[97]
And I, when quite a
young man, established this principle when I was pleading against Cotta, the most eloquent man
of our city. When I was defending the liberty of a woman of Arretium, and when Cotta had suggested a scruple to the decemvirs that our action was not a regular one, because the rights of citizenship
had been taken from the Arretines, and when I argued rather vehemently that rights of
citizenship could not be taken away, at the first hearing the decemvirs gave no decision; afterwards, when they had inquired into, and
deliberated on, the subject, they decided that our action was quite regular. And this was
decided, though Cotta spoke in opposition to it, and while Sulla was alive. But now on the
other cities, why need I tell you how all men who are in the same circumstances proceed by
law, and prosecute their rights, and all avail themselves of the civil law without the
slightest hesitation on the part of any one, whether magistrate or judge, learned man or
ignorant one? There is not one of you who doubts this.
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