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Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 33
l go no further. The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say, with confidence, that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington, and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carWashington, and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully-chosen position in its rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is wee in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that, after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position, and force the Federals to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout
Louisiana (Louisiana, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
e retreat. It is the accepted principle of action in a rout. General Early, in his report of this day's work, says the enemy had been routed. He should, therefore, have been followed by everything that could have been thrown upon his heels, not so much to gain the heights, which were recognized as the rallying point, but to prevent his rallying at all in time to form lines for another battle. If the enemy had been routed, this could and should have been done. In the Military annals of Louisiana (Napier Bartlett, Esq.), in the account of this rout, he says: Hays had received orders, through Early, from General Ewell (though Lee's general instructions were subsequently the reverse) to halt at Gettysburg, and advance no further in case he should succeed in capturing that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were coming around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and were making for the heights — the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it
Frederick, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
r testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I distinctly remember the appearance in our headquarter camp of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee's headquarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his headquarters, and said: To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
Life in Pennsylvania. General James Longstreet. It has been my purpose for some years to give to the public a detailed history of the caerms, or, at least, held Washington, and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carement, he asked me if I did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by his own army would accomplish the same result, and I replied urged with great persistency. I suggested that, after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position, ands were joined together at Hagerstown, and we marched thence into Pennsylvania, reaching Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th. At this poinresults than could possibly have been secured by the invasion of Pennsylvania: First, the offensive strategical, but defensive tactical, plan ons that he adduced as one of the objections to the invasion of Pennsylvania, that the Federals would do superior fighting upon their own soi
Cashtown (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
which General Lee was enveloped, and the anxiety that weighed him down during the afternoon, I quote from General R. H. Anderson the report of a conversation had with him during the engagement. General Anderson was resting with his division at Cashtown, awaiting orders. About ten o'clock in the morning he received a message notifying him that General Lee desired to see him. He found General Lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he saomptly at that time the corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance, when they were stopped by Ewell's wagon trains and Johnson's Division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were detained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see you I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get i
Richmond (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
neral Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right, and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the commanding general is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army. Yours, very truly, Chas. S. Venable. I add upon this point the letter of Dr. Cullen, Medical Director of the First Corps: Richmond, Va., May 18th, 1875. General James Longstreet: Dear General-Yours of the 16th ult. should have received my immediate attention, but before answering it, I was desirous of refreshing my memory of the scenes and incidents of the Gettysburg campaign by conversation with others who were with-us, and who served in different corps of the command. It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First Army Corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to it
Columbus (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
ommander, he should have the support and influence we can give him. If the blame, if there is any, can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there, and shall remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders. Most affectionately yours, J. Longstreet. To A. B. Longstreet, Ll.D., Columbus, Ga. I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the commanding general in that battle gave an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure th
Africa (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
ion, which was left at Chambersburg by General Lee's orders. Ewell was recalled from above-he having advanced as far as Carlisle. I was with General Lee most of that day (the 30th). At about noon, the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's Corps and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above. The orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into camp at Greenwood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st; my artillery did not get the road until two o'clock on the morning of the 2d. General Lee spent the night with us, establishing his headquarters, as he frequently did, a short distance from mine. General Lee says of the movements of this day: Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head
Harrisburg (Texas, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
hat General Lee deeply deplored it as a mistake. His remark, made just after the battle, It is all my fault, meant just what it said. It adds to the nobility and magnanimity of that remark, when we reflect that it was the utterance of a deep-felt truth, rather than a mere sentiment. In a letter written to me by General Lee, in January, 1864, he says: Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg, instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been. Captain T. J. Gorie, of Houston, Texas, a gentleman of high position and undoubted integrity, writes to me upon this same point as follows: Another important circumstance which I distinctly remember was in the winter of 1864, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange Court-House with dispatches for General Lee. Upon my arrival there, General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone with two or three Northern papers on his table. He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official report of the battle of
Greenwood (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 33
hed toward Gettysburg, and my corps followed, with the exception of Pickett's Division, which was left at Chambersburg by General Lee's orders. Ewell was recalled from above-he having advanced as far as Carlisle. I was with General Lee most of that day (the 30th). At about noon, the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's Corps and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above. The orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into camp at Greenwood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st; my artillery did not get the road until two o'clock on the morning of the 2d. General Lee spent the night with us, establishing his headquarters, as he frequently did, a short distance from mine. General Lee says of the movements of this day: Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout
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