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auga, starting from Ottowah and passing by Ringgold, to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon-roadttanooga and Atlanta Railroad. The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge, and west of the rough mountain, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton, or south of it. The valley of the Tennessee River, though several strike the enemy's railroad communication between Resaca Bridge and Dalton. These movements were promptly begun on the eighth and ninth of rously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton. Additional information, obtained during the afternoon and eveniconnoitred the enemy on the fifteenth, and reported him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, Letts, and Rock Springs Church. The head of General McCve these supplies, and if he was to transfer his line of defence to Dalton, it would certainly have been worth his while to render the railroa
borne in mind that the Chickanauga runs in a course nearly north; that Lee and Gordon's Mills are at the crossing of the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, and that Dalton's, Tedford's, Alexander's, and Reid's are respectively in their order further down the river (north) from Lee and Gordon's Mills. The crossing of the ChickamaugaBenning's Georgia brigade, and Robertson's Texas brigade, of Longstreet's corps, under command of General Hood, with Johnson's division, came up that morning from Dalton. It was now determined to force the passage of the Chickamauga, the enemy holding Alexander's Bridge in force, as well as the other. General Walker, commanding ime, while Walker was engaging the enemy, Stewart's division of Buckner's corps, composed of Clayton's, Brown's, and Bate's brigades, were moving on Tedford's and Dalton's Fords. Bate's. brigade was being thrown forward to a commanding position, supported by Clayton and Brown, but before getting into line the enemy opened a sever
th the balance of my command to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor. The line of march would probably lead me near Ringgold, and from thence in the vicinty of Dalton. September 10.--Generals Palmer and Van Cleve with their division ordered to make vigorous pursuit early this morning, marching on the road from Rossville to Ringgold, thence to Dalton. General Wood, after leaving one brigade at Chattanooga, to follow with his two brigades in the same direct line. General Wagner, with his brigade, having crossed during the night, was left as post commander. At four P. M., received report from General Palmer, that owing to want of supplies, troops only. Balance of the command under Minty sent to reconnoitre the whole front and left. At half-past 11 P. M., Colonel Minty reported that the enemy was in force at Dalton, Ringgold, Leet's, and Rockspring Church. September 16.--Nothing occurred of peculiar interest this day, except that Department Headquarters were established a
led to Ringgold, a distance of eight miles, over the roughest road I ever travelled. Many of the men were so sick that they could not raise their heads. Oct. 9.--Last night they put one hundred and eighty of us into box-cars and brought us to Dalton, where we stopped for the night. We had to sleep in the cars, and they gave us no supper. The night was very cold. It was heartrending to witness the suffering among the sick and wounded. This morning we left for Dalton without breakfast, andDalton without breakfast, and arrived at Atlanta, Ga., at six A. M. We were then taken to a military prison, where we now lie upon the ground with no shelter and no fires. Our wounds have not been dressed for three days; the stench is awful. Oct. 10.--We are under the charge of our own doctors here, but the rebels won't furnish bandages to dress the wounds. I never suffered so from hunger in all my life. They have been promising us rations all day, and now they tell us they will be here early in the morning. The boys
g a brigade, was killed by a rebel sharp-shooter concealed in a tree. The shot struck him, in the forehead, killing him instantly. Colonel Grose, reported killed, was not hurt. In a skirmish of Wilder's brigade with Forrest, a few miles from Dalton. Georgia, three days before the battle, Forrest was so badly wounded that he was unable to take his command during the battle. General Joe Johnston accompanied Forrest's brigade, and narrowly escaped being captured. The same day Lee, Johnston,, in the forehead, killing him instantly. Colonel Grose, reported killed, was not hurt. In a skirmish of Wilder's brigade with Forrest, a few miles from Dalton. Georgia, three days before the battle, Forrest was so badly wounded that he was unable to take his command during the battle. General Joe Johnston accompanied Forrest's brigade, and narrowly escaped being captured. The same day Lee, Johnston, Bragg, and other rebel generals, were in Dalton in consultation.--Indianapolis Journal.
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., Iuka and Corinth. (search)
wished to leave a train which was driven at such a reckless rate, but their wishes were not gratified. Before reaching Dalton we urged Andrews to turn and attack the enemy, laying an ambush so as to get into close quarters that our revolvers mightracy by the way of Richmond — merely gave the plan his sanction without making any attempt to carry it into execution. Dalton was passed without difficulty, and beyond we stopped again to cut wires and obstruct the track. It happened that a regimrendered necessary by our unexpected delay and the pouring rain. We made no attempt to damage the long tunnel north of Dalton, as our enemies had greatly dreaded. The last hope of the raid was now staked upon an effort of a different kind. A fewdirection of Chattanooga — a movement to which, on June 11th, Halleck gave the objective of Chattanooga and Cleveland and Dalton ; the ultimate purpose being to take possession of east Tennessee, in cooperation with General G. W. Morgan. To countera
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., The battle of Corinth. (search)
The Confederate evacuation of Corinth occurred on the 30th of May, General Beauregard withdrawing his army to Tupelo, where, June 27th, he was succeeded in the command by General Braxton Bragg. Halleck occupied Corinth on the day of its evacuation, and May 31st instructed General Buell, commanding the Army of the Ohio, to repair the Memphis and Charleston railway in the direction of Chattanooga — a movement to which, on June 11th, Halleck gave the objective of Chattanooga and Cleveland and Dalton ; the ultimate purpose being to take possession of east Tennessee, in cooperation with General G. W. Morgan. To counteract these plans, General Bragg began, on June 27th, the transfer of a large portion of his army to Chattanooga by rail, via Mobile, and about the middle of August set out on the northward movement which terminated only within sight of the Ohio River. The Confederate forces in Mississippi were left under command of Generals Van Dorn and Price. About the middle of July Gene
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., chapter 8.89 (search)
e marched to Rossville. On the 10th Crittenden, leaving Wagner's brigade to occupy Chattanooga, pursued the enemy toward Dalton and Ringgold. Wood reached Lee and Gordon's Mills on the 11th, and Crittenden was now ordered to close up his whole forcus situation in case of defeat. He risked too, to some extent, his trains, which had yet to be moved toward Ringgold and Dalton. His gain, in case of a decided victory, would be the cutting off of Rosecrans from Chattanooga, and possibly the recapt the Mills and at the fords between that place and Catlett's. This would have cut off Bragg from Rome certainly, and from Dalton in case of his advance upon Chattanooga, or else would have compelled him to come out and fight upon ground selected by hnd cover our rear and left, and bring up stragglers. 7. All teams, etc., not with troops should go toward Ringgold and Dalton beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains; rations when cooked will be forwarded to the troops.
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., Comments on General Grant's <placeName reg="Chattanooga, Hamilton, Tennessee" key="tgn,7017496" authname="tgn,7017496">Chattanooga</placeName>. (search)
el him either to retreat, leaving the railroad communication of Cheatham and Longstreet exposed, or else fight a battle with his diminished forces. From General Grant's order of November 7th the following extract is made: . . I deem the best movement to attract the enemy to be an attack on the north end of Missionary Ridge with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and, when that is carried, to threaten, and even attack if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland. . . . The movement should not be made one moment later than to-morrow morning. It will be seen from this order that the plan proposed by me had been entirely changed, for while I had proposed only to threaten the seizure of the north-west end of Missionary Ridge, General Grant proposed to attack the enemy by carrying the ridge, and then to threaten, and even attack if possible, the lines of communication; that is, to bring on a general engagement. When it is remembered tha
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., Longstreet at Knoxville. (search)
lumn. It was unanimously decided to go back to the plan of assaulting Fort Sanders, and I was ordered to get the guns back upon the hills across the river early Saturday morning. This was done, but the day turned out rainy and the assault was again postponed until Sunday, the 28th. So General Leadbetter's advent cost us three as valuable days as the sun ever shone upon. Meanwhile a rumor reached us that Bragg had had a severe battle at Chattanooga, and had been defeated and driven back to Dalton. Late on Saturday afternoon General Longstreet suddenly changed the plan of attack (I believe under advice of General Leadbetter) and ordered that instead of beginning at sunrise, and being preceded by a crushing fire of artillery concentrated on the fort and covered by an enveloping swarm of sharp-shooters, a surprise should be attempted just before dawn by the infantry alone. This was a bitter disappointment to the artillery, after so many days spent in preparation. We believe that in