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cked with desperation in the morning, by Lee's whole army. This expectation held us at high tension on the morning of the 5th, waiting for the Army of the Potomac to come up and secretly hoping in our interior confessionals that Lee would also waitrk corduroying roads, so that they could have something substantial to set foot on. At half-past 2 in the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of the Second Corps began to arrive in rear of our anxious, expectant, front-faced lines, and form in upon oumind that the Fifth Corps and the cavalry held Jetersville from the afternoon of the 4th of April to the afternoon of the 5th, in the face of Lee's whole army. But as things were before morning Sheridan returns the Fifth Corps to the command of Mee Army of the James by hard marches after splendid fighting in the old lines had reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th, and on the morning of the 6th was directed to destroy the High Bridge and all other bridges which might be used by Lee in
April 1st (search for this): chapter 7
. There were gathered also the fugitives from Pickett's and Johnson's Divisions, covered by the remainder of those divisions that had not been in the fight, --Hunton's Brigade of Pickett's Division, and Wise's, Gracie's (commanded by Colonel Sanford), and Fulton's of Johnson's Division, all under command of General R. H. Anderson. Their ultimate destination was to cover the enemy's right flank at Sutherland's Station. These would have been unpleasant fellows to camp with on the night of April 1st. Humphreys, finding the entrenchments in his front impregnable, at about midnight sent Miles up the White Oak Road to Sheridan. But at daylight Sheridan faced him right about, and with two divisions of the Fifth Corps following, pushed back down the White Oak Road to attack the Claiborne flank,--where we had left it on the night of the thirty-first. Meantime, this morning of April 2d saw the splendid and triumphant assault of our army upon the outer Petersburg defenses. Humphreys, l
April 2nd (search for this): chapter 7
t daylight Sheridan faced him right about, and with two divisions of the Fifth Corps following, pushed back down the White Oak Road to attack the Claiborne flank,--where we had left it on the night of the thirty-first. Meantime, this morning of April 2d saw the splendid and triumphant assault of our army upon the outer Petersburg defenses. Humphreys, learning of this at about nine o'clock, attacked the works in his own front along the eastern end of the White Oak Road, defended by McGowan's, Mis was the supreme opportunity for crushing the enemy. It is a little confusing to try to reconcile this testimony and explanation, with General Grant's statement in his official report, that learning the condition of things on the morning of April 2d, Sheridan returned Miles to his proper command. If so, why did Sheridan give Miles permission to attack at Sutherland's? And why, if the smashing up of the rebel right flank was so easy to achieve here, did he turn his back on Miles on the very
rs, born near or far, to be buried here by the lonely wayside, lost but unforgotten! We will look at these things with a more military eye, and something more of detail. When Meade had been sent off to Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th, Sheridan sent his cavalry in the opposite direction,--the way Meade had intended to go with his army,--towards Farmville, where we had learned from intercepted dispatches Lee expected to find rations for his famishing troops. The cavalry soon gomp-fires when we cooked frugal portions of precious coffee with cautious admixtures of turbid and possibly more deeply stained waters that came down to us from the ensanguined banks of Sailor's Creek. As soon as it was dark on the night of the 6th, Longstreet pushed forward to Farmville, where his men at last got a supply of rations. For two or three days past they had been living on parched corn,--if they could stop to make a fire to parch it. Longstreet did not tarry here; but on the mo
restless behavior on the extreme left had at least induced Lee to notify Davis on the evening of that day that he should be obliged to abandon his lines during the night and would endeavor to reach Danville, North Carolina. Davis anticipated him with military promptitude, and succeeded in getting off with his personal effects and the Confederate archives by the Danville Road. Grant had ordered a general assault on the interior lines of Petersburg and Richmond early on this morning of the 3d, but it was then discovered that they had been evacuated during the night. These places were immediately occupied by our troops, and General Warren was assigned to the command of the forces in and around Petersburg and City Point. The order given by Lee for the general retreat had been put into execution early in the evening of the 2d; Longstreet and the troops that had been in our main front, including also Gordon's Corps, had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, directing their cou
ars, however, that Lee being informed by Rooney Lee, his son, that Sheridan had a heavy force of infantry here, gave up the attack and turned his columns off by a more northerly route, sending his trains by the best protected roads towards the Danville communications. So narrow was our chance of being confronted by Lee's whole army. And so great was our satisfaction at Lee's opinion of the Fifth Corps. Our Second and Sixth Corps had been trying to follow the Fifth all the morning of the 4th, but had been stopped a long way back by one of those common, and therefore presumably necessary, but unspeakably vexatious, incidents of a forced march,--somebody else cutting in on the road, claiming to have the right of way. The cavalry had come in on them from one of the river-crossings where they had been heading off Lee from his nearest road to Amelia Court House, and precedence being given the cavalry in order, our infantry corps had to mass up and wait till they could get the road.
April 6th (search for this): chapter 7
of the affront offered him by the false charge of an intended right flank movement which would lead him past the enemy's rear? Or lamenting in helpless agony the lost opportunity of striking a decisive blow at Lee's last vital stand had he not been sent off by Grant and Sheridan to Amelia Court House whence Lee had already fled? For it was well known to some whose business it was to know, that Meade had planned to move in a very different direction and on shorter lines on the morning of April 6th, and strike Longstreet at Rice's Station on the Lynchburg Road where there is every reason to believe he would have brought about the beginning of the end. Alas for Meade! He never saw his army together again,--not even in the grand review at Washington,--from which time too he sunk from sight. To return to our story it will be borne in mind that the Fifth Corps and the cavalry held Jetersville from the afternoon of the 4th of April to the afternoon of the 5th, in the face of Lee's w
April 4th (search for this): chapter 7
rent direction and on shorter lines on the morning of April 6th, and strike Longstreet at Rice's Station on the Lynchburg Road where there is every reason to believe he would have brought about the beginning of the end. Alas for Meade! He never saw his army together again,--not even in the grand review at Washington,--from which time too he sunk from sight. To return to our story it will be borne in mind that the Fifth Corps and the cavalry held Jetersville from the afternoon of the 4th of April to the afternoon of the 5th, in the face of Lee's whole army. But as things were before morning Sheridan returns the Fifth Corps to the command of Meade, an act which he states he afterwards regretted --a conciliatory phrase which had become habitual. Assured by him that Lee's army is at Amelia Court House, Grant orders Meade to move out in that direction in the order of battle in which his corps were already formed, to attack the enemy in position there, while Sheridan with the cavalry
April 8th (search for this): chapter 7
ealized the effects of Grant's permission to push things, --some of these things being ourselves. But the manifest results on others helped our spirits to sustain the wear and tear of body. The constantly diminishing ratio of the strength of Lee's army compared with ours made it clear that we should soon overcome that resistance and relieve Virginia of the burden of being the head of the Confederacy, and from that must follow the downfall of the Confederacy itself. In this race, the 8th of April found the Fifth Corps at Prospect Station on the Southside Railroad, nearly abreast of Lee's hurrying column, ten miles north of us at New Store, across the Appomattox,--Meade with his two corps close upon his rear. We had been now a week in hot pursuit, fighting and marching by sharp turns, on a long road. At noon of this day we halted to give opportunity for General Ord of the Army of the James to have the advance of us upon the road. He had come across from his successful assault o
March 31st (search for this): chapter 7
rwards regretted giving up this division, as I believe the enemy could at the time have been crushed at Sutherland's depot. I returned to Five Forks, and marched out the Ford Road towards Hatcher's Run. Two things are to be noted here: the reason why Sheridan did not join the attack here, but released himself from the fight and Miles from his jurisdiction; and also his belief that this was the place at which to crush the enemy. Some of the rest of us had thought the same way on the 31st of March. This testimony is also confirmed by the opinion of the modest Humphreys, who cannot help saying that if the Second Corps could have been permitted to continue its march in the morning, the whole force of the enemy there would probably have been captured. This cumulative testimony shows what was lost by the antipathy of polarities, in the presence of Miles, the mysterious repellant. In reflecting on the probabilities of Meade's motive in ordering Humphreys away from Miles' Division
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