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Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Daily Dispatch: June 18, 1862., [Electronic resource]. Search the whole document.

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Island Number Ten (Missouri, United States) (search for this): article 21
The movements in the West under Commodore Foote, which sent joy and hope through the nation were made without regard to General McClellan's plan, and sprang directly from Commodore Foote's communications and requests to the Navy Department and its orders to him; and without further enumeration, it is only necessary to say that the series of brilliant successes during February and March, which threw new life into the nation, which gave us Fort Henry, Bowling Green, Columbus, Donelson, Island No.10, and Nashville, which brought national stocks to par, and which forced respect for us abroad if it did not prevent intervention, was in direct contravention of the plan of the commander-in-Chief, and against his protest. What that plan was, were it proper to disease it, becomes of little consequence when we know that no advance was to be made under it until April, and when it was found that the Commander-in-Chief had communicated none to the other Major Generals. While expressing, a
Fort Donelson (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): article 21
the other. The movements in the West under Commodore Foote, which sent joy and hope through the nation were made without regard to General McClellan's plan, and sprang directly from Commodore Foote's communications and requests to the Navy Department and its orders to him; and without further enumeration, it is only necessary to say that the series of brilliant successes during February and March, which threw new life into the nation, which gave us Fort Henry, Bowling Green, Columbus, Donelson, Island No.10, and Nashville, which brought national stocks to par, and which forced respect for us abroad if it did not prevent intervention, was in direct contravention of the plan of the commander-in-Chief, and against his protest. What that plan was, were it proper to disease it, becomes of little consequence when we know that no advance was to be made under it until April, and when it was found that the Commander-in-Chief had communicated none to the other Major Generals. While e
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): article 21
ons to his demonstrated faculty for organization. But it becomes necessary to state how little else had been done, why so little had been done, and to whom the country is indebted for what was done in February and March, and to its position before the world to-day. Whether more could not have been accomplished in Kentucky, nearly all of whose strategic posts were occupied by the enemy, we are not competent to judge. But it is clear to military authorities and to the country that Eastern Tennessee, whose people are the most loyal and the most distressed of the border States, might have been relieved, Knoxville taken, and the great northern line of communication between Virginia and the great sources of her supplies broken, weeks or months before General McClellan ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. The country patiently waited, because we believed it bore wise relation to some great military plan. The country saw the great Baltimore and Ohio Railroad not only abandoned to the
Bowling Green (Indiana, United States) (search for this): article 21
thened and greater for the other. The movements in the West under Commodore Foote, which sent joy and hope through the nation were made without regard to General McClellan's plan, and sprang directly from Commodore Foote's communications and requests to the Navy Department and its orders to him; and without further enumeration, it is only necessary to say that the series of brilliant successes during February and March, which threw new life into the nation, which gave us Fort Henry, Bowling Green, Columbus, Donelson, Island No.10, and Nashville, which brought national stocks to par, and which forced respect for us abroad if it did not prevent intervention, was in direct contravention of the plan of the commander-in-Chief, and against his protest. What that plan was, were it proper to disease it, becomes of little consequence when we know that no advance was to be made under it until April, and when it was found that the Commander-in-Chief had communicated none to the other Major
York (Virginia, United States) (search for this): article 21
ng important lines of railroad. Over all this the country wondered, believed, and waited. We know that, beginning more than five months ago, Gen. Wool and the Navy Department joined in urgent and repeated applications to be allowed to take Norfolk, which they demonstrated to be a military and naval certainty. Besides its immense importance otherwise, the Merrimac would have been taken while building, the Cumberland and the Congress would have been saved, and the James as well as the York river would have been open for Gen. McClellan's march upon Richmond. Their request was peremptorily refused by the Commander-in-Chief. We know that while Gen. McClellan was still Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Sherman reported that he was prepared and anxious to be allowed to take Savannah; that it was a military certainty, and that it could be done with very little loss of life. This, too, was forbidden by the Commander- in-Chief. We have given these great selected facts, derived from cen
Knoxville (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): article 21
so little had been done, and to whom the country is indebted for what was done in February and March, and to its position before the world to-day. Whether more could not have been accomplished in Kentucky, nearly all of whose strategic posts were occupied by the enemy, we are not competent to judge. But it is clear to military authorities and to the country that Eastern Tennessee, whose people are the most loyal and the most distressed of the border States, might have been relieved, Knoxville taken, and the great northern line of communication between Virginia and the great sources of her supplies broken, weeks or months before General McClellan ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. The country patiently waited, because we believed it bore wise relation to some great military plan. The country saw the great Baltimore and Ohio Railroad not only abandoned to the enemy, but its rolling stock neither removed nor destroyed, but given up to him to whom its value was immense. --The r
mpaign, distrust, and a great fall in national stocks, and a possible if not probable foreign intervention. Then, through him, was issued the President's Order No. 1, over Gen. McClellan's head, and against his protest, peremptorily commanding an advance at all points on the 23d of February. Gen. McClellan was placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac, and ceased to be Commander-in-Chief Mr. Stanton simply became a real Secretary of War. taking into his capable hands the reins which Mr. Cameron had either necessarily given to others or misused himself. The President had, at last, a great right arm to lean on, and each was strengthened and greater for the other. The movements in the West under Commodore Foote, which sent joy and hope through the nation were made without regard to General McClellan's plan, and sprang directly from Commodore Foote's communications and requests to the Navy Department and its orders to him; and without further enumeration, it is only necessary
in the channel, and the occupation of the forts was a wise transcending of instructions. In this Gen. McClellan may, perhaps, have had no responsibility. But the instructions for the Burnside expedition were substantially his, and by them Gen. Burnside was limited to perfecting the blockade, and prevented from striking at vital points and cutting important lines of railroad. Over all this the country wondered, believed, and waited. We know that, beginning more than five months ago, Gen. Wool and the Navy Department joined in urgent and repeated applications to be allowed to take Norfolk, which they demonstrated to be a military and naval certainty. Besides its immense importance otherwise, the Merrimac would have been taken while building, the Cumberland and the Congress would have been saved, and the James as well as the York river would have been open for Gen. McClellan's march upon Richmond. Their request was peremptorily refused by the Commander-in-Chief. We know th
from the Federal War Department--attack on Gen. McClellan--Development of the great man Hitchcock — r, what was the posture of affairs under General McClellan's plan and direction? The country was uas the York river would have been open for Gen. McClellan's march upon Richmond. Their request was . We will not stop to conjecture what Gen. McClellan's plan was, and we have no right to state ile expressing, as we have, our faith in General McClellan as the commander of an army — all the moanton that the New York Tribune attacked General McClellan. It is almost the only newspaper on our trace to Mr. Stanton complaints against General McClellan as the head of an army, and it is simplyoth for the safety of Washington, and that Gen. McClellan might be aided by a flank movement under Gand by sending so large a portion of it to Gen. McClellan, beyond agreement, if not in full complian Gen. Banks grew out of and was in aid of, Gen. McClellan's wishes and his call for more troops. Fu[16 more...]<
applications to be allowed to take Norfolk, which they demonstrated to be a military and naval certainty. Besides its immense importance otherwise, the Merrimac would have been taken while building, the Cumberland and the Congress would have been saved, and the James as well as the York river would have been open for Gen. McClellan's march upon Richmond. Their request was peremptorily refused by the Commander-in-Chief. We know that while Gen. McClellan was still Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Sherman reported that he was prepared and anxious to be allowed to take Savannah; that it was a military certainty, and that it could be done with very little loss of life. This, too, was forbidden by the Commander- in-Chief. We have given these great selected facts, derived from central and authoritative sources, to indicate the whole circle which the people supposed bore relation to some sufficient and entirely justifying plan in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief. We will add, without a
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