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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 25. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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South Carolina (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
up to these demands, fulfills all these requirements, and has woven around it an interest far above the average. He was admitted to be the foremost lawyer of South Carolina by his profession and the public generally. If I were to say that he was the foremost lawyer of the South, I do not believe the statement would be challengedpolitics. He was a Union man and was opposed to nulification and secession. In Carolina at that time his was an exceedingly unpopular stand to take. Indeed South Carolina was the leader in both these movements. Our people had but little sympathy for those who entertained opposite ideas on these subjects. And yet there were a en, and conservative in their ideas and views. In the third place they were men of high character, wide experience and more than average ability. They loved South Carolina. She was their native State and was as dear to them as the apple of the eye. Around and about her were centered their affections and interests. They well kn
Carlisle, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle. The advance arrested. Again, in his later and more carefully considered report, after the reports from all the di of the Columbia bridge, to cross my division over the Susquehannah. Ewells possibilities. General Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th, and writes (p. 443): From Carlisle I sent forward my engineer, Captain H. B. Richardson, with Jenkins' cavaCarlisle I sent forward my engineer, Captain H. B. Richardson, with Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg and was starting on the 29th for that place, when ordered by the General commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. General Rodes writes (p. 552): On the arrival at CarliCarlisle, Jenkins' cavalry advanced towards Harrisburg and had, on the 29th, made a thorough reconnoisance of the defenses of the place, with the view of our advance upon it, a step which every man in the division contemplated with eagerness, and which w
Baltimore, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
sions approached Gettysburg, to find Meade's advance was there ahead of him. It had evidently been General Lee's plan to operate west of the South Mountain range, and keep General Meade east of it, as the sending Early east of it to threaten Baltimore clearly indicates. In case the Union army crossed over in spite of his manoeuvres to prevent it, he relied upon the fact that the concentration of his army at Gettysburg would place him nearer to Baltimore than it, and unless his move was quicBaltimore than it, and unless his move was quickly responded to by it, he could interpose his army between Baltimore and Washington on the one side and the Union army on the other. He was in error in supposing that contingency had arisen, though it appears from the fact on the morning of the 28th, three of the seven corps of the Union army were in the Catoctin Valley, near Middleton, and one other at Knoxville, with the passes in the South Mountain heavily guarded, that it was Hooker's purpose to have crossed over as General Lee supposed h
Loudoun (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
all back from before Harrisburg. Just enough information to mislead, brought on the battle of Gettysburg. When the army crossed the Potomac, it was expected of the cavalry to furnish reliable informamation of the movements of the Army of the Potomac. I can find nothing in the records that throws any light upon what it was that detained the two brigades under Robertson in Virginia until July 1st, when they crossed the river at Williamsport. The Army of the Potomac had been withdrawn from Loudoun—the last of the cavalry crossing the river on the 27th, and the positions taken up that night. General Jones, commanding one of the brigades, takes up his report on the 29th, with his command at Snickersville, Loudoun county. There were no reports from the other brigade, and it appears there were no reports from either of them to General Lee at the time of the movements of the enemy. Would not have crossed. What General Lee would have done, had he known the facts fully instead of b
Markham (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
plete victory on the second day. The responsibility for the (as it proved to be) fatal delays has led to much crimination and recrimination. The third day's fighting on the right was a miserable failure, because it was so conducted that, in fact, it was divided into two separate and distinct battles, the first fought by artillery without any infantry, and the second by infantry without any artillery. And yet, in spite of the unnecessary delays and want of co-operation on the second day, and the gross mismanagement of the fighting on the third day, the killed, wounded and missing on the Confederate side were not as great as that on the Union side, and the disparity between the numbers in the two armies at the beginning had been almost obliterated by the fighting, for General Meade reported July 4th that the strength of his army (infantry and artillery), equipped, was only 55,000, and General Lee's numbers could not have been much less. Robert M. Stribling. Markham, Va., June 4, 1897.
Manchester, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
of being compelled to act upon the imperfect information of the scout, is a question open to speculation, for General Lee never disclosed what were his plans in contingencies that never arose. But had he known that Meade's army was moving—the left wing, composed of three corps—through Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, and the other four moving on lines east of that route and kept within easy supporting distance, the 12th and 2d Corps directed upon Gettysburg, the 5th upon Hanover, and the 6th to Manchester, to be a general reserve to the whole, it is almost positively certain that he would not have crossed his army over the mountain. The Union correspondence may throw some light to guide the speculations of those inclined to construct a theory based upon probabilities. General Couch, commanding in that department, with headquarters at Harrisburg, wrote to the Secretary of War June 29th (page 407): I hold from Altoona along the Juniata and Susquehannah to Conowingo bridge above Havre-de
Hagerstown (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
t on the night of the 28th, to the effect, that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains. Acting under the impression produced by the scout's information, that the Union army was moving westward towards Hagerstown, on the line of his communications with Virginia, it must have been a great surprise to him, when his leading divisions approached Gettysburg, to find Meade's advance was there ahead of him. It had evidently been General Lee's plan to operate west of the South Mountain range, and keep General Meade east of it, as the sending Early east of it to threaten Baltimore clearly indicates. In case the Union army crossed over in spite of his manoeuvres to prevent it, he relied upon the fact tha
Dover, N. H. (New Hampshire, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
, under the impression that the army of the Potomac was still in Virginia. Not unfavorable conditions. It so happened that Hill was just where he should have been to observe the movements of Meade's army and to guard the passes through the mountains. Longstreet at Chambersburg, midway between the two wings, was in easy supporting distance of either of them. Stuart, with his three brigades of cavalry, would have rejoined the army on July 1st, for on the morning of that day he reached Dover and in the afternoon Carlisle. It must have been, however, with great reluctance that General Lee would adopt a line of action predicated upon Stuart, for it might be for aught he knew that he had met with a disaster, or been driven back into Virginia. Because General Lee preferred to operate with his army in Pennsylvania until compelled to accept defensive battle with the Army of the Potomac, it by no means follows that an aggressive battle, in which he attacked the enemy as they were a
Wrightsville (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
ething of these conditions, for he had always heretofore kept himself well-informed in regard to the conditions he had to encounter. He must have known something of the quality of the militia, for Early's cavalry had come upon a full regiment of this militia at Gettysburg, which had dispersed so quickly that Jenkins could not get in sight of it. York had been abandoned by the military, and the municipal officers met Early several miles from the city to treat for its surrender. Again, at Wrightsville, 1,200 militia had retreated across the bridge and set fire to it, before Gordon could get his brigade in position to attack. General Early writes (p. 467): I regretted very much the failure to secure the bridge, as, finding the defenseless condition of the country generally, and the little obstacle likely to be afforded by the militia to our progress, I had determined, if I could get possession of the Columbia bridge, to cross my division over the Susquehannah. Ewells possibilities
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.5
asy supporting distance of either of them. Stuart, with his three brigades of cavalry, would have rejoined the army on July 1st, for on the morning of that day he reached Dover and in the afternoon Carlisle. It must have been, however, with great reluctance that General Lee would adopt a line of action predicated upon Stuart, for it might be for aught he knew that he had met with a disaster, or been driven back into Virginia. Because General Lee preferred to operate with his army in Pennsylvania until compelled to accept defensive battle with the Army of the Potomac, it by no means follows that an aggressive battle, in which he attacked the enemy as they were assembling, must be unsuccessful, or even that the conditions were necessarily favorable to the enemy. The results of the first and second days' fighting establish this fact; for, though lacking the important qualities of rapidity of movements and promptness of action, they were so favorable to General Lee as to warrant the
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