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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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R. J. Deas (search for this): chapter 18
uld but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to turn Round Top mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy. Trusting this sketch, however incomplete, may answer its purpose, I am, respectfully yours, J. B. Hood. Witnesses: H. B. Deas, R. J. Deas. Letter from Major-General Henry Heth, of A. P. Hill's corps, A. N. V. [The following letter from General Heth was originally addressed to the Secretary of our Society, and was duly forwarded to our distinguished foreign correspondent, whose letter of enquiry to us called it forth. It has been recently published in the Philadelphia Times, but will be none the less acceptable to our readers as one of our Gettysburg series.] Richmond, Va., June, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D.
ters stood thus: Hooker in my front, with an army more than a hundred thousand strong; Foster preparing to advance into North Carolina; Dix preparing to advance on Richmond from Fortress Monroe; Tyler in the Kanawha Valley preparing to unite with Milroy, who was in the Valley of Virginia, collecting men and material for an advance on Staunton. To oppose these movements I'had sixty thousand men. It would have been folly to have divided my army; the armies of the enemy were too far apart for me troblem in every possible phase, and to my mind it resolved itself into the choice of one of two things-either to retire on Richmond and stand a siege, which must ultimately have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania. I chose the latter. Milroy was in my route; I crushed him, and as soon as the First corps of my army crossed the Potomac, orders were issued countermanding the advance of Foster and Dix. As soon as my Second corps crossed Hooker loosened his hold, and Old Virginia was free
rlisle. Hearing that a supply of shoes was to be obtained in Gettysburg, eight miles distant from Cashtown, and greatly needing shoes for.my men, I directed General Pettigrew to go to Gettysburg and get these supplies. On the 30th of June General Pettigrew, with his brigade, went near Gettysburg, but did not enter the town, reGeneral Pettigrew, with his brigade, went near Gettysburg, but did not enter the town, returning the same evening to Cashtown, reporting that he had not carried out my orders, as Gettysburg was occupied by the enemy's cavalry, and that some of his officers reported hearing drums beating on the farther side of the town; that under these circumstances he did not deem it advisable to enter Gettysburg. About this time Gen The attack on July 3, known as Pickett's charge, made by Pickett's division, numbering some forty-five hundred strong, and my own shattered division, under General Pettigrew, numbering about forty-three hundred muskets, unsupported, was, as was said of the famous charge of the six hundred at Baliklava, ties grande, mais c'est ne
Generell Ewell (search for this): chapter 18
me month, and marched into Pennsylvania. Hill's and Ewell's corps were in advance, and were reported to be in ant from Chambersburg, information was received that Ewell and Hill were about to come in contact with the enem3. Total, 68,352. From this total must be deducted Ewell's loss at Winchester, the details left on the south eyes. The eyes of an army are its cavalry. Before Ewell crossed the Potomac General Lee wrote to General Stut, commanding the cavalry, in substance, as follows: Ewell will cross the Potomac on a certain day, at a certain point. Hill will follow Ewell, crossing on a given day at a given point; Longstreet will hold the gaps in thollows: Longstreet's corps, at or near Chambersburg; Ewell's corps, which had been pushed east as far as York, n my front. General Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's corps en route to Cashtown, was following a road rdivision, it would have been attacked by Longstreet, Ewell and Hill's corps. In that case the fate of this cor
H. B. Deas (search for this): chapter 18
e rear, I could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to turn Round Top mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy. Trusting this sketch, however incomplete, may answer its purpose, I am, respectfully yours, J. B. Hood. Witnesses: H. B. Deas, R. J. Deas. Letter from Major-General Henry Heth, of A. P. Hill's corps, A. N. V. [The following letter from General Heth was originally addressed to the Secretary of our Society, and was duly forwarded to our distinguished foreign correspondent, whose letter of enquiry to us called it forth. It has been recently published in the Philadelphia Times, but will be none the less acceptable to our readers as one of our Gettysburg series.] Richmond, Va., June, 1877. Rev. J. W
he supposition that troops are much more willing to die when fighting on their own soil and in its defence. Attacking a sentiment is not popular, I know. I am not singular, I am satisfied, in expressing the opinion that not one man in a thousand engaged in battle ever thinks what soil he is fighting on, but would rather be on any other soil than just that soil at that time. Far different emotions fill the breasts of men at such times. I confess I am matter-of-fact enough to believe that Leonidas and his celebrated three hundred would not have all died at Thermopylee but for the fact that they were surrounded and could not get away. Human nature was pretty much the same two thousand three hundred and fifty-seven years ago as it is to-day. The part that the uninitiated would have sentiment to play in warfare is very sure to be eradicated by actual participation in such a war as raged in this country from 1860 to 1864. The fight at Gettysburg on July 1 was without order or syste
hen referring to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he says: The proof is that as soon as the latter (Meade) began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on too large a scale, found himself so inuch endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to await him. This determination to strike his enemy was not, from the position he found himself, to attack. And further, to corroborate the fact that General Lee was not compelled to attack Meade where Meade chose to wait for him, 1 will show, I am confident, that the Battle of Gettysburg waMeade chose to wait for him, 1 will show, I am confident, that the Battle of Gettysburg was the result purely of an accident, for which I am probably, more than any one else, accountable. Napoleon is said to have remarked that a dog fight might determine the result of a great battle. Altance determined the Battle of Gettysburg being fought at Gettysburg. It is well known that General Meade had chosen another point as his battle-field. On the 29th of June, 1863, General Lee's army
ad gained not an in inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued. After the battle of Chancellorsville matters stood thus: Hooker in my front, with an army more than a hundred thousand strong; Foster preparing to advance into North Carolina; Dix preparing to advance on Richmond from Fortress Monroe; Tyler in the Kanawha Valley preparing to unite with Milroy, who was in the Valley of Virginia, collecting men and material for an advance on Staunton. To oppose these movements I'had sixty th ultimately have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania. I chose the latter. Milroy was in my route; I crushed him, and as soon as the First corps of my army crossed the Potomac, orders were issued countermanding the advance of Foster and Dix. As soon as my Second corps crossed Hooker loosened his hold, and Old Virginia was freer of Federal troops than she had ever been since the commencement of the war. Had my cavalry been in place my plans would have been very different, and I think
to the right of the railroad, the ground rising in front and in rear. The enemy was evidently in force in my front. General Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's corps en route to Cashtown, was following a road running north of Gettysburg. RodeRodes hearing the firing at Gettysburg, faced by the left flank and approached the town. He soon became heavily engaged, and seeing this, I sought for and found General Lee. Saying to the General: Rodes is very heavily engaged, had I not better attackRodes is very heavily engaged, had I not better attack? General Lee replied: No; I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement to-day-Longstreet is not up. Returning to my division, I sooa discovered that the enemy were moving troops from my front and pushing them against Rodes. I reported thisRodes. I reported this fact to General Lee and again requested to be permitted to attack. Permission was given. My division numbered some seven thousand muskets. I found in my front a heavy skirmish line and two lines of battle. My division swept over these without h
ar distant from Chambersburg, information was received that Ewell and Hill were about to come in contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws' division, were put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which, after a hard march, we reached before or at sunrise on the 2d of July. So imperative afternoon — about three o'clock--it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to our extreme right, and attack up the Emmettsburg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In a short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my troops, and pass to the front of McLaws. This movement wMcLaws. This movement was accomplished by throwing out an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instructions I received were to place my division across the Emmettsburg road, form line of battle, and attack. Before reaching this road, however, I had sent forward some of my picked Texas scouts to ascertain the position of the enemy's
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