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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. Search the whole document.

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Hornady (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
o despatch to the general-in-chief or to Washington, but on the last named day he renewed his recommendations to Grant. It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma and Talladega railroad, at Blue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose one thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. . . . On the 10th, he learned that Hood had crossed the Coo
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
ed in person at the West, had been to acquire Atlanta, and then, retaining possession of that import time contemplating his final circuit around Atlanta, and he telegraphed at once: If there be any lumbus, Georgia, as bases, in connection with Atlanta, we have Georgia and Alabama at our feet. . .od to send Gordon Granger past Mobile towards Atlanta. . . . The movement Sherman is now making, rea, is a hundred and fifty miles southwest of Atlanta, and two hundred from Mobile. Grant's idea nother place; but I think better to hold on to Atlanta and strengthen to my rear, and am therefore gn to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta, and then march across Georgia to Savannah oremorable march. This was to give up not only Atlanta, but the line in the rear to Chattanooga; to ntemplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile. Drawina line to the coast; and if he had arrived at Atlanta, and found it impossible to hold his communic[17 more...]
Deep Bottom (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
ties of general-in-chief movement of Butler from Deep Bottom capture of Fort Harrison Ord wounded national e ready on the morning of the 29th, to start from Deep Bottom and the Aiken House, and assault the enemy's lines entrenched positions back of the river, between Deep Bottom and Richmond, such as Chapin's Farm, which are ga dawn on the 29th of September, Butler moved from Deep Bottom; the Eighteenth corps, under Ord, marched by the run direct to Richmond, only ten miles north of Deep Bottom. The attack by Ord on the left had been ordered should have pushed on with vigor. Grant was at Deep Bottom in person at an early hour, and though anxious to entire command, the general-in-chief returned to Deep Bottom at noon, to communicate with Meade, from whom he want to remain here through the day. I will go to Deep Bottom, however, to meet you, leaving here at five A. M.daylight, accordingly, Grant went up the river to Deep Bottom, and finding everything quiet in that quarter, at
Montgomery (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
nd he telegraphed at once: If there be any possibility of Admiral Farragut and the land forces under Gordon Granger taking Mobile, and further, of pushing up to Montgomery, my best plan would be to wait awhile, as now, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there. This was just at the time when Hood's cavalry under Wheeler ry. On the 4th of September, after Atlanta had fallen, he proposed that he and Canby should each be reinforced by fifty thousand men; that Canby should move to Montgomery, and he himself towards the same point, and, then forming a junction, they should open the line to the Gulf of Mexico. On the 10th, he said to Canby: We must ma at our feet. . . . I will be ready to sally forth in October, but ought to have some assurances that, in case of necessity, I can swing into Appalachicola or Montgomery. This of course was to carry out the original strategy of Grant. The general-in-chief, however, had by this time different views. The rebels west of the Mi
Kingston (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
d the 9th of October he sent no despatch to the general-in-chief or to Washington, but on the last named day he renewed his recommendations to Grant. It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma and Talladega railroad, at Blue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose one thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. . . . On the 10th, he learned
Augusta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
roops to act upon Savannah, while you move on Augusta. I would like to hear from you, however, in this matter. Augusta, on the Savannah river, is a hundred and fifty miles from its mouth, and a h sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgnage to take the Savannah river as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enem and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, and start as soon ssion of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. This was not different from what Grant had to the east of the Oconee, and do the same at Augusta to the east side of the Savannah? As Grant dving open to me the road to Macon, as also to Augusta. If I was sure that Savannah would be in ouruestion is whether, under such circumstances, Augusta and Savannah would not be a better line than [4 more...]
Milledgeville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
en by the enemy's cavalry that swarms around us. . . . If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. The country will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough, in any one place, Alabama line, leaving open to me the road to Macon, as also to Augusta. If I was sure that Savannah would be in our possession, I would be tempted to make for Milledgeville and Augusta, but I must secure what I have. Forrest, however, was now rapidly advancing towards the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga, two hundred miom which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike out with wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple the
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
found necessary to transfer A. J. Smith to West Tennessee and the Nineteenth corps to Virginia. Canessing the army, he turned to a division of Tennessee troops, and exclaimed: Be of good cheer, for: It will be better to drive Forrest from Middle Tennessee as a first step, and then do anything else west], why would it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the resered Athens and moved up into the interior of Tennessee, threatening the line between Thomas and NasHood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphishing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forces; and if Thomas was defeated, the states of Tennessee and Kentucky were opened to the enemy, and pt behind to command the forces in defence of Tennessee. There is one thing, however, I don't wish ippi river, and the needs of commanders in East Tennessee; to order reinforcements to Sherman, and t[9 more...]
Appalachicola (Florida, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
eorgia and Alabama at our feet. . . . I will be ready to sally forth in October, but ought to have some assurances that, in case of necessity, I can swing into Appalachicola or Montgomery. This of course was to carry out the original strategy of Grant. The general-in-chief, however, had by this time different views. The rebelsrman was still looking to his onward march. The crisis so imminent in his rear only made him more eager to advance. On the 28th of September, he said: I want Appalachicola arsenal taken, also Savannah, and if the enemy does succeed in breaking up my roads, I can fight my way across to one or the other place; but I think better tome time, these tremendous demands upon Grant, these imperative calls that the chief should at once protect Nashville, three hundred miles in the rear, and take Appalachicola and Savannah, a thousand miles away, in front, show the absolute faith of Sherman that Grant both could and would supervise all. He had said himself six months
Gulf of Mexico (search for this): chapter 2
to Montgomery, and he himself towards the same point, and, then forming a junction, they should open the line to the Gulf of Mexico. On the 10th, he said to Canby: We must have the Alabama river now. . . . My line is so long now that it is impossith supplies; while Sherman, moving south-east instead of south-west, would approach the Atlantic coast instead of the Gulf of Mexico: he would thus sever the only remaining line between Hood and Lee, and be better able, in case of need, to co-operatembus, Georgia, from which point communication could be opened by the Chattahoochee and Appalachicola rivers, with the Gulf of Mexico. Sherman replied to Grant's telegram the same night, promptly conforming his own views to the new conception of hiGrant, if he had not felt certain that the chief would provide supplies to meet him, wherever, on the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico, he should strike the coast; if he had not been equally sure that Grant would protect the forces and the country tha
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