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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. Search the whole document.

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Washington (search for this): chapter 1
nce were, after all, few in number; and, as usual, the men who talked the loudest were laggard in action. But above all, at this crisis, the victory of Atlanta revived the drooping spirits of the nation and gave stamina to the government; and coming, as it did, the very day after McClellan's nomination, was a disastrous blow to the Democrats. Volunteering at once revived, and troops again began pouring into the armies. Meanwhile, the country and even the government still believed that Washington was in danger. It has, however, already been seen that from the outset all of Grant's orders and plans had contemplated the complete protection of the capital. The route from the Rapidan had been selected with this view, and the expedition of Sigel was especially intended to close the avenue which the Shenandoah Valley would otherwise offer to the enemy. The movements of the Wilderness campaign, the constant retreat of Lee and the advance of Grant after every battle, had accomplished th
R. H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 1
ategy covers the capital Early reinforced by Anderson Sheridan's manoeuvres in the Valley relatio to resist him. It has already been seen that Anderson was sent with Kershaw's division and FitzLee'lso intervened, and concealed the presence of Anderson. FitzLee therefore rode across the mountain ts from the James. The strength of Early and Anderson combined was at least equal to that of Sheridetween the commanders, but this was waived by Anderson, and all the responsibility fell upon Early, in this campaign. On the 21st, Early and Anderson advanced, and on the 22nd, Sheridan fell backas Grant had foreseen, directed the return of Anderson. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan:chance to escape which promises success. But Anderson still remained in the Valley, and Sheridan tethe way. That night, Sheridan learned that Anderson was moving through Winchester, on his way to mand. Though weakened already by the loss of Anderson, he marched with two divisions of infantry an[1 more...]
nce of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manoeuvres on the right and left were, to the multitude, unintelligible. It was only perceived that Hancock had twice been moved to the north bank of the James, and twice withdrawn. Not only was the fact unnoticed that by these manoeuvres the extension on the left had been made practicable; but that extension itself was looked upon as of no especial consequence. Hancock's check at Ream's station more than balanced, in the public mind, all the advantages of Warren's advance. In the same way Sheridan as yet appeared to have accomplished nothing in the Valley; in fact he had retired, and Early had followed him; so that on the Potomac also, the prospect was gloomy. Even Sherman's success, gratifying as it was, seemed isolated; the country had no idea that it had been facilitated by the very movements at the East which were deemed so unfort
ubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front of Richmond, and perhaps to raise the siege. McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee; a work containing more trustworthy information from rebel sources than any other I h were to make a second movement against Washington. This statement of Lee's orders to Early and Anderson is taken from McCabe, who gives it still more minutely. Early, however, says not a word to indicate that he was expected a second time to croer the eye of a superior, he sometimes displayed ability, but an independent command was beyond his powers. * This was McCabe's opinion, as well as the general one at the South; but Early himself entertained a very different one.—See his Memoir, put Early was not anxious for battle at all, although reinforced; This is Early's own statement, although, according to McCabe and Pollard, he had been ordered to cross the Potomac. while an advance of Sheridan, in the event of reverse, exposed the
G. B. McClellan (search for this): chapter 1
The near approach of the Presidential elections reminded this party that it had still another chance; and, when Lincoln was renominated by the Republicans, General McClellan became the candidate of the Democrats, who openly declared the war for the Union a failure, and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities. See resoluby protracted resistance they could even temporarily exhaust the endurance of those who had persisted so long—they would exert an influence directly favorable to McClellan. We have already referred to the great consideration which attached to the Presidential contest in the North which was now to take place; we have stated that it, at this crisis, the victory of Atlanta revived the drooping spirits of the nation and gave stamina to the government; and coming, as it did, the very day after McClellan's nomination, was a disastrous blow to the Democrats. Volunteering at once revived, and troops again began pouring into the armies. Meanwhile, the country an
e fall of Richmond, in April, 1865, one hundred and seventy-five guns were captured, of which forty-one were either 6 or 12 pounders. This does not include the artillery found in the city, nor that taken in the field. In my account of the works around Richmond and Petersburg, I have made free use of papers by Major-General Wright, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michie, also of the Engineers, published in the Report on the Defences of Washington, by Major-General Barnard, of the same corps; as well as of a paper on the Fortifications of Petersburg, by Lieutenant Featherstonaugh, of the Royal (British) Engineers. I am also indebted for valuable assistance to Major-General Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, United States Army. The people of the North entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manoeuvres on the
J. A. Early (search for this): chapter 1
h commanders battle of Winchester blunder of Early Sheridan's plan Sheridan's attack original charge victory of national forces retreat of Early, whirling through Winchester pursuit by Sheria had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but thing in the Valley; in fact he had retired, and Early had followed him; so that on the Potomac also,against the enemy. This was immediately after Early's movement against Washington, and the veterann to the enemy. Nevertheless, the invasion of Early had failed, for the very reason which Grant haout risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled he was aiming because of such a distraction as Early's campaign, than he had of re-crossing the Raper, become essential to defeat the movement of Early. Disaster in the Valley would lay open to thee neighborhood of Culpeper, to co-operate with Early. Anderson's orders were to cross the Potomac [4 more...]
David Hunter (search for this): chapter 1
had been no apprehension in any quarter of an invasion of the North. Nor was the movement against Petersburg at all in contravention of the original design; for Hunter's campaign in the Shenandoah and Sheridan's co-operative march towards Charlottesville were conceived with the express object of destroying the rebel communications north of Richmond, and rendering it impossible for Lee to throw any large force in the direction of the Potomac. Hunter, it is true, had moved on Lexington instead of towards Charlottesville, and Sheridan, thus left unsupported, was obliged to return to Grant; while afterwards, when repelled from Lynchburg, Hunter retreated Hunter retreated entirely away from the Valley, leaving the route to Washington absolutely open to the enemy. Nevertheless, the invasion of Early had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking h
and fifty-three pieces in position on the national lines, of which twenty were field artillery; and at the fall of Richmond, in April, 1865, one hundred and seventy-five guns were captured, of which forty-one were either 6 or 12 pounders. This does not include the artillery found in the city, nor that taken in the field. In my account of the works around Richmond and Petersburg, I have made free use of papers by Major-General Wright, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michie, also of the Engineers, published in the Report on the Defences of Washington, by Major-General Barnard, of the same corps; as well as of a paper on the Fortifications of Petersburg, by Lieutenant Featherstonaugh, of the Royal (British) Engineers. I am also indebted for valuable assistance to Major-General Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, United States Army. The people of the North entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of
J. B. Fry (search for this): chapter 1
. The greater number of men we have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war. These representations were heartily seconded by Halleck, and had their proper effect. A call for five hundred thousand troops was issued by the President. The call was for five hundred thousand men, but from this number were deducted those already raised, under previous calls, in excess of demand; so that in reality only about three hundred thousand were summoned at this time.—See Report of Provost-Marshal General Fry. The response, however, was slow, and if volunteering flagged, the draft must be resorted to. But, when the conscription was ordered, a year before, the enemies of the government had broken out into absolute riot and resistance, burning the houses of prominent citizens, murdering defenceless negroes, and shooting down national officers on duty and in their uniform, in the greatest city of the North. A renewal of these scenes was now threatened, The people in many parts of t
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