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1st (search for this): chapter 14
s, Honorables A. G. Brown, D. F. Kenner, E. Barksdale, and W. P. Harris, See their dispatch, pages 212, 213. thought thirty thousand more troops necessary, they being on the spot. For the causes of Confederate disasters in Mississippi, the reader is referred to pages 204-211. The assertions concerning the little siege of Jackson are contradicted by the very correspondence See it as published by Confederate Congress, and in Appendix, pages referred to, and in pages 207 and 208. On the first day, July 9th, I telegraphed to Mr. Davis that I should endeavor to hold the place. On the 11th: It (the intrenched line) is very defective; cannot stand a siege, but improves a bad position against assault. On the 13th: The enemy's rifles (cannon) reached all parts of the town, showing the weakness of the position, and its untenableness against a powerful artillery. . . . If the position and works were not bad, want of stores, which could not be collected, would make it impossible to stan
6th (search for this): chapter 14
st of the topographical corps reported to me afterward. As regards the efficiency of the party, Lieutenant Heinrichs and myself were the only ones who had any experience in sketching topography, and, this being our first essay in the military line, we were ridiculously minute, and consequently very slow. I left Manassas March 3d, on my reconnaissance to the Rappahannock; I taking the upper route, and sending Lieutenant Randolph, who had just reported, by the lower. I reported to you on the 6th, at Centreville; received orders on the 7th to prepare Rappahannock Bridge for the passage of trains. The bridge was completed Tuesday morning (11th), just as the trains came up. In the consultation, the President seemed to think that the army was exposed, and desired its removal. I thought the object of change of position ought to be, facility of uniting all our forces promptly, when McClellan's designs should be developed. It terminated with informal verbal orders to me to fall back
11th (search for this): chapter 14
e full knowledge of your correspondence, and I am sure that you received no dispatches from Richmond on the way. You could have received no telegram, for there was no telegraph-office on our route. We reached the Rappahannock before noon of the 11th, and the troops bivouacked immediately. A telegraph-office was established afterward in a house near the bridge. The railroad-bridge. If imperative instructions to halt ever came to me from Richmond, it must have been when the army was establishdicted by the very correspondence See it as published by Confederate Congress, and in Appendix, pages referred to, and in pages 207 and 208. On the first day, July 9th, I telegraphed to Mr. Davis that I should endeavor to hold the place. On the 11th: It (the intrenched line) is very defective; cannot stand a siege, but improves a bad position against assault. On the 13th: The enemy's rifles (cannon) reached all parts of the town, showing the weakness of the position, and its untenableness ag
13th (search for this): chapter 14
in Mississippi, the reader is referred to pages 204-211. The assertions concerning the little siege of Jackson are contradicted by the very correspondence See it as published by Confederate Congress, and in Appendix, pages referred to, and in pages 207 and 208. On the first day, July 9th, I telegraphed to Mr. Davis that I should endeavor to hold the place. On the 11th: It (the intrenched line) is very defective; cannot stand a siege, but improves a bad position against assault. On the 13th: The enemy's rifles (cannon) reached all parts of the town, showing the weakness of the position, and its untenableness against a powerful artillery. . . . If the position and works were not bad, want of stores, which could not be collected, would make it impossible to stand a siege. These were my only dispatches to the President on the subject. Stores were not lost, for we had none in Jackson. We were supplied by the railroad from the East, and our depot was at its terminus east of Pea
15th (search for this): chapter 14
he second department of the Confederacy in importance. In war, the testimony of an enemy in one's favor is certainly worth more than that of a friend, as he who receives a blow can better estimate the dexterity of the striker than any spectator. I therefore offer that of one of the most prominent officers of the United States Army, who was conspicuous in this campaign, in the following letter: New York City, October 21, 1873. General M. Lovell: My Dear General: Your letter of the 15th inst., requesting my professional opinion concerning the conduct of the retreat of the Confederate army in 1864, while commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, and also of the impression produced in the Union army on being informed of the removal of that officer from his position, was received. I have no possible objection to communicating to you my views on this subject, briefly, of course (as I have not my notes and maps of the campaign near me to refer to), and, besides, I wish it to be unde
18th (search for this): chapter 14
s About six thousand effective men. were sent to the army in the Valley, and the President thought more urgently required. If I had been professing to be able to crush Patterson, those regiments would not have been sent to me, nor would the President have explained See his letters on pages 29 and 31. so earnestly why he did not send more. This when Beauregard needed them greatly. Not even a suggestion to move to Manassas was sent to me before the telegram of July 17th, received on the 18th. On the contrary, the President's instructions to me in General Cooper's letters of June 13th, 18th, and 19th, and in his own of June 22d, and July 10th and 13th, prove that he had no such thought. And these letters prove that in all the time between the march from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, and that to Manassas, the intended that the Army I commanded should be employed in the defense of the Valley. In the letter quoted, General E. K. Smith wrote: As second in command and your adjutant-
January 23rd (search for this): chapter 14
idence of the army and people, then. His great fame was acquired subsequently, at the head of that army. Mr. Davis can claim no merit for the selection, for General Lee was the only general available; and was then, as he had been previously, in a position inadequate to his rank. 5. When the President assigned me to the command of Generals Bragg, Pemberton, and Kirby Smith, he fixed my headquarters in Tennessee. Before the end of December I transferred them to Mississippi. On the 23d of January he ordered me to Tennessee on special service. When I was returning to Mississippi after having performed it, he ordered See page 163. me to return to Tullahoma and take personal command of General Bragg's army. This made it officially impossible for me to return to Jackson; so that all my absence from Mississippi, in 1863, was compelled by the President. I went to Mississippi in May only in consequence of a positive order, because I had been deprived by the President of the power to
February 1st (search for this): chapter 14
he two armies were equally on the defensive at the time apparently referred to. The result of the conference See pages 75 and 76. at Fairfax Court-House terminated our hope of assuming the offensive, and, in consequence, the army was placed at Centreville and intrenched. So far from expressing satisfaction with the strength and excellence of the army, I urged, at Fairfax Court-House, that it should be increased by at least fifty per cent., and my only letter See those especially of February 1st to the acting Secretary of War, page 91; and March 1st, to the President, page 100. on the subject expressed the strongest dissatisfaction with the condition in numbers and discipline to which the army was reduced by the interference of the War Department with its interior management. The concentration of a vast amount of stores and material of war in and about Manassas was made by the Government itself against my repeated remonstrances, See note page 98, including Colonel Cole's letter
February 20th (search for this): chapter 14
Cole, chief commissary. Fifteen days were devoted by the army to the removal of the public property that had been recklessly collected at Manassas. It would have been very dangerous to the public safety to employ it longer in that way; for, on the eve of a formidable invasion, it was of great importance that it should be so placed as to be able to unite promptly with other available forces, to repel this invasion. I indicated no intention to fall back before the consultation on the 20th of February. The condition of the country made military operations on a large scale impossible, so that the most timid could have imagined no cause for hasty retreat. And in the consultation later, when the country was somewhat less impracticable, I opposed See fifth paragraph, page 106. any movement on account of the difficulty, which indicates that I could not have intended one when the difficulties would have been much greater. I was not ignorant of the country. I had studied it carefull
February 22nd (search for this): chapter 14
nt to the army at the time (before the consultation) nor for the object asserted, but in consequence of an application by me, repeated after the consultation, February 22d. and they reported about the 3d of March, when an attempt by them to make a map of the country would have been absurd, if they had been competent to such work. winter that, when the army left its present position, its next would be behind the Rappahannock. When the orders to remove public property were given on the 22d of February, the principal staff-officers were informed that the new position of the army would be the south bank of the Rappahannock. The right wing, ordered to Frederi the withdrawal of the army from Centreville and Bull Run in March, 1862, I will state that, when you ordered the removal of the military stores from Manassas, February 22d, your principal staff-officers were informed that the position of the army would be on the south side of the Rappahannock, near the railroad-bridge. I accompa
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