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Browsing named entities in a specific section of John Esten Cooke, Wearing of the Gray: Being Personal Portraits, Scenes, and Adventures of War.. Search the whole document.

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Cavalry-Fitz Lee (search for this): chapter 1.7
During the invasion of Pennsylvania he led General Lee's advance, which reached the Susquehanna anderal commander gave up all hope of forcing General Lee's lines, and moving by the left flank reachy the great force arrayed against him, that General Lee received intelligence of the advance of Genat; and an advance which threatened to paralyse Lee, and by severing his communications, drive him ad been weakened, and the heavy weight upon General Lee's shoulders lightened. Ii. These evendge's Division1,800 Total Infantry8,300 Cavalry-Fitz Lee's Division Wickham's Brigade1,000 Lomaxllest degree the instructions received from General Lee, and accomplish admirably the objects for w was not probably believed by himself or by General Lee. His command was essentially what he callm, the second corps having been returned to General Lee. He had then only a handful of cavalry andre the bar of history. It is the letter of General Lee, to him, dated March 30, 1865, three days b[3 more...]
Bradley Johnson (search for this): chapter 1.7
4, the day of the battle of Winchester, his first defeat, we can give statistics nearly official, procured from an officer of rank who held a high command during the campaign, and who had every opportunity of knowing. Early's infantry consisted of Gordon's Division2,000 Ramseur's Division2,000 Rodes' Division2,500 Breckenridge's Division1,800 Total Infantry8,300 Cavalry-Fitz Lee's Division Wickham's Brigade1,000 Lomax's old Brigade6000 Lomax's Division McCauseland's Brigade800 Johnson's Brigade700 Imboden's Brigade400 Jackson's Brigade300 Total Cavalry3,800 Artillery Three Battalions Light Artillery40 guns One Battalion Horse Artillery12 guns Total guns52 guns About one thousand artillerists. This recapitulation embraces all the forces of Early's command. General Sheridan, according to official statements, had under his command over thirty-five thousand muskets, eight thousand sabres, and a proportionate quantity of artillery. The force of Sheridan is n
irably the objects for which he had been sent to that region. He was placed there as Jackson had been in 1862, to divert a portion of the Federal forces from the great arena of combat in the lowland. By his movements before and after the battle of Kernstown, Jackson, with about four thousand men, kept about twenty-five thousand of the enemy in the Valley. By his movements preceding the battle of Opequon, Early, with eight or ten thousand men, kept between forty and fifty thousand from General Meade's army at Petersburg. That he could meet the Federal force in his front, in a fair pitched battle, was not probably believed by himself or by General Lee. His command was essentially what he calls it, a forlorn hope --the hope that it could cope with its opponents being truly forlorn. As long as that opponent was amused, retarded, or kept at arm's length, all was well. When he advanced to attack in earnest, it was doubtless foreseen that the thirty or forty thousand bayonets would d
ee received intelligence of the advance of General Hunter up the Valley with a considerable army; anly was selected, and the result is known. General Hunter advanced, in spite of opposition from the ete defeat of the Federal forces followed, and Hunter's campaign was decided at one blow. He gave ghe inhabitants of the region, subjected by General Hunter to the most merciless treatment, saw theiry through Swift Run Gap or Brown's Gap, attack Hunter, and then cross the Potomac and threaten Washiington sent to hurry forward the forces of General Hunter from the Ohio, and a considerable force frrt of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps, and General Hunter was hastening from the West to strike his pears to have retarded this consummation. General Hunter seems to have been paralysed, or intimidatnfusion; and grim and defiant, Early faced General Hunter in line of battle, defying him to make an of September, when, Sheridan having superseded Hunter, the attack was made at the Opequon. And yet [1 more...]
g of these facts, that fifteen trains of the Virginia and Alexandria Railroad (no one train of a capacity of carrying five hundred men) brought the whole of the Second Corps of the Confederate 90 Army under division commanders Gordon, Rodes, and Ramseur to this place: that Breckenridge's division, then here, was only about two thousand men: and that these were all of the infantry carried from this place by Early down the Valley after his chase of Hunter. It will thus be perceived that Early's nchester, his first defeat, we can give statistics nearly official, procured from an officer of rank who held a high command during the campaign, and who had every opportunity of knowing. Early's infantry consisted of Gordon's Division2,000 Ramseur's Division2,000 Rodes' Division2,500 Breckenridge's Division1,800 Total Infantry8,300 Cavalry-Fitz Lee's Division Wickham's Brigade1,000 Lomax's old Brigade6000 Lomax's Division McCauseland's Brigade800 Johnson's Brigade700 Imboden's B
e back the eight or nine thousand. That result followed on the 9th of September, when, Sheridan having superseded Hunter, the attack was made at the Opequon. And yet nothing is better established than the fact that up to the moment when he put his cavalry in motion against the Confederate left, General Sheridan had been virtually defeated. Every assault of his great force of infantry had been repulsed; and nowhere does this more clearly appear than in an account of the action published in Harper's Magazine, by a field officer, apparently of one of the Federal regiments. That account is fair, lucid, and records the precise truth, namely, that every advance of the Federal infantry was met and repulsed. Not until the ten thousand cavalry of General Sheridan advanced on the Martinsburg road, attained the Confederate rear, and charged them in flank and rear, was there the least wavering. It is true that from that moment the action was lost. Early's line gave way in confusion; his art
Ulysses Grant (search for this): chapter 1.7
advance up the Valley, from which, as his report shows, General Grant had expected so much, had thus completely failed. The , however, in scenes more striking and dramatic still. General Grant, with about 150,000 men, was pressing General Lee with st broken in the effort. To divert reinforcements from General Grant was a matter of vital importance — a thing of life and uld not probably be able to do more than divert troops from Grant; but this was an object of the first importance, and much m advance came to the Federal authorities at the moment when Grant was supposed to be carrying everything before him. To meet ral Hunter from the Ohio, and a considerable force from General Grant's army was dispatched up the bay to man the fortificatied him, but an army of about 50,000 men. To that extent General Grant had been weakened, and the heavy weight upon General Lef. Pursuit was not made to Mount Jackson, as stated by both Grant and Stanton, but my troops were halted for the night at Fis
George Washington (search for this): chapter 1.7
un Gap or Brown's Gap, attack Hunter, and then cross the Potomac and threaten Washington. This critical task he now undertook with alacrity, and he accomplished it wshing his column toward Maryland; and such was the rapidity of the march upon Washington, that the capital was placed in imminent danger. In spite of the prostratingore him. To meet the attack of their formidable adversary, the authorities at Washington sent to hurry forward the forces of General Hunter from the Ohio, and a consiated General Wallace at the Monocacy, and was now in sight of the defences of Washington; the crack of his skirmishers was heard at the White house and in the departme daring advance upon the Federal capital. The extent of the danger to which Washington was then exposed, still remains a matter of doubt and difference of opinion aments of his wary opponent. From the period of his return to the Valley from Washington, Early had given his adversary no breathing spell. To-day he seemed retreati
two brigades across at Warrenton Springs, under Early, and these resolutely held their ground in face of an overpowering force. Thenceforward Early continued to add to his reputation as a hard fighter-at Bristoe, the second Manassas, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Spotsylvania, Monocacy, and throughout the Valley campaign. During the invasion of Pennsylvania he led General Lee's advance, which reached the Susquehanna and captured York. In Spotsylvania he commanded Hill's corps, and was in the desperate fighting at the time of the assault upon the famous Horseshoe, and repulsed an attack of Burnside's corps with heavy loss to his opponents. After that hard and bitter struggle the Federal commander gave up all hope of forcing General Lee's lines, and moving by the left flank reached Cold Harbour, where the obstinate struggle recommenced. It was at this moment, when almost overpowered by the great force arrayed against him, that General Lee received intellig
our efforts would be embarrassed, and our means of resistance weakened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you cannot command the united and willing co-operation which is so essential to success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your influence both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our military operations in S. W. Va. While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion to the cause, is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavour to find a commander who would be more likely to develop the strength and resources of the country and inspire the soldiers with confidence, and to accomplish this purpose, thought it proper to yield my own o
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