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MY design in this essay is to treat of that virtue
which is called and accounted moral, and is chiefly distinguished from the contemplative, in its having for the
matter thereof the passions of the mind, and for its form,
right reason; and herein to consider the nature of it and
how it subsists, and whether that part of the soul wherein
it resides be endowed with reason of its own, inherent in
itself, or whether it participates of that which is foreign;
and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of
those things which are mingled with what is better than
themselves, or whether, as being distinct itself but yet under
the dominion and superintendency of another, it may be
said to partake of the power of the predominant faculty.
For that it is possible for virtue to exist and continue altogether independent of matter, and free from all mixture,
I take to be most manifest. But in the first place I. conceive it may be very useful briefly to run over the opinions
of other philosophers, not so much for the vanity of giving
an historical account thereof, as that, they being premised,
ours may thence receive the greater light and be more
firmly established.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 3.
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