[1012b]
[1]
so that if they are
impossible in combination they are also impossible individually. And
again obviously there are contrary statements, which cannot be true at
the same time. Nor can they all be false, although from what we have
said, this might seem more possible.But in opposing all such theories we must
demand, as was said in our discussion above,1
not that something should be or not be, but some significant
statement; and so we must argue from a definition, having first
grasped what "falsehood" or "truth" means. And if to assert what is
true is nothing else than to deny what is false, everything cannot be
false; for one part of the contradiction must be true.Further, if everything must be
either asserted or denied, both parts cannot be false; for one and
only one part of the contradiction is false. Indeed, the consequence
follows which is notorious in the case of all such theories, that they
destroy themselves;for he
who says that everything is true makes the opposite theory true too,
and therefore his own untrue (for the opposite theory says that his is
not true); and he who says that everything is false makes himself a
liar.And if they
make exceptions, the one that the opposite theory alone is not true,
and the other that his own theory alone is not false,
[20]
it follows none the less that they
postulate an infinite number of true and false statements. For the
statement that the true statement is true is also true; and this will
go on to infinity.Nor, as is obvious, are those right who
say that all things are at rest; nor those who say that all things are
in motion. For if all things are at rest, the same things will always
be true and false, whereas this state of affairs is obviously subject
to change; for the speaker himself once did not exist, and again he
will not exist. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true,
so everything will be false; but this has been proved to be
impossible.Again, it
must be that which is that changes, for change is from
something into something. And further, neither is it true that all
things are at rest or in motion sometimes, but nothing continuously;
for there is something 2 which always moves that which is
moved, and the "prime mover" is itself unmoved.3
2 The sphere of the fixed stars; cf. Aristot. Met. 12.6, 12.7.1, 12.8.18.
3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.7.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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