[13]
You reply that if I had been allowed my freedom, I should have made off without awaiting my trial—as though you had forced me to enter this country against my will. Yet if I attached no importance to being debarred from Athens for the future, it was equally open to me either to disregard the summons to appear in court and so lose the case by default, or to avail myself of the right given to every one of leaving the country after making the first speech for the defense.1 You, however, for purely personal reasons, are trying to rob me, and me alone, of a privilege accorded to every Greek, by framing a law to suit yourself.
1 i.e., the prosecution justify their choice of an ἀπαγωγή rather than a δίκη φόνου by claiming that only thus could the defendant be prevented from slipping through their fingers. The defendant objects to this on two grounds: （a） The prosecution have no reason to assume that they would not have faced a δίκη φόνου if left at liberty. In fact, he cut himself off from Athens by so defaulting, and that was a strong deterrent. （b） In any case, it was recognized that the defendant in a δίκη φόνου had the right of withdrawing into exile either before or during the trial. The speaker is of course careful not to remind the court that he is an alien, whose position is not necessarily the same as that of an Athenian citizen charged with murder.
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