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11. It is also the
business of the political philosopher to examine the nature of Pleasure and Pain; for he
is the master-craftsman, and lays down the end which is the standard whereby we pronounce
things good or bad in the absolute sense.
[2]
Moreover this
investigation is fundamental for our study, because we have established1 that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned
with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of
Happiness, which is why the word denoting ‘supreme bliss’ is derived
from the verb meaning ‘to enjoy.’2
[3]
Now （1） some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether
essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.
（2） Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.
（3） There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good,
nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.3
[4]
（1） To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that
（a） Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but
a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the
process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built.
（b） The temperate man avoids pleasures.
（c） The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.
（d） Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so
the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything
while indulging in it.
（e） There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an
art which produces it.
（f） Children
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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