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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Turin (Italy) (search for this): chapter 8
word, all that which may be called the poetry and the metaphysics of war, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, and that no tactical theory could be useful? What reasonable military man would dare pronounce such a blasphemy? Will it be believed that Eugene and Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable chances, will their occasional failure be sufficient for denying their efficacy, and for disputing all influence of the study of the art; will every theory
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 8
skillfully chosen, your movements well disguised; if the enemy, on the contrary, make false movements which permit you to fall upon the yet dispersed fractions of his army, you will be able to conquer without pitched battles, by the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively the discussed history of a few campaigns of the great masters, maintain still that there are neither principles nor good maxims of war, then one could only pity them and reply to them by the famous saying of Frederick the Great: A mule which should have made twenty campaign
Essling (Wien, Austria) (search for this): chapter 8
tions will be able but to diminish the disasters of an almost inevitable defeat. This defeat would be all the more sure when with such instruments he should have to combat an adversary, perhaps less skillful than himself, but having troops inured to war, or enthusiasts for their cause. No tactical system could guarantee the victory when the moral of the army is bad, and even when it should be excellent, victory may depend upon an incident like the rupture of the bridges of the Danube at Essling. A systematic general could prohibit columns from adopting the shallow or firing order, or else confine it to purely defensive means, in order to adopt exclusively the semi-profound columns, without being sure, nevertheless of success. These truths do not prevent the existence of good maxims of war which, with equal chances, will be able to procure victory; and if it be true that these theories could not teach with a mathematical precision what it would be suitable to do in every possib
Waterloo (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 8
d Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the pby the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively th
Jena (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 8
the greater or less martial spirit, not only of nations, but even of epochs The famous Spanish proverb, he was brave on such a day, may be applied to nations as well as to individuals. One could not compare the French at Rosback with those at Jena nor the Prussians at Prenzlow with those at Dennewitz.--in a word, all that which may be called the poetry and the metaphysics of war, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, agh have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable cha
Talavera (Spain) (search for this): chapter 8
r, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, and that no tactical theory could be useful? What reasonable military man would dare pronounce such a blasphemy? Will it be believed that Eugene and Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable chances, will their occasional failure be sufficient for denying their efficacy, and for disputing all influence of the study of the art; will every theory be vain because it will procure but three fourths of the chances of succe
Austerlitz (Czech Republic) (search for this): chapter 8
results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, and that no tactical theory could be useful? What reasonable military man would dare pronounce such a blasphemy? Will it be believed that Eugene and Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable chances, will their occasional failure be sufficient for denying their efficacy, and for disputing all influence of the study of the art; will every theory be vain because it will procure but three fourths of the chances of success? If the moral of an army and of i
Wagram (Niederosterreich, Austria) (search for this): chapter 8
ur lines of operations have been skillfully chosen, your movements well disguised; if the enemy, on the contrary, make false movements which permit you to fall upon the yet dispersed fractions of his army, you will be able to conquer without pitched battles, by the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively the discussed history of a few campaigns of the great masters, maintain still that there are neither principles nor good maxims of war, then one could only pity them and reply to them by the famous saying of Frederick the Great: A mule which s
Borodino (Russia) (search for this): chapter 8
s. If your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen, your movements well disguised; if the enemy, on the contrary, make false movements which permit you to fall upon the yet dispersed fractions of his army, you will be able to conquer without pitched battles, by the sole ascendancy of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties find themselves in equally good condition at the moment when the rencounter shall have place, then there will result one of those great tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, in which the precepts of grand tactics indicated in Chapter IV, will certainly be able to exercise a notable influence. If certain obstinate military men, after having read this book, after having studied attentively the discussed history of a few campaigns of the great masters, maintain still that there are neither principles nor good maxims of war, then one could only pity them and reply to them by the famous saying of Frederick the Great: A mul
Marlborough (search for this): chapter 8
tions as well as to individuals. One could not compare the French at Rosback with those at Jena nor the Prussians at Prenzlow with those at Dennewitz.--in a word, all that which may be called the poetry and the metaphysics of war, will ever have an influence upon its results. Is it saying, for all that, that there are no tactical rules, and that no tactical theory could be useful? What reasonable military man would dare pronounce such a blasphemy? Will it be believed that Eugene and Marlborough have triumphed only by inspiration, or by the moral superiority of their battalions? Will there not be found, on the contrary, in the victories of Turin, of Hochstaedt, of Ramillies, manoeuvres which resemble those of Talavera, of Waterloo, of Jena, or of Austerlitz, and which were the causes of victory? Now, when the application of a maxim, and the manoeuvre which has been its result, have a hundred times given the victory to skillful captains, and offer in their favor all the probable