Col. J. Stoddard Johnston, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 9.1, Kentucky
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

[221] the defense of the valley of Mississippi. The passage is almost completed, and the head of my column is already with General Bragg at Corinth. The movement was deemed too hazardous by the most experienced members of my staff, but the object warranted the risk. The difficulty of effecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it approaches completion. Day after to-morrow, unless the enemy intercepts me, my force will be with Bragg and my army nearly 50,000 strong. This must be destroyed before the enemy can attain his object.

I have given you this sketch so that you may appreciate the embarrassments which surrounded me in my attempts to avert or remedy the disaster of Donelson before alluding to the conduct of the generals.

When the force was detached I was in hopes that such dispositions would be made as to enable the forces to defend the fort or withdraw without sacrificing the army. On the 14th I ordered General Floyd by telegram, ‘if he lost the fort, to get his troops back to Nashville.’ It is possible that this might have been done; but justice requires to look at events as they appeared at the time, and not alone by the light of subsequent information. All the facts in relation to the surrender will be transmitted to the secretary of war as soon as they can be collected in obedience to his order. It appears from the information received that General Buckner, being the junior officer, took the lead in advising the surrender and General Floyd acquiesced, and they all concurred in the belief that their force could not maintain the position. Subsequent events show that the investment was not so complete as the information from their scouts had led them to believe. The council resulted in the surrender. The command was irregularly transferred and devolved on the junior general; but not apparently to avoid any just responsibility, or from any want of personal or moral intrepidity.

The blow was most disastrous and almost without remedy. I thereupon in my first report remained silent. This silence you were kind enough to attribute to my generosity. I will not lay claim to the motive to excuse my course. I observed silence, as it seemed to me the best way to serve the cause and the country. The facts were not fully known, discontent prevailed, and criticism or condemnation was more likely to augment than cure the evil. I refrained, knowing that heavy censures