Plato, Theaetetus, section 160c

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[160c] it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

Theaetetus
Yes, quite so, Socrates.

Socrates
Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

Theaetetus
Of course.

Socrates
Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

Theaetetus
So it seems.

Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921.

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