E. M. Cope, Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle

The verbs ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The aorist infin, gives ὑπάρξαι here a future sense, ‘to become or to be made’, which does not naturally, ex vi verbi, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise de Part. ἄν IV, 2, Opuscula, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infin. without ἄν, after verbs such as δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, οἴεσθαι, φάναι, ἐλπίζειν, προσδοκᾶν, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as δοκεῖν πεσεῖσθαι, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with ἄν, πίπτειν ἄν, πεσεῖν ἄν, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infin. without ἄν, πίπτειν, or πεσεῖν, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, πίπτει and ἔπεσε, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; caducum esse. The distinction between the present and aorist infinitive is this: ‘Praesentis autem et aoristi infinitivis, sive accedat ἄν sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transeunti, praesens duranti adhibeatur.’

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. Permanence (‘duranti’) does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say ‘this has been’ up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infin. in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infin. ‘to do’ is the naked conception of ‘doing’ without any connotation of time (so the present infinit. with the definite article stands for a substantive; τὸ εἶναι is the mere notion of being). The aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of habit, implying liability, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, δοκῶ πεσεῖσθαι, ‘I think it will fall’, at some future time, and nothing more: δοκῶ πίπτειν or πεσεῖν ἄν, ‘I think it could, would, or might fall’, under certain conditions; δοκῶ πίπτειν, ‘I think the notion of falling belongs to it’, ‘I think it may fall’; that is, that it is liable, or likely, to fall, caducum esse: and δοκῶ πεσεῖν, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untranslatable; as in such a case as νοεῖς δρᾶσαι (Soph. Phil. 918), ‘what dost thou intend to do’, where the expression of the liability must needs be omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when Sophocles writes νοεῖς δρᾶσαι: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, δρᾷν νοεῖς. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and aorist infin., it may be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordinary phrase δεῖ λαβεῖν (it occurs, for instance, II 8, 12). It is quite certain that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition to the abstract conception of ‘taking up, acquiring’—as representing the previous formation of the opinion, which has been taken up before. But at all events no one would think of translating δεῖ λαβεῖν in any other form than that of the simple verb ‘to assume or suppose’.

ἥ τις ἐνδέχεται] ἐνδέχεσθαι is here used, as is customary with other writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an impersonal. Comp. note on c. 2, 14.

ἢ καὶ οὓς ἐπίδοξον] ‘or indeed of those with whom war may be expected’. Supply for the sense, ἢ καὶ (δεῖ εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν τούτων) πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον (ἡμῖν or ἡμᾶς) πολεμεῖν. ἐπίδοξος, ‘subject to, liable to expectation’, ἐπί penes, note on I 1, 7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. Similarly ἐπίδικος, subject to a δίκη, ἐπιζήμιος infr. I 14, 7, II 23, 21, ἐπαίτιος liable to blame, ἐπάξιος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπιθάνατος (Demosth.), ἐπίκληρος, ἐπισφαλές (liable to trip) Pol. II 5, ἐπίμαχος, ἐπίβατος, ἐπίδρομος. This notion is more directly expressed by ὑπό in composition, ὑπόδικος, ὑπεύθυνος, &c.

εἰρηνεύηται] εἰρηνεύειν, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B, and in other authors, is properly transitive, ‘to bring into a state of peace, pacificate, or reconcile’ contending parties, and hence employed here as a passive.

ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς] Note on I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I 1, 12 p. 22, δἰ αὐτῶν: 1 7, 35, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (τῶν ὁμόρων ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι) πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνό- μοιαι (εἰσι ταῖς οἰκείαις). This rule is well illustrated by Archidamus' comparative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory to engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3.

πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι] properly contrasted. πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ‘to have too much or too little’, ‘more or less than your due’. So in Thucyd. I 77, ἐλασσοῦσθαι and πλεονεκτεῖσθαι (the irregular passive of πλεονεκτεῖν) represent the same notion, ‘to come by the worse, or to be overreached’. And so here, ‘for in this point also we may be at an advantage or disadvantage’.

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ.] ‘for similar circumstances are naturally followed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results’.