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Caffey (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
he moment of the immediate ground, your first idea, as I remember, was that your forces should assemble as early as possible at a point designated on the maps as Monterey, in advance of Corinth, toward the Federal position. But, as your own health was infirm at the time, you entrusted General Bragg with the duty of a personal examination of the terrain, though stating your preference for Monterey as the true strategic point to be occupied. That officer, however, having reported adversely to Monterey, you settled upon Corinth as your base of operations. Meanwhile, in several dispatches, you urged General Sidney Johnston, who had fallen back from NashMonterey, you settled upon Corinth as your base of operations. Meanwhile, in several dispatches, you urged General Sidney Johnston, who had fallen back from Nashville in the direction of Stevenson, to join his forces to your own at the same point, and with the army thus assembled to fall upon and crush the Federal army at Pittsburg landing before it had been fully concentrated for offensive operations. One or more of your communications to this effect you sent by Captain J. M. Otey, of
Tennessee River (United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
pported, you found ready to fall by its own weight, in consequence of the appearance in the Tennessee river of a heavy offensive Federal force under General Grant on the one side, and of General Buelrt. This you urged, not only as essential for the maintenance of Confederate control of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, but also as placing our forces in a far better position with respect tocussed them in the paper in question, let me note, that Fort Henry, on the east bank of the Tennessee river, was twelve miles distant from Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the Cumberland, while botferred from Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, to Pittsburg landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee river, and near which the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi touch each other. Withoed no farther in advance than at and around Monterey, and did not reach the vicinity of the Tennessee river until about 2.30 P. M. on the 5th (the distance traversed to Monterey and beyond not having
Iuka (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
ly once again to General Johnston for reinforcements, asking him to spare you, as well as I recollect, at least five thousand men, and to send them by rail with as little delay as possible. His answer was the immediate announcement that he had now concluded to make the junction of his forces with your own. This was done without delay, so far as to bring to Corinth from eight to ten thousand men under General Hardee, while the remainder of his army was put in position at Burns' station and at Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Soon after his arrival at Corinth, as I understood at the time, General Johnston desired to turn over the direct command of the united armies to you and to confine his own functions to those of a department commander, with his headquarters separated from the forces in operation, alleging as his reason for so doing the highly patriotic and unselfish view of affairs, that such a course would be best for the success of the cause, insomuch as he apprehe
Huntsville (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
with the army thus assembled to fall upon and crush the Federal army at Pittsburg landing before it had been fully concentrated for offensive operations. One or more of your communications to this effect you sent by Captain J. M. Otey, of the Adjutant-General's staff, and by an Aid-de-Camp, Captain Ferguson, I believe. General Johnston, however, did not seem to see the necessity of the proposed concentration, but turning from the direction of Stevenson, preferred for the time to occupy Huntsville and the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad for a short distance westward and separated about one hundred miles from your army. Your own forces you had organized into two nearly equal corps, the one under Major-General Polk, the other under Major-General Bragg, and these were subdivided respectively into two divisions. While at Jackson (West Tennessee) you had applied to the War Department once more for the officers from the Army of the Potomac upon whose promotion and assignme
Shiloh, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
ordan. To the Editor of the Savannah Republican: My attention has been recently attracted to a wide-spread article under the caption of A lost opportunity at Shiloh, which, it appears, is taken from a letter addressed to your journal by your regular correspondent P. W. A. This article is calculated to elevate a subordinate Ge enough to feel assured that he wrote with no such purpose, and yet that must be the effect with all who have given credit to the story of the Lost opportunity at Shiloh. Having been on the staff of General Beauregard during the battle of Shiloh, I happen to know the exact truth of the matter misrepresented to P. W. A. by his ption of the untruth, I think it proper to ask space for a brief statement. General Prentiss did not deceive the Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces at Shiloh by any shallow invention, either in regard to the movements of General Buell's army or the existence of extensive works at Pittsburg landing. General Beauregard h
modification, I drew up the general order which was published to the army at Corinth. Under that order, as you will recollect, the forces were arranged into three corps, respectively under Major-Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, leaving the cavalry and certain troops along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad unattached to corps. You were announced as second in command. Major-General Bragg was nominally appointed chief of the general staff, a position borrowed from continental European armies, although there was no such office provided by law for in the Confederate military organization, which, however, was not regarded as material at the time, as General Bragg was not to be detached or at all diverted from the command of his corps; and in fact his assignment to the position was in order simply to enable him, at some possible exigent moment on the field, to give orders in the name of General Johnston, a power which both the Commander-in-Chief and yourself desired that Gen
Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
the capture of Grant's army, wrecked even as it was and cowering under the high river banks, yet sheltered by his gunboats, but in the greater dispersion and disorganization of our own jaded troops, and to such an extent, indeed, in such a field as to have rendered it impossible to have collected them on the next morning in any order to have offered resistance even to Wallace's fresh division of Grant's army. Even as it was, at no time during the 7th of April were we able to engage the enemy with more than 15,000 men, with whom, however, properly massed and handled, we held the field against Wallace, the debris of Grant's division and Buell's army (35,000) until it became evidently wrong to maintain longer so unequal a battle; when our forces were withdrawn from the field in an order and spirit without a parallel in war, and without abatement of the honor they had won for our arms, leaving the enemy stunned and unable to follow. Thomas Jordan. Chattanooga, Tennessee, August 8, 1862.
Columbus, Ky. (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
entreville, Virginia, at the end of January, 1862, under orders attaching you to the Confederate forces in the West, you proceeded directly to Bowling Green to report to and confer with General Johnston; while, under your instructions, I repaired to Richmond to discuss with the Confederate Secretary of War certain matters, the arrangement of which you regarded as vital to the effective discharge of the duties that were to be devolved upon you. My orders were to meet you subsequently at Columbus, Kentucky, the headquarters of Major-General Polk, whom you were to succeed in command. My visit to Richmond having been in the main unfruitful, I proceeded immediately to Columbus, where I soon received telegraphic orders to retrace my steps to meet you at Jackson, West Tennessee, at which place I joined you within a week after the fall of Fort Donelson. At once, in the course of a full conversation with me touching your visit to Bowling Green, you stated first your grievous disappointmen
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
, New Orleans, La.: My Dear General — In compliance with your request, I make the following statement of my recollections of an important incident of your official visit to the headquarters of General Albert Sidney Johnston, at Bowling Green, Kentucky, early in the month of February, 1862. Upon leaving Centreville, Virginia, at the end of January, 1862, under orders attaching you to the Confederate forces in the West, you proceeded directly to Bowling Green to report to and confer with Genrecollect, the Confederate forces immediately disposable by General Johnston were the command at Bowling Green, a little over 23,000 men; the remains of the late General Zollicoffer's division — beaten several weeks before at Mill Spring, Southeastern Kentucky--namely, 5,000 men; Major-General Polk's force at Columbus, nearly 14,000 strong, and the garrison at Fort Donelson, some 3,500 men — that is to say, in all about 45,000 men, who could, for the most part, be readily concentrated for any d<
Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 7.65
ught from Pensacola and Mobile, the latter having been added to your command in consequence of your urgent appeals to the Richmond authorities, supported probably by the direct application of Major-General Bragg himself. This concentration was with the view to meet and baffle the evident offensive purposes for which the Federal army was transferred from Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, to Pittsburg landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee river, and near which the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi touch each other. Without having any personal knowledge at the moment of the immediate ground, your first idea, as I remember, was that your forces should assemble as early as possible at a point designated on the maps as Monterey, in advance of Corinth, toward the Federal position. But, as your own health was infirm at the time, you entrusted General Bragg with the duty of a personal examination of the terrain, though stating your preference for Monterey as the true s
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