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1st (search for this): chapter 16
t his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform. In fact, Lee did not know that Meade had moved at all, and his own movement eastward was really inspired by apprehension for his own communications, aroused by Hooker's action before he had been superseded. Although Meade had selected his proposed line of battle behind Pipe Creek, and now announced his intention to rest his troops, he still, on the 1st, ordered a further advance of each of his seven corps, as follows: The 5th corps was ordered to Hanover; the 6th corps to Manchester; the 12th corps to Two Taverns; the 3d corps to Emmitsburg, and the 1st and 11th corps to Gettysburg. These advances were not intended to bring on a battle, but to cover the position selected, allowing space in front to delay the enemy's approach and give time for preparation. The instructions to Reynolds, who was in command on the left, were not to bring on
2nd (search for this): chapter 16
mpatient. When Stuart, at last, reported in person, late in the afternoon of the 2d, although Lee said only, Well, General, you are here at last, his manner implieder Lee's death that Longstreet had disobeyed orders in not attacking early on the 2d. No orders whatever were given Longstreet that night. Before sunset, he had ridnight they bivouacked four miles from the field. Marching again at dawn on the 2d, they arrived near the field between 6 and 8 A. M. His reserve artillery (the Was, recalled from New Guilford C. H., did not rejoin its division until noon on the 2d, having marched at 3 A. M., and covered by that time about 20 miles. Pickett's dirching from Hanover at 7 P. M., arrived on the field, 14 miles, at 8 A. M. on the 2d. The 6th corps, from the Union right at Manchester, arrived about 2 P. M., after a march of about 32 miles in 17 hours. At 8 A. M. of the 2d, therefore, practically the whole of both armies was upon the field except Pickett's division and La
3rd (search for this): chapter 16
an organization in every large army. On Wednesday, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of manoeuvring Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahannock by a movement of the 1st and 2d corps toward Culpeper. Hood and McLaws marched on the 3d, Rodes on the 4th, and Early and Johnson on the 5th. Longstreet's reserve — the Washington Artillery with eight guns, and my own with 26— marched on the 3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small forc3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rappahannock, at the old position near the mouth of Deep Run. On this, Lee ordered Ewell's corps to halt and await developments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the afternoon, Lee himself left Fredericksburg for Culpeper. Hill's corps now stood alone in front of Hooker's entire army. Meanwhile, Hooker had sent Buford's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry, supported by Russell's and Ames's brigades of infant
4th (search for this): chapter 16
ice, its being discontinued was due to our poverty of guns, not to dissatisfaction with the system. And the fine service at Gettysburg by the Federal reserve of 110 guns, under Hunt, would seem to demonstrate the advantage of such an organization in every large army. On Wednesday, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of manoeuvring Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahannock by a movement of the 1st and 2d corps toward Culpeper. Hood and McLaws marched on the 3d, Rodes on the 4th, and Early and Johnson on the 5th. Longstreet's reserve — the Washington Artillery with eight guns, and my own with 26— marched on the 3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rappahannock, at the old position near the mouth of Deep Run. On this, Lee ordered Ewell's corps to halt and await developments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the afternoon, Le
5th (search for this): chapter 16
, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of manoeuvring Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahannock by a movement of the 1st and 2d corps toward Culpeper. Hood and McLaws marched on the 3d, Rodes on the 4th, and Early and Johnson on the 5th. Longstreet's reserve — the Washington Artillery with eight guns, and my own with 26— marched on the 3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rappahannock, at the old position near t5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rappahannock, at the old position near the mouth of Deep Run. On this, Lee ordered Ewell's corps to halt and await developments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the afternoon, Lee himself left Fredericksburg for Culpeper. Hill's corps now stood alone in front of Hooker's entire army. Meanwhile, Hooker had sent Buford's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry, supported by Russell's and Ames's brigades of infantry, to attack Stuart's camps near the Rappahannock
9th (search for this): chapter 16
Ewell's corps to halt and await developments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the afternoon, Lee himself left Fredericksburg for Culpeper. Hill's corps now stood alone in front of Hooker's entire army. Meanwhile, Hooker had sent Buford's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry, supported by Russell's and Ames's brigades of infantry, to attack Stuart's camps near the Rappahannock. A severe cavalry battle resulted on the 9th, near Brandy Station. The enemy's attack was a surprise, and the isolated Confederate brigades, first encountered, were so roughly handled that help was called for from the infantry and artillery. My own battalion and an infantry force were sent to the field, but reached it too late. The enemy, having obtained the information which was the object of his expedition, withdrew across the Rappahannock under cover of his infantry brigades, with loss of three guns and 907 men. Stuart's loss was
13th (search for this): chapter 16
tions were made to storm the fortified line at dawn on the 15th, an enterprise which might easily have been disastrous, had they been well defended. But Milroy saw his communications threatened, and did not wait for the attack. About dawn, his retreating forces were struck in the flank near Stephenson's depot by Steuart's and the Stonewall brigade, and were routed with the loss of about 2400 men and 23 guns. Rodes's division, going by Berryville, had driven the enemy from that point on the 13th, and on the 14th had captured Martinsburg late in the afternoon, taking five guns and many stores. Most of the enemy escaped under cover of darkness, though the pursuit was pushed until late at night. On the 15th, starting at 10 A. M., Rodes reached Williamsport at dark and at once crossed three brigades and three batteries over the Potomac. The marches made by Ewell's whole corps in this swoop upon Milroy, and the fruits of victory secured, compare well with the work of the same corps un
14th (search for this): chapter 16
f it on the Plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him? Hooker would have only been too glad to try, but Stanton and Halleck were on guard over him, and practically the Army of the Potomac was bound hand and foot, and Lee was free to work his own will, unmolested, until Hooker should be forced to tender his resignation. Hooker's movement toward Manassas was at once followed by Hill's marching for Culpeper on the 14th, and, on the 15th, Longstreet marched from Culpeper to take position east of the Blue Ridge, while Hill passed in his rear and crossed the mountains to Winchester via Front Royal. When Hill was safely in the Valley, Longstreet also entered through Ashby's and Snicker's gaps, and about the 20th the two corps were united. The cavalry had acted as a screen in front of Longstreet during this advance, and, in this duty, had severe encounters with the enemy at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville,
15th (search for this): chapter 16
ohnson advanced upon Winchester, and, on the 13th and 14th, drove Milroy's forces into the city. Preparations were made to storm the fortified line at dawn on the 15th, an enterprise which might easily have been disastrous, had they been well defended. But Milroy saw his communications threatened, and did not wait for the attackin the afternoon, taking five guns and many stores. Most of the enemy escaped under cover of darkness, though the pursuit was pushed until late at night. On the 15th, starting at 10 A. M., Rodes reached Williamsport at dark and at once crossed three brigades and three batteries over the Potomac. The marches made by Ewell's whoker should be forced to tender his resignation. Hooker's movement toward Manassas was at once followed by Hill's marching for Culpeper on the 14th, and, on the 15th, Longstreet marched from Culpeper to take position east of the Blue Ridge, while Hill passed in his rear and crossed the mountains to Winchester via Front Royal.
24th (search for this): chapter 16
asted no time paroling prisoners and saving wagons, his raid might have been successful, as raids go, for his whole casualties were but 89 killed, wounded, and missing. But the venture was a strategic mistake, for it resulted in the battle's being one of chance collision, with the Confederates taking the offensive, whereas the plan of the campaign had been to fight a defensive battle. Hill crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on June 23, and Longstreet began crossing at Williamsport on the 24th. Hooker was not far behind, for he crossed at Edward's Ferry on the 25th and 26th, and moved to the vicinity of Frederick. Here he threatened Lee's rear through the South Mountain passes, if he moved north, and, at the same time, covered Washington. Hooker had, meanwhile, been placed in command of the troops at Washington (some 26,000 men), and at Harper's Ferry, where there were about 11,000. It was a wise order, but under the policy of not allowing Hooker to fight, it was but a sham, as
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