Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

which has some resemblance to the licentiousness of adults. Which of the two takes its name from the other is of no importance for the present enquiry, but it would seem clear that the state which comes later in life must be named from the one which comes earlier. [6] The metaphor appears apt enough, since it is that which desires what is disgraceful and whose appetites grow apace that needs chastisement or pruning,¹ and this description applies in the fullest degree to desire, as it does to the child. For children, like profligates, live at the prompting of desire; and the appetite for pleasure is strongest in childhood, so that if it be not disciplined and made obedient to authority, it will make great headway. [7] In an irrational being the appetite for pleasure is insatiable and undiscriminating, and the innate tendency is fostered by active gratification; indeed, if such gratification be great and intense it actually overpowers the reason. Hence our indulgences should be moderate and few, and never opposed to principle— [8] this is what we mean by ‘well-disciplined’ and ‘chastened—; and the appetitive part of us should be ruled by principle, just as a boy should live in obedience to his tutor. [9] Hence in the temperate man the appetitive element must be in harmony with principle. For （1） the aim of both Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and （2） the temperate man desires the right thing in the right way at the right time, which is what principle ordains. [10]

Let this then be our account of Temperance.