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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

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s on the 27th of March. offers to turn over command of the army to General Beauregard, who declines. General Beauregard urges an early offensive movement against the enemy, and gives his views as to plan of organizing the forces. General Johnston authorizes him to complete the organization already begun. General orders of March 29th. reasons why the army was formed into small corps. General Beauregard desirous of moving against the enemy on the 1st of April. why it was not done. on the 2d, General Cheatham reports a strong Federal force threatening his front. General Beauregard advises an immediate advance. General Johnston yields. General Jordan's statement of his interview with General Johnston on that occasion. special orders no. 8, otherwise called order of March and battle. by whom suggested and by whom written. General Beauregard explains the order to corps commanders. tardiness of the first corps in marching from Corinth. our forces in position for battle on the
the First Corps, who, instead of moving forward upon the full verbal instructions he had received, held his corps under arms and, with its trains, blocked the way of the other troops. As soon as this most unfortunate delay was brought to General Beauregard's knowledge, he despatched an order to the First Corps to clear the way at once, which was done; but it was already dark before the rear of its column filed out of Corinth. Had it not been for this deplorable loss of the afternoon of the 3d, the Confederate army must have made the march to the immediate vicinity of the enemy by the evening of the 4th. The attack would then have been made on the morning of the 5th, as had been planned, or twenty-four hours earlier than it actually occurred, in which event Buell must have reached the theatre of action entirely too late to retrieve the disaster inflicted upon Grant, and must himself have been forced to retire from middle Tennessee. The delay which had marked the outset was followe
outset was followed by unwarrantable tardiness in the general conduct of the march, so much so that, by the evening of the 4th, the forces bivouacked at and slightly in advance of Monterey, only ten miles from Corinth; and it was not until two o'cloce traversed was not more than about seventeen and a half miles. True, there were heavy rain-falls during the night of the 4th, and the early part of the next day, which made the roads somewhat difficult, not to speak of their narrowness and of the of so raw a force as ours. We knew, from the careful examination of Colonel Crocket, the Federal officer captured on the 4th, that, up to the evening of that day, there were no breastworks; but the several warnings given by the conflict in which hand ran away, held their ground against sixty thousand chosen troops of the South with their best leaders. On Friday, the 4th, no officers nor soldiers, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can prove. It is somewhat strange t
federate army must have made the march to the immediate vicinity of the enemy by the evening of the 4th. The attack would then have been made on the morning of the 5th, as had been planned, or twenty-four hours earlier than it actually occurred, in which event Buell must have reached the theatre of action entirely too late to retrby the evening of the 4th, the forces bivouacked at and slightly in advance of Monterey, only ten miles from Corinth; and it was not until two o'clock P. M., on the 5th, that they approached the Federal position, near the Shiloh meeting-house. The whole distance traversed was not more than about seventeen and a half miles. True, tate army had advanced and was then assembled at Monterey and vicinity, less than nine miles in his front. Our forces, as they had arrived in the afternoon of the 5th, at the intersection of the Griersford (Lick Creek) and Ridge roads, from Corinth to Pittsburg, less than two miles from the Shiloh meeting-house, were formed into
Federal force threatening his front. General Beauregard advises an immediate advance. General Johnston yields. General Jordan's statement of his interview with General Johnston on that occasion. special orders no. 8, otherwise called order of March and battle. by whom suggested and by whom written. General Beauregard explains the order to corps commanders. tardiness of the first corps in marching from Corinth. our forces in position for battle on the afternoon of the 5th; too late to co Johnston calls General Beauregard and the corps commanders in an informal council. General Beauregard believes the object of the movement foiled by the tardiness of troops in arriving on the battle-field. alludes to noisy demonstrations on the March, and to the probability of Buell's Junction, and advises to change aggressive movement into a reconnoissance in force. General Johnston decides otherwise, and orders preparations for an attack at dawn next day. description of the field of Shilo
March 18th (search for this): chapter 20
thousand strong, exclusive of cavalry—were halted at Beirnsville and Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. A shade of sadness, if not of despondency, rested upon General Johnston's brow. The keen anxiety and still-increasing gloom overspreading the country weighed heavily upon him. He suffered deeply, both as a patriot and as a soldier; but men of his courage and character are uncomplaining. The test of merit, in my profession, with the people, he wrote to Mr. Davis, on the 18th of March, is success. It is a hard rule, but I think it right. The concluding lines of his letter show what were his feelings, when complying with General Beauregard's urgent request for a junction of their armies: If I join this corps to the forces of Beauregard (I confess, a hazardous experiment), then, those who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument. Soon after General Johnston's arrival, and in the course of his first conference with General Beauregard, he expressed,
March 22nd (search for this): chapter 20
ment into a reconnoissance in force. General Johnston decides otherwise, and orders preparations for an attack at dawn next day. description of the field of Shiloh. strength of the Federal forces. what General Sherman testified to. we form into three lines of battle. our effective strength. carelessness and oversight of the Federal commanders. they are not aroused by the many sounds in their front, and are taken by surprise.> General Johnston reached Corinth on the night of the 22d of March, in advance of his army, which followed closely after him, portions arriving daily up to the 27th. General Hardee took position in the vicinity, with a body of about eight thousand men; while the remainder, under General Crittenden—some five thousand strong, exclusive of cavalry—were halted at Beirnsville and Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. A shade of sadness, if not of despondency, rested upon General Johnston's brow. The keen anxiety and still-increasing gloom overspr
March 27th (search for this): chapter 20
Chapter 19: Arrival of General Johnston at Corinth. position of his troops on the 27th of March. offers to turn over command of the army to General Beauregard, who declines. General Beauregard urges an early offensive movement against the enemy, and gives his views as to plan of organizing the forces. General Johnston authorizes him to complete the organization already begun. General orders of March 29th. reasons why the army was formed into small corps. General Beauregard desirous of moving against the enemy on the 1st of April. why it was not done. on the 2d, General Cheatham reports a strong Federal force threatening his front. General Beauregard advises an immediate advance. General Johnston yields. General Jordan's statement of his interview with General Johnston on that occasion. special orders no. 8, otherwise called order of March and battle. by whom suggested and by whom written. General Beauregard explains the order to corps commanders. tardiness
March 29th (search for this): chapter 20
Chapter 19: Arrival of General Johnston at Corinth. position of his troops on the 27th of March. offers to turn over command of the army to General Beauregard, who declines. General Beauregard urges an early offensive movement against the enemy, and gives his views as to plan of organizing the forces. General Johnston authorizes him to complete the organization already begun. General orders of March 29th. reasons why the army was formed into small corps. General Beauregard desirous of moving against the enemy on the 1st of April. why it was not done. on the 2d, General Cheatham reports a strong Federal force threatening his front. General Beauregard advises an immediate advance. General Johnston yields. General Jordan's statement of his interview with General Johnston on that occasion. special orders no. 8, otherwise called order of March and battle. by whom suggested and by whom written. General Beauregard explains the order to corps commanders. tardiness
es at that important point being considered indispensable. See Chapter XVIII., p. 257. General Beauregard, notwithstanding his impaired health, devoted himself assiduously to preparing the army for an immediate offensive movement, which he hoped would take place, at latest, on the 1st of April, as our spies and friends in middle Tennessee had informed us that General Buell was at Franklin, on his way to form a junction with General Grant, at Savannah, where he might be expected early in April. It was known, however, that the bridges on his line of march—especially the large one across Duck River, at Columbia—had been destroyed, and that he might thereby be delayed several days. General Johnston had left the organization and preparation of the forces for offensive operations to General Beauregard. Corps commanders made their reports directly to him, or through his office; the General-in-Chief being kept well advised of all information of an important nature that reached army
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