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Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): article 1
r forces. We must conquer Washington and Maryland on Virginia soil. McClellan is required by truin them, and open the way to Washington and Maryland. We must break up their army before we advance into Maryland; and this they will afford us an early opportunity to effect, if we will be but patissouri, Kentucky, Northwestern Virginia, and Maryland, which offered them no resistance when the waand strength of their enemies. Relief to Maryland. Many who admit that it is both perilous e are in honor bound to attempt the relief of Maryland. Marching into her territory will be surtuation more deplorable than would be that of Maryland if we were now to march a part of our army in winter closes. Should we be defeated in Maryland our whole array, with their arms and ammunitia stunning and appalling blow. One defeat in Maryland would do us more harm than ten in Virginia. selection of the battle- ground — why choose Maryland? We cannot conquer the North except by e
Russia (Russia) (search for this): article 1
it is hourly receding, for it the retreating army have not entirety exhausted the supplies of the country through which it has passed, the people are unfriendly, and will not bring into the camp of their enemies the little that is left. If they send out foraging parties this still further weakens them, and exposes them to decimation in detail. Bonaparte set out for Moscow with half a million of men, and if we mistake not, had little over a hundred and fifty thousand when he arrived there. Russia, and the whole of Northern Europe except Sweden, Norway, and Lapland, is a dead level, interspersed with towns and villages. It has no natural strength, and hence in past times conquest in Europe, with slight exceptions, has proceeded north was dry. The Confederate States present greater natural obstacles to an invading army than any equal area of country on the globe. Armies cannot march down our Atlantic coast, because of the great number of bays, inlets, creeks, and rivers; nor down the
G. Ross (search for this): article 1
t, because of the great number of bays, inlets, creeks, and rivers; nor down the inferior, because of mountain ridges, impassable roads, sparse population, and scarcity of provisions. The Mississippi is narrow, long, tedious, and easily defended, and its valley is subject to overflow. No invading army will attempt a serious invasion in that direction. It is our true policy to decoy the enemy into the interior, and then to cut them off as were Braddock, and Burgoyne, and Cornwallis, and Ross, and Packenham, and our own troops in the everglades of Florida. When we have defeated and captured their armies, exhausted their treasury, and cowed their spirits by defensive warfare, it will be time for us to begin to act on the offensive, and to invade their territory. The Northwest is as level a country as Northern Europe, teems with provisions, and abounds with towns and villages Its population is a spiritless rabble, who have few arms and know little of their use, and who are endowed
Lucretia (search for this): article 1
ifice true honor to gain ephemeral reputation. They possess that lofty moral fortitude, that true courage, that can submit, even to the imputation of cowardice, rather than by failing in duty, to play the actual coward. With what truth and pathos did Scott exclaim (in effect,) "I am a coward, because I have permitted popular clamor to swerve me from the line of duty." It is easier, far easier, to face the cannon's mouth, or mount the deadly breach, than to prefer duty to reputation. Lucretia's virtue satisfies most men; for they are solicitous not so much for self-approbation as for the applause of the crowd, and are satisfied to do what is wrong, provided they can win the plaudits of the mob. When the future historian records the story of our war, his pen will become most eloquent as he dilates upon that wise, cautious, and prudent policy that, despite of misconstruction and sacrificing temporary reputation to ultimate success, often won victory by avoiding battle. He will pl
Fairfax (search for this): article 1
rce before us," contend, nevertheless, that we are in honor bound to attempt the relief of Maryland. Marching into her territory will be sure to transfer the seat of war from Virginia and carry it into her midst. She is now comparatively well treated by the Federal forces, because they are trying to conciliate her favor, and retain her in the Union. When we attempt to relieve her by crossing the Potomac, we shall place her in the situation of Kentucky, Missouri, Western Virginia, and Fairfax. The Federalists will burn her farm-houses, and villages, and towns, and rob and lay waste her whole territory; and her own citizens divided in their allegiance, will rise up and shed each other's blood. We can imagine no situation more deplorable than would be that of Maryland if we were now to march a part of our army into her territories. The time has not yet arrived when the Federals would flee from her soil, panic stricken at our approach; and will not arrive until we have re-enacte
Packenham (search for this): article 1
the great number of bays, inlets, creeks, and rivers; nor down the inferior, because of mountain ridges, impassable roads, sparse population, and scarcity of provisions. The Mississippi is narrow, long, tedious, and easily defended, and its valley is subject to overflow. No invading army will attempt a serious invasion in that direction. It is our true policy to decoy the enemy into the interior, and then to cut them off as were Braddock, and Burgoyne, and Cornwallis, and Ross, and Packenham, and our own troops in the everglades of Florida. When we have defeated and captured their armies, exhausted their treasury, and cowed their spirits by defensive warfare, it will be time for us to begin to act on the offensive, and to invade their territory. The Northwest is as level a country as Northern Europe, teems with provisions, and abounds with towns and villages Its population is a spiritless rabble, who have few arms and know little of their use, and who are endowed with no sen
Bonaparte (search for this): article 1
e of operations. Besides, with it the difficulty of obtaining provisions increases with each advance. It must procure them from home, from which it is hourly receding, for it the retreating army have not entirety exhausted the supplies of the country through which it has passed, the people are unfriendly, and will not bring into the camp of their enemies the little that is left. If they send out foraging parties this still further weakens them, and exposes them to decimation in detail. Bonaparte set out for Moscow with half a million of men, and if we mistake not, had little over a hundred and fifty thousand when he arrived there. Russia, and the whole of Northern Europe except Sweden, Norway, and Lapland, is a dead level, interspersed with towns and villages. It has no natural strength, and hence in past times conquest in Europe, with slight exceptions, has proceeded north was dry. The Confederate States present greater natural obstacles to an invading army than any equal area
Burgoyne (search for this): article 1
march down our Atlantic coast, because of the great number of bays, inlets, creeks, and rivers; nor down the inferior, because of mountain ridges, impassable roads, sparse population, and scarcity of provisions. The Mississippi is narrow, long, tedious, and easily defended, and its valley is subject to overflow. No invading army will attempt a serious invasion in that direction. It is our true policy to decoy the enemy into the interior, and then to cut them off as were Braddock, and Burgoyne, and Cornwallis, and Ross, and Packenham, and our own troops in the everglades of Florida. When we have defeated and captured their armies, exhausted their treasury, and cowed their spirits by defensive warfare, it will be time for us to begin to act on the offensive, and to invade their territory. The Northwest is as level a country as Northern Europe, teems with provisions, and abounds with towns and villages Its population is a spiritless rabble, who have few arms and know little of th
Depew (search for this): article 1
Reflections on the times.conduct of the war. [written for a forthcoming number of Depew's Review] The New York Evening Post, the some very harsh comments on the conduct of the Federal officers in crossing the Potomac with a small body of troops near Leesburg lately remarked, that the greatest blunder an officer could make was "sleave an impassable river behind him with an enemy in superior force before him." Not heeding the lessons we tried to teach the Yankees at Bethel, at Manassas, and the other day, at Leesburg, though less people among us are continually complaining that our armies do not follow the fatal examples set by the North, and rush headlong into positions where they would have to encounter superior force, strong fortifications, and natural advantages of situation. Tis the mob of the North, and its mouthpiece, the press of the North, that has urged on their armies to certain defeat.-- This mob rules despotically among our enemies. Shall we install it in su
Scott (search for this): article 1
exhibited a noble specimen of the moral sublime, in the patience with which they have submitted to misconstruction, calumny and abuse.--They prefer to pursue that course which is right, to that which only seems to be right — They will not sacrifice true honor to gain ephemeral reputation. They possess that lofty moral fortitude, that true courage, that can submit, even to the imputation of cowardice, rather than by failing in duty, to play the actual coward. With what truth and pathos did Scott exclaim (in effect,) "I am a coward, because I have permitted popular clamor to swerve me from the line of duty." It is easier, far easier, to face the cannon's mouth, or mount the deadly breach, than to prefer duty to reputation. Lucretia's virtue satisfies most men; for they are solicitous not so much for self-approbation as for the applause of the crowd, and are satisfied to do what is wrong, provided they can win the plaudits of the mob. When the future historian records the story
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