Xxv.
In the meantime, before Earl Russell's dispatch was
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379]
received in
Washington, or any possibility of news of the state of feeling in
England could have reached here,
Mr. Seward,
Secretary of State, wrote to
Mr. Adams, our Minister at
London, an account of what had occurred, and stated that ‘
Captain Wilkes acted without any instructions from the government, and he trusted that there would be no difficulty in adjusting the matter, if the
British Government should be disposed to meet the case in the same pacific spirit which animated the
President and his administration.’
By a singular coincidence, this letter was read by
Mr. Adams to Earl Russell on the very same day that Lord Lyons had read the
English Secretary's demand to
Mr. Seward.
It was then in the power of Earl Russell to make the purport of
Mr. Seward's letter known, which would at once have allayed the war fever which the
British ministry had done everything in their power to inflame.
But this was not done.
In speaking of this,
Mr. Dana remarks:
The truth seems to be that, so long as they were uncertain whether their menace of war might not lead to war, they could not afford to withdraw the chief motive for the war spirit in the British people, and admit that their warlike demonstration had been needless.
Their popular support depended upon the general belief in a necessity for their having accompanied their demand with the preparations and menace of war.
This conduct of the
British government subsequently cost her a large portion of the respect of the civilized world.
In
Count de Gasparin's L'Amerique devant l'europe, in which that eminent publicist treats the whole question with consummate learning and ability, he remarks:
Between great nations, between sister nations, it was a strange
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opening.
The usage is hardly to commence with an ultimatum—that is, to commence with the end. Ordinarily, when there has been a misunderstanding or regrettable act, especially when that act comes within a portion of the Law of Nations which is yet full of obscurity, the natural opening is to ask for explanations as to the intentions, and for reparation for what has been done, without mixing therewith an immediate menace of rupture.
It is astonishing that a demand of apology should figure in the original programme, where it was entirely out of place.
Seeing such haste, and proclamation so lofty of an exigence above debate; seeing the idea of an impious war accepted with so much ease by some, and with such joy so little dissembled by others, Europe declared without ambiguity or reserve, that if England were not miraculously saved from her own undertaking—that if she went so far as to fire a cannon at the North as an ally of the South, she would tear with her own hands her principal titles to the respect of the civilized world; for from the moment that England becomes only the ally of Slave-traders, she has abdicated.
But the wisest council prevailed in
Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet.
A very brief examination of the case showed that the act of
Captain Wilkes could, under no circumstances, be sustained; and that the surrender of the prisoners, with or without a demand from the
British Government, would be only in strict conformity with the precedents which had been established by our own government.
Consequently, without any regard to popular clamor,
Mr. Lincoln peremptorily ordered a release of the
Rebel Commissioners, who had been confined in
Fort Warren, in
Boston harbor; and that portion of the precious freight of which the steamer
Trent had been relieved, was handed over to the
British Government, much to the regret of the war party of
Great Britain.
Before this had taken place, however,
Mr. Sumner, who had received letters from distinguished friends of
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America in
England, read them, to the
President, and his Cabinet.
One from
Richard Cobden, January 23, 1862, said:—‘It is perhaps well that you settle the matter by sending away the men at once;
consistently with your own principles, you could not have justified their detention.’
Mr. Sumner's speech in the Senate—to which his position as chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs gave additional weight—soon followed, and it settled the opinion of the world on that subject forever.
His mild rebuke of
Mr. Hale's patriotic, but indiscreet motion and speech, had induced that
Senator to withdraw the
Resolution, for he had treated the whole matter on
a hypothesis, by assuming that
Great Britain had made an arrogant demand, when he knew nothing of the sort.
‘Who in the Senate,’ inquired
Mr. Sumner, ‘knows it?
Who in the country knows it?
I don't believe it—will not believe it, except on evidence.
I submit, therefore, that the
Senator acted too swiftly.’
We need not make any quotations from this exhaustive speech.
The object of its delivery was fully accomplished, and
England had the mortification of learning that we had acted
right, without any reference to her threats or demands.
There was no end to the congratulations
Mr. Sumner received from his countrymen, and from the illuminated statesmen of all
European countries.
He showed me whole stacks of letters, journals, reviews, of which he remarked: ‘The grand source of satisfaction is, that we have done right: and I shall live long enough, I hope, to read these through some time.’
