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service, and the national troops, rallying under the cover of their guns, made a superb resistance, and although the enemy flung himself fiercely upon the Union lines he was again and again driven back. The military historians have not done justice to the work of the gun-boats at this important juncture. Croly disposes of the subject by saying: the gun-boats were of some importance as they had been for some time previous engaged in checking the advance of the enemy on the extreme left. Badeau,the historian, also speaks of the gunboats being employed during the night in throwing shells amongst the enemy's troops, which annoyed them greatly and set fire to the woods, which were ablaze all around them. It is not likely that the two gun-boats would be idle at Pittsburg Landing while our Army was being driven back by the enemy, and it is the belief of many officers that without the aid of these vessels the Federal army would have been annihilated. But there are no reliable Army ac
e was one omission in this naval attack, which is due to the history of the times, and should be mentioned. Had the flagofficer sent his remaining gun-boats past the batteries at night, when the darkness would have prevented the enemy from estimating his distance, these vessels would have been ready on the following day to enfilade the works in their weakest point; and what is more important still,they would have cut off all hope of escape of the garrison. The transports in which Floyd and Pillow with 5,000 men escaped across and up the river, would all have fallen into our hands. Having looked into all the details of this interesting affair we feel obliged to say that all the credit for the capture of Fort Donelson belongs to the Army, as there was no truth in the statement that the enemy were so demoralized by the attack of the gun-boats, that they could not be brought into effective use on the following day in the actions which resulted in their defeat and the surrender of 16.0
A. H. Foote (search for this): chapter 15
as writing about picks and shovels he informed Foote that he was only waiting for the return of thee water side were preparing for the attack. Foote, according to his own report, did not considerg about than a number of vessels in groups. Foote's vessels were struck about fifty times each bmen or guns. In this case the report of Flag-officer Foote was very indefinite, and he only gives areports. After the battle of Fort Donelson, Foote's gun-boats had to go to Cairo for repairs, whwas in his hands. Lieut. Gwin in writing to Foote, puts it Rear-Admiral Henry Walke, (Commanderilliant writers of history and biography that Foote sent the Carondelet to Fort Donelson upon a reort Donelson. From Commander Walke to Flag-officer Foote. U. S. Gun-Boat Carondelet, Paducathe following report of Commander Walke to Admiral Foote. U. S. Gun-Boat Carondelet, Near Forgratulatory orderFebruary 17th, 1862. Flag-officer Foote, the Commander-in-chief of the Naval For[12 more...]
g. There was one omission in this naval attack, which is due to the history of the times, and should be mentioned. Had the flagofficer sent his remaining gun-boats past the batteries at night, when the darkness would have prevented the enemy from estimating his distance, these vessels would have been ready on the following day to enfilade the works in their weakest point; and what is more important still,they would have cut off all hope of escape of the garrison. The transports in which Floyd and Pillow with 5,000 men escaped across and up the river, would all have fallen into our hands. Having looked into all the details of this interesting affair we feel obliged to say that all the credit for the capture of Fort Donelson belongs to the Army, as there was no truth in the statement that the enemy were so demoralized by the attack of the gun-boats, that they could not be brought into effective use on the following day in the actions which resulted in their defeat and the surren
E. S. Boynton (search for this): chapter 15
Federal troops with their backs to the river, and no cover but the gun-boats, there made an unconquerable stand. The following account, taken in substance from Boynton's Naval History, seems to be the most correct version of the part taken by the gun-boats Taylor and Lexington, in the battle of Shiloh: From the beginning of Taylor had rounded to opposite the ravine, so that their batteries could be brought to bear upon the dense mass swarming in across the line of fire. So far Mr. Boynton: Capt. Gwin will tell the rest: * * * Both vessels opened a heavy and well-directed fire on them, and in a short time, in conjunction with our artillery on ine for a rush upon our disorganized troops, already driven nearly to the river. The military historian says, the gunboats gave mutual support at this moment. Boynton says, thus, on the same day, the Navy on the Western rivers received the surrender of one of the Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi, and aided very mat
John Webster (search for this): chapter 15
at remained of the organization of the national army. Between our position and where the enemy had prepared for this last rush, was a ravine which they must cross in the assault, and here the two gunboats took up a position. At the same time Col. Webster, of Gen. Grant's staff, hastily collected some scattered guns and placed them where they would play on the left flank of the enemy's line when they should advance. This was the decisive point in the battle. The next half hour would settle ass with the centre not half a mile from the river. Our men (with the exception of the shameless skulkers) had fought bravely, but were now in a disorganized condition, and it seemed as if their main dependence must now be upon the guns which Col. Webster had collected to check the advance of the enemy. The delay was for a few moments only, and they came preceded by a storm of shot from their batteries which swept over all the intervening space and up to the very banks of the river. As st
Ebenezer Thompson (search for this): chapter 15
were preparing for the attack. Foote, according to his own report, did not consider himself properly prepared for such an adventure, as his force was not sufficiently strong to make an attack on the fort; but at the earnest request of Halleck and Grant, he felt called upon to do what he could, and at 3 P. M. on the 14th, he moved up with his fleet in the following order: iron-clads, St. Louis, (flag-ship), Lieut. Paulding; Carondelet, Corn. Walke; Louisville, Com. Dove; Pittsburg, Lieut. E. Thompson; gun-boats: Taylor, Lieut.-Com. Gwin; Conestoga, Lieut.-Com. Phelps, the two latter in the rear. After a severe fight of an hour and a half, during part of which time the iron-clads were within 400 yards of the fort, the flagship St. Louis, and the iron-clad Louisville, had their wheels disabled and drifted out of action. The fire of the fort, which had during the greater part of the engagement been very rapid and accurate, was now concentrated on the remaining vessels of the fle
troops, having been driven by the enemy from point to point and ridge to ridge, had reached the river bank and were brought to bay. Here the gun-boats Lexington and Taylor rendered good service, and the national troops, rallying under the cover of their guns, made a superb resistance, and although the enemy flung himself fiercely upon the Union lines he was again and again driven back. The military historians have not done justice to the work of the gun-boats at this important juncture. Croly disposes of the subject by saying: the gun-boats were of some importance as they had been for some time previous engaged in checking the advance of the enemy on the extreme left. Badeau,the historian, also speaks of the gunboats being employed during the night in throwing shells amongst the enemy's troops, which annoyed them greatly and set fire to the woods, which were ablaze all around them. It is not likely that the two gun-boats would be idle at Pittsburg Landing while our Army was b
W. T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 15
defense was moved farther South and was now established on the following points: Island No.10, Fort Pillow and Memphis on the Mississippi, a point in Tennessee near Pittsburg, and the town of Chattanooga. All of these points were strongly fortified and defended by large armies, thus closing up East Tennessee, and preventing our armies from marching southward. On the 15th of February, Gen. Grant was assigned to the new military district of West Tennessee, with limits undefined, and Gen. W. T. Sherman to the command of the district of Cairo. Grant commenced at once to concentrate his forces and make his dispositions to meet the new order of defense established by the Confederates. His first step was to send Gens. Wright and McClernand up to Pittsburg, while he remained himself at Savannah, superintending the organization of the new troops which were arriving from Missouri, and making preparations to advance towards Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh). The account of the famous battle
William Gwin (search for this): chapter 15
rvices rendered by the gun-boats Lexington and Taylor. Captain Gwin's report. the Navy aids materially in saving the Army d, and the following gun-boats passed through: Taylor, Lieut.-Com.Gwin; Lexington, Lieut.-Com. Shirk, and the Conestoga, Lieuve; Pittsburg, Lieut. E. Thompson; gun-boats: Taylor, Lieut.-Com. Gwin; Conestoga, Lieut.-Com. Phelps, the two latter in thestance, but received no orders to do so. At that time Lieut.-Com. Gwin, of the Taylor, having as yet received no instructionding to communicate with Gen. Grant. His reply was that Lieut. Gwin must use his own judgment in the case. Directly afterming in across the line of fire. So far Mr. Boynton: Capt. Gwin will tell the rest: * * * Both vessels opened a heavack when he considered that victory was in his hands. Lieut. Gwin in writing to Foote, puts it Rear-Admiral Henry Walke, wooden gun-boats Conestoga (Lieut. Phelps), and Taylor (Lieut. Gwin), and several transports with re-enforcements for Genera
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