[992a] [1]

Further, why should a number <of units>, taken together, be one thing? And further, in addition to the above objections, if the units are unlike, they should be treated as the thinkers who assume two or four elements treat those elements; for not one of them applies the term "element" to the common substrate, e.g. body, but to fire and earth—whether there is a common substrate (i.e. body) or not.1As it is, the One is spoken of as though it were homogeneous, like fire or water. But if this is so, the numbers will not be substances. And if there is an absolute One which is a principle, clearly the term "one" is ambiguous; otherwise this is impossible.2

When we wish to refer substances to their principles we derive lines3 from "Long and Short," a kind of "Great and Small"; and the plane from "Wide and Narrow," and the solid body from "Deep and Shallow." But in this case how can the plane contain a line,or the solid a line and a plane? for "Wide and Narrow" and "Deep and Shallow" are different genera. Nor is Number contained in these objects (because "Many and Few" is yet another class); and in the same way it is clear that none of the other higher genera will be contained in the lower. Nor, again, is the Broad the genus of which the Deep is a species; for then body would be a kind of plane. [20] Further, how will it be possible for figures to contain points?4 Plato steadily rejected this class of objects as a geometrical fiction, but he recognized "the beginning of a line," and he frequently assumed this latter class, i.e. the " indivisible lines."5 But these must have some limit; and so by the same argument which proves the existence of the line, the point also exists.6

In general, although Wisdom is concerned with the cause of visible things, we have ignored this question (for we have no account to give of the cause from which change arises),7 and in the belief that we are accounting for their substance we assert the existence of other substances; but as to how the latter are the substances of the former, our explanation is worthless—for "participation," as we have said before,8 means nothing.And as for that which we can see to be the cause in the sciences, and through which all mind and all nature works—this cause9 which we hold to be one of the first principles—the Forms have not the slightest bearing upon it either. Philosophy has become mathematics for modern thinkers,10 although they profess11 that mathematics is only to be studied as a means to some other end.

1 In the Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 320b 23Aristotle says that there is not.

2 This last sentence shows that in what goes before A. has been regarding the Platonic One as a unit. If this is so, he says, substance cannot be composed of it. If on the other hand the One is something different from the unit, they ought to make this clear.

3 The lines, planes, and solids here discussed are probably the Ideal lines, etc., which are immediately posterior to the Idea-Numbers. Cf. 30, Aristot. Met. 13.6.10, Aristot. Met. 13.9.2, and see Introduction.

4 Lines, planes, and solids are generated from varieties of the Great and Small, but points cannot be, having no magnitude; how, then, can the latter be present in the former?

5 That Plato denied the existence of the point and asserted that of indivisible lines is not directly stated elsewhere, but the same views are ascribed to Xenocrates, and were attacked in the treatise Xenocrates De lineis insecabilibus. See Ross ad loc.

6 Sc. if the point is the limit of the line.

9 The final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.9-10.

10 e.g. Speusippus, for whom see Aristot. Met. 7.2.4.