James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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οἷόν τέ τι. The reading of A τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε involves the separation of ὅθεν from γέγονε, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider's περὶ τούτου ἅκουε τί οἴονται, καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οἷόν τε and οἴονται occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on 1 329 E), but the specific reference in ὃ ἔφην πρῶτον ἐρεῖν to 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι points to the presence of οἷον here. The reading οἷόν τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τί in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οἷόν τέ τι (SC. ἐστί), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τί) wrongly inserted before οἶόν (where it remained in Π), οἷον itself being afterwards changed to ὄν in order to provide a kind of construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises,’ J. and C.). This ὄν was itself fortified by τυγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell's suggestion that “τί ὄν τε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί” is improbable: still less can Herwerden and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker's conjecture τί τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests ἄκουέ τι, οἷόν τε καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centralblatt 1898 p. 296 οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστί κτλ.

358E - 359B Glauco will first describe the origin and nature of Justice according to the theory which he has undertaken to maintain. According to nature, to commit injustice is a good, to suffer injustice an evil. But as there is more evil in suffering than good in committing injustice, experience causes men to enter into a compact neither to commit nor suffer wrong. The collective prescriptions of this compact are called Law and Justice. Justiceis accordingly a compromise between the best policy, i.e. doing wrong without incurring any penalty, and the worst, i.e. suffering wrong without being able to exact vengeance. No one will accept the compromise who is strong enough to do wrong successfully.

ff. In thus resuscitating the theory of Thrasymachus, Glauco removes a serious stumbling-block by introducing the distinction between φύσις and νόμος. Civilisation revolts against the anti-social doctrines of Thrasymachus in their application to itself, but receives them more favourably when its own existence is safeguarded by relegating them to an age anterior to society. The view maintained by Glauco is allied to that of Callicles in Gorg. 482 E ff.; and it has already been pointed out (on 1 337 A, 344 B) that similar views were tolerably widely entertained in Plato's time. To the evidence previously adduced may be added Laws 690 B, 889 E, Eur. Phoen. 509 and Frag. 912 ἡ φύσις ἐβούλεθ᾽ ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει. But whereas the doctrine of Callicles breaks down in explaining the origin of Law (Gorg. 483 C, cf. 488 D—489 D), Glauco's theory endeavours to solve this difficulty by postulating a social contract. A kindred solution is ascribed by Aristotle to the Sophist Lycophron: Pol. Γ 1280^{b} 10 ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων. The theory of a Social Contract was revived by Epicurus: see D. L. X 150. The views of the “incomplete Protagoreans” in Theaet. 172 B (with which cf. Laws 889 E), though they do not offer an explanation of the origin of Law, are parallel in so far as they regard it as depending for its binding force solely upon the sanction of society.

πεφυκέναι γὰρ -- κακόν. Cf. Gorg. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. That the natural relation between man and man is one of war is a view expressed in Laws 626 A ἢν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. A similar theory is contained in the myth of Protagoras (Prot. 322 B ff.).

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις κτλ.: i.e. (according to the theory of Callicles) τοῖς ἀσθενέσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς (Gorg. 483 B). In place of δοκεῖ in 359 A I have adopted Ast's conjecture δοκεῖν. Throughout this paragraph Glauco consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν 360 D, and for the error itself Introd. § 5.