E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι] ‘worthy and respectable people’. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες. The primary sense of ἐπιεικής is therefore ‘equitable’, one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the better disposition of the two, ἐπιεικής is ‘transferred’ by metaphor (i.e. the μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of ‘good’.

ἁπλῶς] has various usages. It may for instance mean (I) ‘simply’, opposed to συνθέσει or κατὰ συμπλοκήν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἁπλᾶ σώματα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἁπλῶς, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote ‘singly, or simply, by itself’ (καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes ‘simplicity’ (of composition), ‘singleness’ of heart and purpose, as opposed to ‘duplicity’, (Plat. Rep. III 397 E, οὐ διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλῶ λέγειν τἀληθὲς ἀεὶ κοὐ διπλοῦς πέφυκ᾽ ἀνήρ. Ruhnk. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) simpliciter et sine exceptione ‘generally’ or ‘universally’, as opposed to καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ‘specially’, ‘particularly’, ‘individually’, Eth. N. I 1, 1095 a 1, or to ἔστιν ὡς ‘partially’, or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, in general terms—we must now come to particulars. Hence it signifies ‘altogether’, ‘absolutely’, omnino, as οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ‘none at all’, de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδύνατον ὅλως ‘absolutely impossible’. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, Comm. on Organ. Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ᾽ αὑτόν, and opposed to πρός τι, ‘the relative’. In this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 b 33, ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἁπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 22 and b 37, where τὸ ἁπλῶς and μὴ ἁπλῶς are opposed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4, 83 a 15, κατηγορεῖν μὲν μὴ ἁπλῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 3, Polit. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 17, καὶ ἁπλῶς (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ἡμῖν (relatively to us).

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 a 21, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι... λίαν ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματευθησαν “treated the subject too simply”, i. e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient elaboration; ‘negligenter’, Bonitz ad loc. q. v. On the various modes in which ἁπλῶς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος] ‘is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion’. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀντίδοσις §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony's speech in Fulius Caesar, Act III Sc. 2, “I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts,” &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the ‘authority’ or ‘influence’ exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our ‘sovereign’, as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, Comm. p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, ‘ratio e iudiciis et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui ἀκύρῳ oppositus est, lex est quae rata viget &c.—ita hic κύρια ὀνόματα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.’ This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima II 8, 3, 419 b 19, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, where κύριος may be interpreted ‘absolute master’, the air and water are not absolute masters of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. Ib. 419 b 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν.