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United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 10
ke it to our advantage. Therefore I propose, as necessary both for the offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately. Other preparations for advance are going on., No notice was taken of this explanation. In the mean time our scouts were furnishing evidence of almost daily arrivals of Federal reenforcements, which was punctually communicated to the Administration through General Bragg. From these indications it was clear that the military authorities of the United States were assembling in our front a much greater force than that which had driven us from Missionary Ridge a few months before. On the contrary, our army had not recovered from the effects of that defeat-numerically, that is to say. It was as plain that these Federal preparations were made not for the purpose of holding the ground won from us in the previous campaign, but for the resumption of offensive operations. On the 25th, therefore, I again urged upon the Government the necessity of s
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
o reference had been made to the design of recovering Middle Tennessee, I reminded him of it on the 27th, through General Br throw a heavy column of cavalry, as a diversion, into West Tennessee; and thence, if practicable, into Middle Tennessee, toMiddle Tennessee, to operate on the enemy's lines of communication and distract his attention. If by a rapid movement, after crossing the mo to say necessity, of reclaiming the provision country of Tennessee and Kentucky; and, from my knowledge of the country and p to be prepared to beat him here; he has not come back to Tennessee to stand on the defensive; his advance, should we be readmake it easy. There is another reason: Grant's return to Tennessee indicates that he will retain that command, for the presean only be found near Chattanooga. The march into Middle Tennessee, via Kingston, would require all the stores we shouldville en route. Would it not be easier to march into Middle Tennessee through North Alabama I believe fully, however, that
Resaca (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
10 Disposition of the Confederate troops. affair at Dug Gap. cavalry light at Varnell's Station. fighting at Resaca. General Wheeler encounters Stoneman's cavalry. army withdrawn to Resaca to meet flanking movement of the enemy. As,Resaca to meet flanking movement of the enemy. As, since the President's letter of December 23d, no reference had been made to the design of recovering Middle Tennessee, I reminded him of it on the 27th, through General Bragg, who was virtually his chief staff-officer, in the following letter: Geneered Major-General Martin, with his division, from the valley of the Etowah to that of the Oostenaula, to observe it from Resaca to Rome. Brigadier-General Kelly, whose little division of cavalry had just come up from the vicinity of Resaca, was ordh to that of the Oostenaula, to observe it from Resaca to Rome. Brigadier-General Kelly, whose little division of cavalry had just come up from the vicinity of Resaca, was ordered to join the troops of that arm in observation on the Cleveland road.
Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
s in a great measure on its connection with Chattanooga for support, and both are entirely dependen and destroy the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga, fulfills both conditions. To accomplisrland is low, similar to the one in passing Chattanooga, you isolate that position and compel a retle. Such a position can only be found near Chattanooga. The march into Middle Tennessee, via Kailroads enough to compel the evacuation of Chattanooga. Certainly it could make a powerful diversral army at Knoxville, equally distant from Chattanooga and Dalton, was exactly between Longstreet nited forces on the road from that place to Chattanooga, at the point nearest to Dalton, and employe navigation of the Tennessee — the army in Chattanooga might be induced in that way to attack in or position, and repairing the railroad from Chattanooga to Ringgold. The intelligence received on t Charleston, on the 2d, both on the way to Chattanooga; and that these troops and the Army of the [1 more...]
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
Lieutenant-General Polk thought at the end of February that he could send fifteen thousand cavalry on such an expedition. Even two-thirds of that force might injure the railroads enough to compel the evacuation of Chattanooga. Certainly it could make a powerful diversion. I apprehend no difficulty in procuring food (except meat) and forage. This department can furnish nothing. Its officers receive supplies from those of the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments at and beyond Atlanta. The efficient head of the Ordnance Department has never permitted us to want any thing that could reasonably be expected from him. I am afraid that the collection of the additional field-transportation will require a good deal of time. None can be obtained within the limits of my authority. There has been an unnecessary accumulation of bread-stuffs and corn at Mobile-six months supply for a much larger force than Major-General Maury's. Half of it will spoil during the summer, if left
Knoxville (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
ove upon his lines of communication. The force in Knoxville depends in a great measure on its connection with t move simultaneously by a route east and south of Knoxville, so as to form a junction with you near this cross. As soon as you come within supporting distance, Knoxville is isolated, and Chattanooga threatened, with barefor them. It strikes me that we cannot isolate Knoxville in the manner you propose, because we cannot hope ain our own communications and interrupt those of Knoxville. Such a position can only be found near Chattanooransport from Dalton., so that we could not reduce Knoxville en route. Would it not be easier to march into Miy authorities in Richmond; for the Federal army at Knoxville, equally distant from Chattanooga and Dalton, was le; that the only manner in which we could isolate Knoxville would be by placing our united forces on the roadin order to drive us back and reopen the routes to Knoxville; and that the attempt to unite the Army of Tenness
Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
the line of communication long enough to incommode the forces there. We cannot do so unless we can occupy a position from which we can maintain our own communications and interrupt those of Knoxville. Such a position can only be found near Chattanooga. The march into Middle Tennessee, via Kingston, would require all the stores we should be able to transport from Dalton., so that we could not reduce Knoxville en route. Would it not be easier to march into Middle Tennessee through North Alabama I believe fully, however, that Grant will be ready to act before we can be; and that, if we are ready to fight him on our own ground, we shall have a very plain course, with every chance of success. For that, we should make exactly such preparations as you indicate for the forward movement, except that I would have the troops assembled here without delay, to repel Grant's attack, and then make our own; or, should the enemy not take the initiative, do it ourselves. Our first object then
Kingston (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
u explain should be assembled in this vicinity. The enemy could, without particular effort, prevent their junction near Kingston by attacking one of our armies with his united forces. His interior positions make it easy. There is another reason: Gerrupt those of Knoxville. Such a position can only be found near Chattanooga. The march into Middle Tennessee, via Kingston, would require all the stores we should be able to transport from Dalton., so that we could not reduce Knoxville en routxville, equally distant from Chattanooga and Dalton, was exactly between Longstreet and our main army-and, to unite near Kingston as proposed, each of our armies would be compelled to march in front of a much greater Federal force, exposed to attack ack and reopen the routes to Knoxville; and that the attempt to unite the Army of Tennessee and Longstreet's corps, near Kingston, would be a violation of a sound military rule, never to assemble the troops that are to act together, in such a manner
Augusta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
at the collection of the additional field-transportation will require a good deal of time. None can be obtained within the limits of my authority. There has been an unnecessary accumulation of bread-stuffs and corn at Mobile-six months supply for a much larger force than Major-General Maury's. Half of it will spoil during the summer, if left in Mobile. It would be economical, therefore, as well as convenient, to transfer that portion of it to this army. Lieutenant-Colonel Cole, at Augusta, informs me that the artillery-horses required will be furnished by the 1st of May. Besides the foregoing, other reasons for opposing the plan of operations explained by General Bragg, were committed to Colonel Sale, to be delivered orally-such as: That the interior positions belonged to the enemy, instead of being held by us as was supposed by the military authorities in Richmond; for the Federal army at Knoxville, equally distant from Chattanooga and Dalton, was exactly between Longst
Cleveland, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 10
rrard's, and McCook's divisions arrived-adding, probably, twelve thousand. Our scouts reported that the Fourth Corps and McCook's division of cavalry were at Cleveland, and the Army of the Ohio at Charleston, on the 2d, both on the way to Chattanooga; and that these troops and the Army of the Cumberland reached Ringgold in the afternoon of the 4th and encamped there. Our pickets (cavalry) were at the same time pressed back beyond Varnell's Station, on the Cleveland road, and within three miles of Tunnel Hill, on that from Ringgold. Upon these indications that the enemy was advancing upon us in great force, I again urged the Administration, by tel, and ordered Major-General Martin, with his division, from the valley of the Etowah to that of the Oostenaula, to observe it from Resaca to Rome. Brigadier-General Kelly, whose little division of cavalry had just come up from the vicinity of Resaca, was ordered to join the troops of that arm in observation on the Cleveland road.
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