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1861 AD (search for this): chapter 11
roperty. But the Confederates as yet had no artillery organization which could quickly appreciate and improve all the passing opportunities of a battle-field. Indeed, as before stated, the army was only a mass of divisions, associated by temporary assignments to Longstreet and Jackson, who were themselves only division commanders. On the morning of the 31st, Lee lost no time in renewing his advance. As the position at Centreville was strong, and had been fortified by the Confederates in 1861, he ordered Jackson's corps to turn Centreville, crossing Bull Run at Sudley, and moving by the Little River turnpike upon Fairfax C. H. Stuart's cavalry were to precede Jackson. Longstreet was to glean the battle-field and then to follow Jackson. All progress was slow on account of the rain and mud. This was the third battle within 14 months which had been closely followed by heavy rain, — Bull Run, Malvern Hill, and Second Manassas. The theory took root that cannonading has rain-making v
August 22nd (search for this): chapter 11
mpaign. By a bold raid of Stuart's, however, Lee now had the good luck to turn the tables and come into possession of Pope's private despatch book, with copies of his most important correspondence with Lincoln, Halleck, and others. Stuart had gotten Lee's permission to try to burn a railroad bridge over Cedar Run, near Catlett's Station, some 12 miles in rear of Pope's army. With about 1500 cavalry and two guns, he crossed the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge, above Pope's right flank, on Aug. 22, and pushed on through Warrenton toward Catlett's Station. A terrific rain-storm came on late in the afternoon, and in it the command captured the enemy's picket and surprised the Federal encampments. The night was memorable for black darkness, the time being just at the change of the moon. A negro recognized Stuart and volunteered to lead him to the camp of Pope's staff and baggage. A regiment under W. H. F. Lee raided this camp, while other regiments raided other camps in the vicinit
1862 AD (search for this): chapter 11
ssible not to be amazed at the audacity of the confederate general, in thus risking an encounter in which the very existence of Jackson's command would be imperilled, and to ask what was the object which Gen. Lee considered as warranting such an extremely dangerous manoeuvre. The answer is not an easy one. . . . We shall. . . . only remark here that this move of Gen. Lee's in dividing his army, was an illustration of the daring, not to say hazardous, policy which he pursued in this summer of 1862. The best answer is the one given by Lee himself, who is reported in Allan's Army of Northern Virginia to have said, in referring to some discussion of this matter, — Such criticism is obvious, but the disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable. It was scarcely 60 days since Ives, as has been told, stopped his horse in the road to say to me,— If there is a man in either army, head and shoulders above all others in audacity, that man is Lee, and
1000 AD (search for this): chapter 11
eries. Two corps, Sumner's and Franklin's, of the Army of the Potomac, and two extra divisions, Cox's and Sturgis's,— in all about 42,000,—were coming from Alexandria, 25 miles off, as fast as possible. With these, Pope would have about 107,000 in the field. Lee also had some reenforcements coming, and already at the Rappahannock River. They were the divisions of McLaws and D. H. Hill, each about 7000; Walker's division about 4000; Hampton's cavalry 1500, and Pendleton's reserve artillery 1000 — total 20,500. Having telegraphed Halleck that the Confederates were retreating, Pope now began to set his army in battle array to press the retreat. Some hours were consumed, but they were well spent in forming his troops, thus avoiding the isolated efforts of the previous day, and arranging for a simultaneous attack along the whole line. Meanwhile, there was some artillery firing at rather long range by each side, and skirmishers in front were everywhere in easy range and sharply eng<
August 26th (search for this): chapter 11
Chapter 11: second Manassas The situation, Aug. 15. Lee's plan. how it failed. a Federal scouting party. Pope Escapes. Stuart's raid. storm frustrates efforts. Lee plans his move. Ropes's criticism. Jackson's march. Aug. 26 Manassas captured. destruction of stores. Pope's move. Lee and Longstreet's march. Pope blunders. Jackson's move. orders captured. Johnson's skirmish. Pope at a loss. Ewell attacks King. hard fighting. losses. Thoroughfare Gap. flanking the Gap. the opposing forces. Sigel's attack. Reno's and Kearny's attack. Hooker's and Reno's attack. Grover's brigade. Porter's corps. Pope versus Porter. Kearny and Reno attack. Longstreet takes position. Longstreet meets King. Pope is misled. Lee awaits attack. the forces. the lines. a surprise. Longstreet comes in. the Henry House Hill. night and rain. no pursuit. Centreville turned. affair at Ox Hill. Stevens and Kearny. casualties. the ammunition supply. Gen. Lee ha
August 25th (search for this): chapter 11
were possible, has written: S. J. II., 124.— It is only certain that we have record of few enterprises of greater daring than that which was there decided on; and no matter from whose brain it emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the responsibility. It is easy to conceive. It is less easy to execute, but to risk cause and country, name and reputation, on a single throw, and to abide the issue with unflinching heart, is the supreme exhibition of the soldier's fortitude. Early on Aug. 25, Jackson set out upon what Henderson calls his most famous march. He marched 26 miles that day, and bivouacked very late that night at Salem. His course was first northwest to Amissville, and thence about north to Salem. As his march was intended to be a surprise, it had been favored by the storm of the 23d. This tended to prevent large columns of dust, which so great a movement would surely have raised in dry weather. Considering the object of the march, it was a mistake to allow the
August 16th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 11
nd the next. The principal failure in the preparations was the non-arrival of Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry at the appointed rendezvous at Verdiersville, near Raccoon Ford, where it was to cross on the morning of the 18th to act upon the right flank of the army. Its commander had duly received orders from Stuart, but had taken the liberty to delay their execution for a day, not supposing that it would make any material difference. Stuart's report gives the following details:— On Aug. 16, 1862, in pursuance of the commanding general's secret instructions, I put this brigade (Fitz-Lee's) on the march for the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, near which point the army under Gen. Lee's command was rapidly concentrating. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee was directed by me to proceed the next day, from near Davenport's Bridge, opposite Beaver Dam, across to the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, where I promised to join him on that evening (17th). I proceeded on the cars directly to the commanding general, whom
August 15th (search for this): chapter 11
Chapter 11: second Manassas The situation, Aug. 15. Lee's plan. how it failed. a Federal scouting party. Pope Escapes. Stuart's raid. storm frustrates efforts. Lee plans his move. Ropes's criticism. Jackson's march. Aug. 26 Manassas captured. destruction of stores. Pope's move. Lee and Longstreet's march. Pope blunders. Jackson's move. orders captured. Johnson's skirmish. Pope at a loss. Ewell attacks King. hard fighting. losses. Thoroughfare Gap. flanking thehe lines. a surprise. Longstreet comes in. the Henry House Hill. night and rain. no pursuit. Centreville turned. affair at Ox Hill. Stevens and Kearny. casualties. the ammunition supply. Gen. Lee had arrived at Gordonsville early on Aug. 15, and taken command. On the 13th McClellan had abandoned his camp at Harrison's Landing and marched for Fortress Monroe. Lee now left at Richmond but two brigades of infantry to protect the city against cavalry raids, and took the rest of his a
August 18th (search for this): chapter 11
promptly issued the necessary orders on the very day of his arrival. His army, however, was not yet sufficiently well organized to be called a military machine, or to be relied upon to carry out orders strictly. On the contrary, in some respects, it might be called a very unmilitary machine, as the history of the failure in this case will illustrate. Lee, in his report, tells the story very briefly. He says, — The movement, as explained in the accompanying order, was appointed for Aug. 18, but the necessary preparations not having been completed, its execution was postponed until the 20th. This postponement was the fatal act, for on the 18th the enemy discovered his danger, and in great haste put his army in motion to the rear and fell back behind the Rappahannock, during that day and the next. The principal failure in the preparations was the non-arrival of Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry at the appointed rendezvous at Verdiersville, near Raccoon Ford, where it was to cro
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