this treatise I opposed the formation of cavalry upon more that two lines; but I have never intended to exclude several lines en echiquier or in echelon, nor reserves formed in columns; I wished to speak only of cavalry deployed for charging en muraille, and the lines of which uselessly accumulated the one behind the other, would be swept away as soon as the first should chance to retreat. M. Wagner, in order to combat this assertion, cites the battle of Rami
Gosa (search for this): chapter 7
) But every charge against squares of good infantry not broken, must fail. Great charges are made for carrying the batteries of the enemy, and facilitating for the masses of infantry the means of crowning his position; then it is necessary that the infantry be in condition to sustain them without delay, for a charge of this nature has but an instantaneous effect, of which it is necessary to profit briskly before the enemy drive back your cavalry disunited. The fine charge of the French upon Gosa, at the battle of Leipsic, 16th of October, is a great example of this kind. Those which they executed at Waterloo with the same object, were admirable, but without results, for want of support. In the same manner the audacious charge of the feeble cavalry of Ney upon the artillery of the Prince Hohenloe, at the battle of Jena, is an example of what may be done in such a case. Finally, general charges are made against the enemy's cavalry for driving it from the field of battle and return
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