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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 23. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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Bull Run, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.21
right flank, and threatening his communications with Washington, fell back rapidly from the line of the Rapidan, first to the Rappahannock, and ultimately behind Bull Run, concentrating his army in the vicinity of Centreville. It was then well known that General Lee had recently detached Longstreet to the assistance of Bragg at C campaign of 1862, also several days in ignorance of his enemy's whereabouts and intentions, had followed the wise policy of General Meade and fallen back behind Bull Run, there safely awaiting the development of General Lee's purpose, it is unquestionable that he could have received the Confederate attack on his own ground with at is impossible to move this army until I know something more definite of the movements of the enemy. Everything indicated that the Confederate army was between Bull Run and the Rappahannock, but a rumor had reached General Meade that its head had appeared again in the lower Shenandoah Valley. Upon this, General Halleck, seemin
Centreville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.21
given military situation. This surprising characteristic in so irritable and passionate a man had two remarkable illustrations during General Lee's mystifying flank movement from the Rapidan toward Washington in the fall of 1863. General Meade, finding the Confederates on his right flank, and threatening his communications with Washington, fell back rapidly from the line of the Rapidan, first to the Rappahannock, and ultimately behind Bull Run, concentrating his army in the vicinity of Centreville. It was then well known that General Lee had recently detached Longstreet to the assistance of Bragg at Chattanooga, and that consequently he was still probably inferior in strength to the Union army, although that also had been reduced by two corps, sent to reinforce Rosecrans, after the Battle of Chickamauga. The Washington authorities, therefore, correctly viewed General Lee's advance as a big bluff, which ought to be called, and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fig
Centreville (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.21
with calmly replying to the President, through General Halleck, that it was, and had been, his intention to attack when the whereabouts of the enemy was discovered; that only lack of information on this head and fear of jeopardizing his communications with the capital had prevented his doing so thus far. And that was all. But the pressure from Washington continued, and resulted in the second episode to which I have alluded, two days later. On the 18th of October, from the vicinity of Centerville, General Meade telegraphed Halleck asking for information of General Lee's movements, and announcing that it is impossible to move this army until I know something more definite of the movements of the enemy. Everything indicated that the Confederate army was between Bull Run and the Rappahannock, but a rumor had reached General Meade that its head had appeared again in the lower Shenandoah Valley. Upon this, General Halleck, seemingly having lost all patience with his subordinate's ig
City Point (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.21
age toward those with whom he came in contact. This irascibility of temper made him many enemies in the army. It is generally understood that at one period personal dislike of General Meade was almost universal among the officers of higher rank. Hon. Charles A. Dana, who as Assistant-Secretary of War was with the army during the early days at Petersburg, in one of his reports to Secretary Stanton, made the following vigorous statements concerning General Meade's faults of temper: City Point, Va., July 7th, 1864. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which prevails among the officers of every rank who come in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render success under his
General Meade's temper. Its peculiarities made him an enigma. What Dana wrote about It—a note from Mr. Lincoln—General Halleck and the Testy Commander—Took his own course. The late Federal General Meade's peculiarities of temper, to draw it mildly, were such as to make him something of an enigma, even to his closest asties, therefore, correctly viewed General Lee's advance as a big bluff, which ought to be called, and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fight. Lincoln's note. In a short note to General Halleck, the Federal general-in-chief, dated October 16, 1863, President Lincoln, touching upon the situation as he understoPresident Lincoln, touching upon the situation as he understood it, and pointing out the probability of General Lee's inferiority of numbers, closes with the following eminently Lincolnian suggestion: * * * If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his <
Charles A. Dana (search for this): chapter 1.21
General Meade's temper. Its peculiarities made him an enigma. What Dana wrote about It—a note from Mr. Lincoln—General Halleck and the Testy Commander—Took his own course. The late Federal General Meade's peculiarities of temper, to draw it mildly, were such as to make him something of an enigma, even to his closest aies in the army. It is generally understood that at one period personal dislike of General Meade was almost universal among the officers of higher rank. Hon. Charles A. Dana, who as Assistant-Secretary of War was with the army during the early days at Petersburg, in one of his reports to Secretary Stanton, made the following vior curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently, but he is said to apply them often without occasion and without reason. * * * C. A. Dana. Toward the end there is a discernible modification of the better feeling against Meade; nevertheless, it is certain that he never became a popular command<
based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to be, and I desire to be, relieved from command. George G. Meade, Major-General Commanding. General Halleck was undoubtedly an able, clear-headed adviser to his government. The one blot upon the character of this accomplished man was an inherent disposition to browbeat subordinates—an overbearing habit that had its first public illustration in his treatment of the modest, unassuming Grant early in 1862, and, subsequently Sherman, at the close of the war. But when, in turn, he met a bulldozer like General Meade, he seemed to lack the necessary moral courage to carry the game through with a high hand. He weakened. On the next day, on the excuse that his truisms were merely telegraphed as the best mode of conveying to the general in the field the wishes of the government, Halleck apologized to Meade in the most handsome manner, if his language had unintentionally given offence. And in a spirit that showed him to
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 1.21
and passionate a man had two remarkable illustrations during General Lee's mystifying flank movement from the Rapidan toward Washington in the fall of 1863. General Meade, finding the Confederates on his right flank, and threatening his communications with Washington, fell back rapidly from the line of the Rapidan, first to the Rappahannock, and ultimately behind Bull Run, concentrating his army in the vicinity of Centreville. It was then well known that General Lee had recently detached Longstreet to the assistance of Bragg at Chattanooga, and that consequently he was still probably inferior in strength to the Union army, although that also had been reduced by two corps, sent to reinforce Rosecrans, after the Battle of Chickamauga. The Washington authorities, therefore, correctly viewed General Lee's advance as a big bluff, which ought to be called, and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fight. Lincoln's note. In a short note to General Halleck, the Federal ge
George G. Meade (search for this): chapter 1.21
r—Took his own course. The late Federal General Meade's peculiarities of temper, to draw it mildood that at one period personal dislike of General Meade was almost universal among the officers oble modification of the better feeling against Meade; nevertheless, it is certain that he never bece or nagging from his superiors could sway General Meade to act against his judgment of the necessih ought to be called, and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fight. Lincoln's no. Lincoln. In deep anxiety to impress General Meade with the importance of immediately attackiwith such energy and rapidity as to leave General Meade for a time in almost complete darkness as ntentions, had followed the wise policy of General Meade and fallen back behind Bull Run, there safshoulder the blame for a possible failure, General Meade imperturably followed his own judgment regarmy from the Rapidan. Meades reply. General Meade was not a man to tamely submit to bullying[21 more...]
W. S. Rosecrans (search for this): chapter 1.21
ight flank, and threatening his communications with Washington, fell back rapidly from the line of the Rapidan, first to the Rappahannock, and ultimately behind Bull Run, concentrating his army in the vicinity of Centreville. It was then well known that General Lee had recently detached Longstreet to the assistance of Bragg at Chattanooga, and that consequently he was still probably inferior in strength to the Union army, although that also had been reduced by two corps, sent to reinforce Rosecrans, after the Battle of Chickamauga. The Washington authorities, therefore, correctly viewed General Lee's advance as a big bluff, which ought to be called, and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fight. Lincoln's note. In a short note to General Halleck, the Federal general-in-chief, dated October 16, 1863, President Lincoln, touching upon the situation as he understood it, and pointing out the probability of General Lee's inferiority of numbers, closes with the followi
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