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Hobart Ward (search for this): chapter 63
up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward's brigade and Smith's battery (Fourth New-York) to secure that vital position, and at the same time advancing his line of battle about three hundred yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of the army. These dispositions were made in the very face of the enemy, who were advancing in columas immediately put in position by General Sickles to the left of the Third corps, and General Sykes was desired to relieve Ward's brigade and Smith's battery on the Roundtop, and hold the line from thence to Birney's left, (First division, Third corpate exertions to carry it. Fearing this result, Sickles sent orders to General Crawford, of the Fifth corps, to reenforce Ward's brigade, but he declined to move without orders from his own corps commander, Sykes; but Captain Moore, of Sickles's sta
Hancock (search for this): chapter 63
and once more essayed to carry our position on the left. It was during this conflict that General Hancock, commander of the Second corps, a gallant soldier and accomplished officer, was wounded by Historicus says was four miles in the rear of the battle-field, had already been placed by General Hancock in or near the position taken up by the Third corps on its arrival. I may remark here that Historicus studiously avoids mentioning General Hancock's name in his account of the operations of July first--a very strange mistake for an eye-witness. When General Sickles arrived at Gettysburghwas not the commanding officer, and had not been for some time. He was first superseded by General Hancock, by virtue of the written order of General Meade, and afterward by the arrival of General Sdecided to retreat from Gettyburgh. But it is certainly true, that the leading general, Major-General Hancock, entertained no such proposition, after he assumed command, and long before the arrival
Birney (search for this): chapter 63
. A second peremptory summons came from General Meade, and, leaving his unfinished task to the active supervision of General Birney and General Humphreys, Sickles rode off to the rear to headquarters. Before he had reached there, the sound of cannoGeneral Sykes was desired to relieve Ward's brigade and Smith's battery on the Roundtop, and hold the line from thence to Birney's left, (First division, Third corps.) Strange to say, this movement was not promptly carried out, and there was imminentand Sickles, seeing this, put a battery in position to check the enemy if he broke through this gap on our front, and General Birney was sent to order Barnes back into line. No, he said; impossible. It is too hot. My men cannot stand it. Remonstra Barnes ordered his men to lie down, and the chivalric Zook and his splendid brigade, under the personal direction of General Birney, did march over them right into the breach. Alas! poor Zook soon fell, mortally wounded, and half of his brigade per
Edward W. Smith (search for this): chapter 63
oundtop Hill; and this in their possession, General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward's brigade and Smith's battery (Fourth New-York) to secure that vital position, and at the same time advancing his line of battle about three hundred yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of thlike lions, against tremendous odds, for nearly an hour before the Fifth corps came up under Sykes, who was immediately put in position by General Sickles to the left of the Third corps, and General Sykes was desired to relieve Ward's brigade and Smith's battery on the Roundtop, and hold the line from thence to Birney's left, (First division, Third corps.) Strange to say, this movement was not promptly carried out, and there was imminent danger of losing the Roundtop, for Longstreet was making
Ewell (search for this): chapter 63
evolved on General Howard, of the Eleventh corps, who maintained his position till about two o'clock P. M., when the enemy was heavily reenforced by the arrival of Ewell's corps. The battle now raged fearfully between Hill's and Ewell's corps on one side, and the First and Eleventh corps on the other, till about four P. M., when GEwell's corps on one side, and the First and Eleventh corps on the other, till about four P. M., when General Howard was compelled to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy and fall back, losing many prisoners — nearly four thousand--to the south side of Gettysburgh. His position was eminently critical, when, to the great relief of both the General and our valiant troops, a division of the Third corps, under the immediate command which Sickles occupied, and which both generals evidently regarded as of the highest importance. While this terrific combat was raging on our left, Lee ordered Ewell to attack our right wing, and Hill to threaten our centre, both with the object, as he says in his report, to divert reenforcements from reaching our left, which,
Newton (search for this): chapter 63
he field. It was now pretty clear that General Meade had awakened to the fact which he treated with such indifference when pressed on him by Sickles in the morning — that our left was the assailable point, if not the key to our position; for he began to pour in reenforcements whose presence in the beginning of the action would have saved thousands of lives. Perceiving great exertions on the part of the enemy, says Meade's report, the Sixth corps (Sedgwick's) and part of the First corps, (Newton's,) Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps, were all brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retired in confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts. If this remarkable concentration of troops was necessary, at last, to save the left of our army, it is almost incredible that the single corps of General S
William H. Hunt (search for this): chapter 63
this on account of other duties. Yielding, however, to the prolonged solicitations of Sickles, General Meade desired General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, to accompany Sickles and report the result of their reconnaissance. Hunt concurred with Sickles Hunt concurred with Sickles as to the line to be occupied — the advance line from the left of the Second corps to the Roundtop Hill — but he declined to give any orders until he had reported to General Meade, remarking, however, that he (General Sickles) would doubtless receivell need more artillery, added Sickles. Send for all you want, replied Meade, to the artillery reserve. I will direct General Hunt to send you all you ask for. The conference was then abruptly terminated by a heavy shower of shells, probably directthe repeated warnings of that sagacious officer, General Sickles, as well as the report of his own Chief of Artillery, General Hunt, who concurred in all the suggestions of the commander of the Third corps. Without meaning to do injustice to General
A. Buford (search for this): chapter 63
y was put in motion, and by Tuesday night the right flank had reached Manchester and the left occupied Emmettsburgh. General Buford's cavalry had advanced as far as Gettysburgh, and reported that the confederate army was debouching from the mountaindered to advance on Gettysburgh with the First and Eleventh corps, which he reached early on the first of July, and found Buford's cavalry already engaged with the enemy — the corps of General Hill. Rapidly making his dispositions, General Reynolds e moving rapidly around to our left and rear. These facts were again reported to headquarters, but brought no response. Buford's cavalry had been massed on the left, covering that flank with outposts, and videttes were thrown forward on the Emmetsbrance to General Meade, whose reply was that he did not intend to withdraw the cavalry, and that a part of this division (Buford's) should be sent back. It never returned. Under these circumstances, Sickles threw forward three regiments of light tr
J. E. Pickett (search for this): chapter 63
disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts. If this remarkable concentration of troops was necessary, at last, to save the left of our army, it is almost incredible that the single corps of General Sickles was able to withstand the impetuous onset of Longstreet's legions for nearly an hour before any succor reached it. On Friday, July third, the enemy renewed their efforts to carry out the original design of Lee by overthrowing our left wing, and Longstreet was reenforced by Pickett's three brigades, and further supported by one division and two brigades from Hill's corps. In addition to this heavy mass of infantry, the entire artillery of the rebel army was concentrated against our left. After his oversight of the day before, it may be supposed that General Meade was better prepared to defend his left, and had made adequate preparations. About one P. M. the enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our left and left centre, which continued some two hours, with occasi
Jonathan W. Geary (search for this): chapter 63
attention is the indirect assertion that the arrival of the Third division of the Third corps, about four o'clock in the afternoon, on the field, put an end to the conflict on the first of July, and relieved the First and Eleventh corps from imminent peril. The facts are, that there was no fighting, save light skirmishing, after three o'clock in the afternoon, and that General Sickles's command did not make its appearance till nearly six o'clock. One division of the Twelfth corps, under General Geary, which Historicus says was four miles in the rear of the battle-field, had already been placed by General Hancock in or near the position taken up by the Third corps on its arrival. I may remark here that Historicus studiously avoids mentioning General Hancock's name in his account of the operations of July first--a very strange mistake for an eye-witness. When General Sickles arrived at Gettysburgh, General Howard was not the commanding officer, and had not been for some time. He was
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