ese circumstances, and for the further reason that the enemy, being on the alert, Buell's junction would no doubt be hastened, he was no longer in favor of making the attack, but favored inviting one by turning this offensive movement into a reconnoissance in force, to draw the enemy after us nearer to our base—Corinth—and thereby detach him further from his own, at Pittsburg Landing.
Somewhat similar strategy had been resorted to by Wellington in 1810, when, advancing to attack Massena at Santarem, he unexpectedly found that able officer on his guard, ready for battle, on ground of his own choosing, and much stronger than he had anticipated.
After making some demonstrations in front of his wily adversary, to draw him away from his stronghold, Wellington did not hesitate to retire without giving battle.
General Beauregard's views produced a visible effect on all present.
General Johnston, although shaken, after some reflection said that he admitted the weight and force of Genera
stated, under oath, at the trial of Colonel Worthington, that they amounted to fortythree thousand men, exclusive, be it remembered, of Lew. Wallace's division of about eight thousand men, on the northwest side of Owl Creek.
He then supposed our force was sixty thousand strong, instead of its actual number—forty thousand three hundred and thirty-five men of all arms and conditions.
But it may be fair to infer that he judged of their number by the effect they produced.
Thus it was that Mr. Lincoln was sorely puzzled during the war at his commanding generals reporting constantly that they had fought the Rebels with inferior numbers.
In the instance of the battle of Shiloh, this phenomenon might, however, possibly have happened; for in about thirty days, with our defective means of transportation, we had collected at Corinth, from Murfreesboroa, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and other distant points, an effective force of over forty thousand men of all arms, while the Federals had