Chapter 12: Boonsboro or South Mountain, and Harper's Ferry
- Choice of moves. -- interior lines. -- policy of invasion. -- across the Potomac. -- affairs in Washington. -- McClellan succeeds Pope. -- Lee's Proclamation. -- organizations and strength. -- Harper's Ferry garrison. -- orders no. 191. -- the army Scatters. -- the lost order. -- Lee warned. -- battle of Boonsboro or South Mountain. -- Longstreet Arrives. -- the retreat. -- Crampton's Gap. -- Franklin attacks. -- Jackson before Harper's Ferry. -- preparations for assault. -- bombardment and surrender. -- borrowed wagons. -- paroles and colors. -- casualties.
The enemy having taken refuge within lines impregnable to assault, Lee had no alternative but to take the offensive elsewhere. He could not afford to sit down before Washington and await the enemy's pleasure. There were two openings for offensive operations, each with some chances of success. The safest would have been to withdraw behind the Rappahannock, where he might occupy a strong line with one-half of his forces, under Jackson, while the other half, under himself and Longstreet, was sent by railroad to Chattanooga via Bristol. At the time, in Tennessee, the Confederates were conducting two campaigns aimed at Louisville; the design being to drive the Federals from Kentucky. Kirby Smith, with an army of about 15,000, from Knoxville, had opened the road through Cumberland Gap, and on Aug. 30 had won a victory over a Federal force at Richmond, Ky., and on Sept. 2 had occupied Lexington. Bragg, with about 30,000 men, from Chattanooga had moved northward up the Sequatchie Valley, and, crossing the Cumberland Mountains, was, on Sept. 5, at Sparta, Tenn., turning the Federal position at Murfreesboro, where Buell was in command with about 50,000 men. Such a movement by Lee would have been utilizing our ‘Interior Lines,’ the one game in which the Confederacy had an advantage over the Federals. On a small scale it had been
