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September 1st (search for this): chapter 37
in fact resulted from his threatening of Hood's flank-forced his superior numbers wedge-like into the gap, and effectually separated the wings. Then he struck in detail. Hardee, at Jonesboro, failed to make any impression upon him on the 1st of September, while Hood-weakened and unable to check his movements on the left — was forced, on the 31St August, to decide upon the evacuation of Atlanta! This fatal movement was accomplished on the evening of the 1st of September, without further l1st of September, without further loss; but the key to the Confederate cause — the sole barrier to the onward sweep of Sherman to the ocean --was in his hands at last! There may have been causes operating on General Hood that were not known to the people; for the results and their motive was shrouded in silence. His dispatch announcing the fall of the most important point was very brief; stating in a few lines that Hardee, having failed against the enemy at Jonesboro, while he could not oppose his flank movement at Atlanta,
and hounding on his men with the savagery of the bloodhound, was pushing on for Lynchburg and the railroad lines of supply adjacent to it. Grant at once detached Sheridan with a heavy force, to operate against the lines from Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Simultaneously he, himself, was to strike a resistless blow at Petersburg; and thus with every avenue of supply cut off, the leaguered Capital must soon — from very weakness-drop into eager hands stretched out to grasp her. On the 16th and 17th June, there were sharp and heavilysup-ported attacks upon portions of the Confederate line before Petersburg. The expectation evidently was to drive them in by sheer weight; for it was known only that part of Lee's forces had crossed the river, and the line was one of immense extent-requiring three times his whole force to man it effectively. But, as ever before, General Grant underrated his enemy; and, as ever before, his cherished theory of giving six lives for one to gain his
this hope he relied much upon the powerful aid of the fleet; but Admiral Lee, ascending in a double-ender, lost his pioneer-boat, the Commodore Jones and very nearly his own flag-ship, by a torpedo, opposite Signal Station. This stopped the advance of the fleet, as the river was supposed to be sown with torpedoes. Nowise daunted, General Butler-like the true knight and chivalrous leader his entire career proves him to be-drew his line closer round the coveted stronghold. But on the 16th of May, Beauregard sallied out and struck the hero of New Orleans so suddenly and so sharply that he drove him, with heavy loss and utter demoralization, clear from his advanced lines to Bermuda Hundred. Only the miscarriage of a part of the plan, entrusted to a subordinate general, saved Butler's army from complete destruction. As it was, he there remained bottled up, until Grant's peculiar strategy had swung him round to Petersburg; and then the bottleimp was released. Seeing himself
eady front to the enemy, pressing rapidly on. Feeling that the fate of the whole cause was now vested in the little army left him to defend the great key-Atlanta-Johnston was great enough to resist the opportunities for glorious battle; to give up, without a struggle — which could only entail resultless waste of men — the rich tracts so valuable to us; to offer himself to the condemnation of unthinking censure-all to insure the safety of that vital organ of Confederate life. On the 14th June, the enemy pressed heavily against temporary works in Resaca Valley and was twice repulsed, with heavy loss. Then Johnston turned upon him and gained a decisive advantagedriving him two miles. On the two succeeding days, his attempts amounted to scarcely more than skirmishes; and on the third our troops resumed, unmolested, their retreat along the line of the Etowah. By the end of the month Johnston had taken up a strong position, with his center resting upon Kenesaw Mountain; while the
h heavy loss. Then Johnston turned upon him and gained a decisive advantagedriving him two miles. On the two succeeding days, his attempts amounted to scarcely more than skirmishes; and on the third our troops resumed, unmolested, their retreat along the line of the Etowah. By the end of the month Johnston had taken up a strong position, with his center resting upon Kenesaw Mountain; while the enemy had thrown up works, at some points nearer even than those at Petersburg. At dawn on the 27th, Sherman attacked along the whole line, directing his main strength to Kenesaw Mountain. He was repulsed decisively on both flanks and with especial slaughter in the center; losing over 3,500 men. Next day Cleburne's division defeated McPherson's corps in a severe fight, inflicting even heavier loss than it had sustained at Kenesaw Mountain. But these fights-while retarding the enemy's advance and causing him a loss three times our ownwere all nullified by Sherman's effective use of that fl
McPherson's corps in a severe fight, inflicting even heavier loss than it had sustained at Kenesaw Mountain. But these fights-while retarding the enemy's advance and causing him a loss three times our ownwere all nullified by Sherman's effective use of that flanking process, so strangely misused by his rival in Virginia. Those movements were but those of pawns upon the board; while the serious check to Johnston at Dalton — the flank movement upon his right — was repeated here. On the 4th of July he was flanked out of his mountain fastnesses and was falling back upon Atlanta. There is no stronger proof of the hold General Johnston had upon the masses of the people and of their respectful confidence in his great ability, than their reception of this news. They had watched his long retreat almost without a fight; had seen the enemy penetrate almost to the heart of Georgia, occupying rich tracts of our most pro-, ductive land, just ready for the harvest; and finally had heard hi
August 31st (search for this): chapter 37
o distinct armies-sending one, under Lieutenant-General Hardee, to Jonesboro, twenty-two miles away! Sherman, aware of the movement — which had in fact resulted from his threatening of Hood's flank-forced his superior numbers wedge-like into the gap, and effectually separated the wings. Then he struck in detail. Hardee, at Jonesboro, failed to make any impression upon him on the 1st of September, while Hood-weakened and unable to check his movements on the left — was forced, on the 31St August, to decide upon the evacuation of Atlanta! This fatal movement was accomplished on the evening of the 1st of September, without further loss; but the key to the Confederate cause — the sole barrier to the onward sweep of Sherman to the ocean --was in his hands at last! There may have been causes operating on General Hood that were not known to the people; for the results and their motive was shrouded in silence. His dispatch announcing the fall of the most important point was ver<
eloped by Grant. And there was more to be dreaded from his quiet and cautious approach-with its accompanying care for human life, that would preserve his army --than from any direct assault, however vigorous. This was proved at the very outset; for his advance on Dalton was a piece of military tact that-unlike Grant's at the Wilderness — was founded upon sound calculation. McPherson was thrown so far round to the South-west as seriously to threaten Johnston's communications; and by the 8th of June, the latter was forced to evacuate Dalton and retire down Resaca Valley toward the line of the Etowah river. This movement was accomplished with quiet and perfect ease;, keeping ever a steady front to the enemy, pressing rapidly on. Feeling that the fate of the whole cause was now vested in the little army left him to defend the great key-Atlanta-Johnston was great enough to resist the opportunities for glorious battle; to give up, without a struggle — which could only entail resu
was driven back from an assault on Lynchburg, and sent in disgraceful rout through West Virginia. Hampton, too, had done his share as ever in the long war. He had caught Sheridan at Trevellian's Station, and compelled him to retreat and entirely abandon his part of Grant's new programme; and a little later he came upon Kautz and Wilson — in a railroad raid below Petersburg-and defeated them disastrously, capturing their trains, artillery and a large proportion of their men. Thus, by July, these rough and repeated lessons had taught even General Grant that hammering with flesh and blood upon earthworks was too costly; that barn-burning and railroad-tearing cavalry were not effectual to reduce the city that had so laughed to scorn his brilliant tactics of the left flank! A more disgusted, if not a wiser man, he sat down and fortified for a regular siege; as fully convinced as ever that the blood of the soldiers was the seed of the war; as fixed in his theory that he could s
n those ceaseless killings into which Grant's strategy sent them. Nor was the immense superiority of numbers already shown, all. For this main advance-like every other of General Grant's-had cooperating columns all around it. Add to the men under his immediate command, those of the adjunct forces under his inspiration-Butler, 35,000, Hunter, 28,000 and Sigel, 10,000-and there foots up a grand total of 307,000 men! We may, therefore, consider that General Lee, in the summer campaign of 1864, kept at bay and nullified the attack of 307,000 men with scarcely one-fifth their number; not exceeding 63,000! Some time after the notes were made, from which these figures are condensed, two articles on Grant's campaign appeared in print-one in the New York World, the other, by Mr. Hugh Pleasants, in The land we love magazine. Writing from diametrically opposite standpoints, with data gathered from opposing sources, Mr. Pleasants and the World very nearly agree in their figuring; and i
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